history then we know everything about the future already just by knowing the present in its totality and whitehead's saying that's never the case because there's always this ingression
- Source
- Idea Cast Episode Twenty Nine Bernardo Kastrup In Dialogue With Matthew D Segall. · 01:39:30.639 ↗
- Concept
- whitehead
- Score
- 8 · always · never · because
- Status
- candidate — not yet promoted to canon
Corpus evidence — top 10 passages
Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).
- 01 · blog0.801
Furthermore, from the very nature of the case the general notion of physical object “cannot have been derived by abstraction from observed instances of it, as the notion of ‘red’ no doubt has been.” [ 9 ] In fact, general concept of a physical object “is not ‘got out of’ experience until it has been ‘put into’ experience. It is best described as an innate principle of interpretation which we apply to the data of sense-perception” (1925, p. 217). 3. Time It is possible to distinguish roughly three different phases in Broad’s philosophy of time. In his (1921a) Broad defends a Russellian theory o…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/charlie-dunbar-broad.md
- 02 · blog0.800
[ 4 ] It may be this picture of passage that the great logician Kurt Gödel had in mind when he wrote (1949, p. 558): “The existence of an objective lapse of time … means (or, at least, is equivalent to the fact) that reality consists of an infinity of layers of ‘now’ which come into existence successively.” There is an ambiguity in this last quote, however, that we must note. Did Gödel think that the layers of now come into existence (as what is to be becomes what is now) and then immediately cease to exist (as what is now becomes what once was), which is the presentist metaphysics of time? Or…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/being-and-becoming-in-modern-physics.md
- 03 · blog0.799
To say the world is essentially history is to say that at the lowest level it is aesthetic experiences woven into a single fabric, a world-narrative, with the added judgement that it is real, that it exists. Croce takes this to be inevitable: the subjective present is real and has duration; but any attempt to determine its exact size is surely arbitrary. Therefore the only rigorous view is that the past is no less real than the present. History then represents, by definition, the only all-encompassing account of reality. What we call the natural sciences then are impure, second-rate. Consider …
blog/plato-stanford-edu/croce-s-aesthetics.md
- 04 · blog0.798
A generation or so later we have a classic statement of the opposing view by Parmenides: There remains, then, but one word by which to express the [true] road: Is. And on this road there are many signs that What Is has no beginning and never will be destroyed: it is whole, still, and without end. It neither was nor will be, it simply is—now, altogether, one, continuous… Permanence is basic. No things come to be or, slipping into the past, cease to be. Past, present, and future are distinctions not marked in the static Is. Time and becoming are at best secondary, at worst illusory, as our under…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/being-and-becoming-in-modern-physics.md
- 05 · blog0.793
If we retort then that time is what did exist, what exists at present and what will exist, then we notice first that our account is insufficient: after all, there are many things which did, do, or will exist, but these are things that are in time and so not the same as time itself. We further see that our account already threatens circularity, since to say that something did or will exist seems only to say that it existed at an earlier time or will come to exist at a later time . Then again we find someone objecting to our account that even the notion of the present is troubling. After all, ei…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/aristotle.md
- 06 · blog0.791
So, let us start with the simplest argument that we can formulate. If we reflect on experience in general, what we cannot deny is that experience is conditioned by time. Every experience, necessarily, takes place in the present. In the present experience, there is the kernel or point of the now. What is happening right now is a kind of event, different from every other now I have ever experienced. Yet, also in the present, I remember the recent past and I anticipate what is about to happen. The memory and the anticipation consist in repeatability. Because what I experience now can be immediate…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/jacques-derrida.md
- 07 · yt0.789
He says: Perhaps something has occurred in the history of the concept of structure that could be called an "event" [évênement, something which emerges, something which is there now and wasn't there before]… That's the most problematic issue for structuralism. When structuralism thinks about how yesterday things were different from the way they are today, it has to say: yesterday there was a certain synchronic cross-section of data, and today there's a slightly different synchronic cross-section of data. But structuralism is unable and furthermore-- much more importantly--unwilling to say any…
yt/Np72VPguqeI-10-deconstruction-i/transcript.txt
- 08 · yt0.788
Gadamer says, and here again he's attacking historicism: The text that is understood historically is forced to abandon its claim that it is uttering something true. We think we understand when we see the past from a historical standpoint, i.e., place ourselves in the historical situation and seek to reconstruct the historical horizon. [I've been attempting to summarize this position and so I trust that it's easily intelligible as I read it to you now.] In fact, however, we have given up the claim to find, in the past, any truth valid and intelligible for ourselves. And, by the way, this would …
yt/iWnA7nZO4EY-3-ways-in-and-out-of-the-hermeneutic-circle/transcript.txt
- 09 · yt0.788
They're differential equations that tell us what happened. There's conservation of information. It's a wholly different story in the macroscopic world of the manifest image. There's a difference between past and future. There is cause and effect. It is true that I need to push the bottle to keep it moving. There are reasons why things happen in the macroscopic world. So, how do we connect these different levels? That's the difficult part. The that equation I showed you, the core theory equation, that's the easy part. Okay, this is the hard part. That's why we're not done with it yet. So, let m…
yt/rqezWO5Yba8-sean-carrol-the-big-picture-on-the-origins-of-life-meaning-a/transcript.txt
- 10 · wikisource0.786
History teaches the continuity of the development of science. We know that every age has its own problems, which the following age either solves or casts aside as profitless and replaces by new ones. If we would obtain an idea of the probable development of mathematical knowledge in the immediate future, we must let the unsettled questions pass before our minds and look over the problems which the science of today sets and whose solution we expect from the future. To such a review of problems the present day, lying at the meeting of the centuries, seems to me well adapted. For the close of a g…
wikisource/mathematical-problems/page.txt
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