Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · blog0.818

   Not, on account of the absence of organs... 32. Brahman is not the cause; on account of the world having the nature of what depends on a motive 33. But it is mere sport, as in ordinary life 34. Not inequality and cruelty... 35. If it be said 'not so, on account of non-distinction of deeds'... 36. And because all the attributes are proved to be present in Brahman Second Pâda Second Pâda: 1. Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of construction, and on account of activity 2. If it be said--like milk or water; there also intelligence guides 3. And because from the independen…

   blog/www-sacred-texts-com/the-ved-nt-s-tras.md

2. 02 · yt0.816

   Brahman definition Brahman is the ultimate unchanging reality or absolute it is considered to be formless infinite and beyond all attributes Brahman is often described as the source and essence of the universe transcending space time and causality impersonal and non-dual Brahman is neither a personal deity nor a separate entity it is impersonal meaning it doesn't have personal attributes or characteristics moreover Brahman is non-dual advaita implying that there is no fundamental distinction between the individual self ottman and Brahman imminent and Transcendent while Brahman is transcendent …

   yt/TmZC41rBi_0-part-1-exploring-schr-dinger-s-concept-of-a-universal-mind-s/transcript.txt

3. 03 · blog0.803

   Although the theory of non-existent objects did not explicitly include the notion of essences, it posited a real distinction between objects ( dhawāt ) and their thing-ness ( shayʾiyya ) on the one hand and their existence ( wujūd ) on the other. Things are already things even before they are made existent. Hence, what things are must be different from the fact that they exist (Wisnovsky 2000). The second relevant theory addresses the relationship between things and their existence even more directly. The Basran Muʿtazilites argue that being existent ( mawjūd ) is a state ( ḥāl ) that belongs …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/essence-and-existence-in-arabic-and-islamic-philosophy.md

4. 04 · yt0.803

   So, the first thing that the ontologist must teach the scientist is the distinction between, if you will, the really real world, which consists of irreducible wholes, and organisms are part of that, and then the empirical world, for lack of a better name, which is the world which is how the scientist the physicist the physical scientist conceives of things. And that's something entirely different. You cannot confuse these two. But the beauty is that in a certain sense that only the metaphysician can understand, you can really say that the difference between the world of the metaphysician, whic…

   yt/V_ZWBkSNMFg-platonic-physics-in-dialogue-with-wolfgang-smith/transcript.txt

5. 05 · blog0.798

   In this sense, he asserts that existence relates to real objects and is identical to them. For a cup, “to be” still means to be a cup, insofar as by “being” we refer to an ontological reality that pertains to cups outside our minds. (Menn 2008). 3. Things and Their Existence in Classical Kalām In classical kalām, there are two theories that problematize the relationship between things and the fact of their ontological presence in the world. One of these theories proposes that objects ( dhawāt ) have some ontological status of their own, beyond their existence ( wujūd ). Several representatives…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/essence-and-existence-in-arabic-and-islamic-philosophy.md

6. 06 · blog0.793

   Knowledge per se is non-omniscience.) However, all copresence-in-the-world, all conditioning, all relation, all causality between two entities requires some overlap or interface between them. There must be some place, thing, time, medium or concept that simultaneously includes them both, or which they both include. Any two entities must have something in common to succeed in being copresent—to have a causal relation or to even be contrasted. But no genuinely distinct entities, insofar as they are distinct and thus determinate, have anything in common. Hence two genuinely mutually exclusive ent…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/tiantai-buddhism.md

7. 07 · blog0.791

   Something is in a category by reduction stricte if and only if it is not an aggregate, and, (a) like differences, it is a component of the reality of a thing which is in a category by itself, but the highest genus of that category is not predicated of it; or (b) it is the privation correlated to a certain property which, in turn, is in a category by itself; or (c), like extra-categorial principle such as God, the unity, and the point, it somehow instantiates the mode of being proper to a certain categorial field, but the highest genus of that category is not one of the constitutive elements of…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/robert-alyngton.md

8. 08 · blog0.791

   In the case of him who has approached Brahman... 41. There is non-restriction of determination, because this is seen; for there is a separate fruit, viz. non-obstruction 42. Just as in the case of the offerings... 43. On account of the plurality of indicatory marks... 44. There is option with regard to what precedes... 45. And on account of the transfer 46. But it is a meditation only, on account of assertion and what is seen 47. And on account of the greater strength of direct statement, and so on, there is no refutation 48. On account of connexions and the rest, as in the case of the separat…

   blog/www-sacred-texts-com/the-ved-nt-s-tras.md

9. 09 · blog0.791

   If a thing-at-\(t_{1}\) were identical with a thing-at-\(t_{2}\), then they should share all their properties. What sort of identity is it, if not that? But if the properties at different times are incompatible, then a contradiction follows. Because they emphatically took the view that contradictions are never true, the great Buddhist logicians Dharmakirti (C7th CE) and his commentator Dharmottara (C8–9th CE), who had certainly read their Aristotle, deduced that identity over time does not exist (see Scherbatsky (1930) vol 2). This is the Buddhist doctrine of moments, essentially an ontology o…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/change-and-inconsistency.md

10. 10 · blog0.787

    Insofar as It is existent, the Principle is thus existent just as the world is. Hence the ontological distinction between the uncaused Principle and Its effect does not lie in existence as such, but in one of its modes: the uncaused Principle is necessary as regards existence , while everything else is always possible as regards existence : i.e., it exists insofar as it is necessitated and therefore necessary by virtue of something other. As a consequence, the existence of things that are in themselves possible is always conceived as related to a (possible) essence , while the being of the Pri…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/ibn-sina-s-metaphysics.md