Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · blog0.763

   Accordingly, Allison needn’t intend to deceive herself nor believe at any point that her daughter, in fact, has learning difficulties. If we think someone like Allison is self-deceived, then self-deception requires neither contradictory beliefs nor intentions regarding the acquisition or retention of the self-deceptive belief. Such approaches are ‘deflationary’ in the sense that they take self-deception to be explicable without reaching for exotic cognitive architecture since neither intentions nor dual-beliefs are required to account for self-deception. (For more on the dual-belief requiremen…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/self-deception.md

2. 02 · blog0.757

   The young woman who thinks that her father has been replaced by an impostor would form this belief because she has reduced autonomic response to familiar faces (factor 1), and this affects her capacity to recognize the face of the man in front of her as her father’s face, even if she can judge that the face is identical (or virtually identical) to that of her father. But this unusual event (due to a reduction of autonomic response) is not the only factor responsible for the formation of the Capgras delusion. In order to explain why the thought that a dear one has been replaced by an impostor i…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/delusion.md

3. 03 · blog0.748

   Initially, such a model may not appear promising for self-deception since simply being mistaken about p or accidentally causing oneself to be mistaken about p doesn’t seem to be self-deception at all but some sort of innocent error. Non-intentionalists, however, argue that in cases of self-deception, the false belief is not accidental but, rather, motivated by desire (Mele 2001), emotion (Lazar 1999), anxiety (Johnston 1988; Barnes 1997), or some other attitude regarding p or related to p . So, for instance, when Allison believes, against the preponderance of evidence available to her, that he…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/self-deception.md

4. 04 · blog0.744

   The lowest of the created intellects—namely, the Agent Intellect—creates the form and matter of the sublunary world, as well as the rational souls of individual human beings. Avicenna adapts his account of emanation from al-Fārābī (870–950), known among the philosophers as the “Second Teacher”, though his version of emanation differs from that of al-Fārābī in several ways (Davidson 1992). Avicenna’s hierarchical account of agency acknowledges the superiority of divine causation and identifies the differences between creative and non-creative efficient causes. Still, it supports his earlier sug…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/causation-in-arabic-and-islamic-thought.md

5. 05 · gutenberg0.741

   Evolutionary Psychology demands a Mind-dust. Some alleged proofs that it exists. Refutation of these proofs. Self-compounding of mental facts is inadmissible. Can states of mind be unconscious? Refutation of alleged proofs of unconscious thought. Difficulty of stating the connection between mind and brain. 'The Soul' is logically the least objectionable hypothesis. Conclusion.

   gutenberg/PG-57628-the-principles-of-psychology-volume-1-of-2/PG-57628.txt

6. 06 · blog0.735

   But the hypothesis that an evil demon is deceiving me attributes mysterious, unexplained powers to the supposed evil demon. Perhaps for these reasons, the skeptical hypotheses most widely used today are variations on the idea that I am a bodiless brain in a vat whose neuro-chemical receptors are stimulated by a super-computer in the same way that the neuro-chemical receptors of an ordinary embodied brain are stimulated. Suppose \(p\) is a statement about the world around me that I believe. Then a skeptical hypothesis H , such as I am dreaming , an evil demon is deceiving me , and I am a bodile…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/content-externalism-and-skepticism.md

7. 07 · blog0.735

   Further, recent literature on whether people with delusions can be vulnerable to epistemic injustice, suggests that the presence of delusions does not undermine agency (Sanati and Kyratsous 2015). The etiological answer to the question why delusions are pathological in (vi) needs to be better explored. So far, the consensus seems to be that reasoning biases affect neurotypical reasoning, and are not present only in people with delusions. Perceptual anomalies can explain the formation of some delusions, but are not always a core factor in the formation of all delusions. A problem with hypothesi…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/delusion.md

8. 08 · blog0.735

   The traditional way of distinguishing primary from secondary delusions relied on the notion that primary delusions ‘arise out of nowhere’ (Jaspers 1963). This traditional characterization of the distinction is problematic, because it is difficult to establish whether there are antecedents of the delusion, and for other methodological and clinical reasons (e.g., Miller and Karoni 1996, p. 489). A delusion may arise out of our previous adverse experience that is not known to other, and some studies show that even very unusual beliefs can be made sense of in the context of our lives (Gunn and Lar…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/delusion.md

9. 09 · _intake0.733

   The lesson for us to learn here isn’t necessarily that viruses and bacteria directly damage the fetal neocortex. Rather,** the mother’s attempt to repel invaders, her inflammatory response to the insult, seems to be at fault.** Research by Paul Patterson, an expert in neuro-immunity at Caltech, demonstrates this important principle. When we inflaming pregnant mice artificially, without any living infective agent, it prompts behavioral problems in the young mice offspring. In this simplistic model, autism results from collateral damage of neuro-immune activation. It’s an unintended consequence …

   _intake/kruse-blog-corpus/articles/energy-epigenetics-8-autism.md

10. 10 · blog0.732

    By stipulating a category of human beings with radical cognitive disabilities, we seek to avoid difficult empirical issues about the extent to which individuals classified as having serious cognitive disabilities actually lack the psychological functions held to confer moral status. Even the most direct assessments of these functions may fail to recognize atypical, especially nonverbal, forms of cognitive functioning. And with the possible exception of extreme cases like anencephaly, there are formidable difficulties in inferring a lack of cognitive capacity from a lack of specific behavior or…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/cognitive-disability-and-moral-status.md