Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · yt0.749

   When I was talking to you about the upanishads, I explained at several points the fundamental doctrine of the Hindus and that is that the innermost reality of man is not quite quite what we who have been brought up in a Christian tradition call the soul. We have an inherited teaching of course of an immortal and individual soul which is the root principle of every human being. But in the Hindu doctrines the soul is not individual. The soul is supra individual or as they would say in their technical language the atman the soul or self. Self is really a better translation than soul. The atman is…

   yt/VLQMGHBnxVg-eastern-and-western-zen-08-eastern-wisdom-alan-watts/transcript.txt

2. 02 · blog0.742

   Taken by themselves, these epithets can be understood in two importantly different ways: they may be taken as characterizing how things are (by nature) in themselves, or they may be taken as commenting on human beings’ lack (by our nature) of cognitive access to things. Adiaphora is normally translated ‘indifferent’. But this might be taken as referring either to an intrinsic characteristic of things—namely that, in themselves and by nature, they possess no differentiating features — or to our natural inability to discern any such features. In the latter case ‘undifferentiable’ might be a more…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/pyrrho.md

3. 03 · blog0.741

   This fact accounts for both the difference between the general names in the category of substance (such as ‘man’) and concrete accidental terms, and the presence of the relation of identity (or non-identity) in so-called ‘real propositions’ ( propositiones in re ). General names in the category of substance are concrete terms as well, but the form they primarily signify is really identical to the substances they name. Therefore, in this case, the name of the form is the same as the name of the substance ( TsP , ch. de substantia , ed. Conti, p.38; EP , ch. de denominativis , fol. 19va–b). This…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/walter-burley.md

4. 04 · yt0.740

   Brahman definition Brahman is the ultimate unchanging reality or absolute it is considered to be formless infinite and beyond all attributes Brahman is often described as the source and essence of the universe transcending space time and causality impersonal and non-dual Brahman is neither a personal deity nor a separate entity it is impersonal meaning it doesn't have personal attributes or characteristics moreover Brahman is non-dual advaita implying that there is no fundamental distinction between the individual self ottman and Brahman imminent and Transcendent while Brahman is transcendent …

   yt/TmZC41rBi_0-part-1-exploring-schr-dinger-s-concept-of-a-universal-mind-s/transcript.txt

5. 05 · blog0.736

   If a thing-at-\(t_{1}\) were identical with a thing-at-\(t_{2}\), then they should share all their properties. What sort of identity is it, if not that? But if the properties at different times are incompatible, then a contradiction follows. Because they emphatically took the view that contradictions are never true, the great Buddhist logicians Dharmakirti (C7th CE) and his commentator Dharmottara (C8–9th CE), who had certainly read their Aristotle, deduced that identity over time does not exist (see Scherbatsky (1930) vol 2). This is the Buddhist doctrine of moments, essentially an ontology o…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/change-and-inconsistency.md

6. 06 · blog0.734

   Let this, then, be our invocation of the Gods, to which I add an exhortation of myself to speak in such manner as will be most intelligible to you, and will most accord with my own intent. First then, in my judgment, we must make a distinction and ask, What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and never is? That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state; but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason, is always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is. Now…

   blog/www-sacred-texts-com/timaeus.md

7. 07 · blog0.732

   Kant writes: …every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will…Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, nevertheless, if they are not rational beings, only a relative value as means and are therefore called things. On the other hand, rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves. (Kant [1785] 1998: [Ak 4: 428]) And: The fact that the human being can have the representation “I” raises him infinitely above all the other beings on earth. By th…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-moral-status-of-animals.md

8. 08 · wikisource0.730

   At this point McX begins; to wonder whether there is any limit at all to our ontological immunity. Does nothing we may say commit us to the assumption of universals or other entities which we may find unwelcome? I have already suggested a negative answer to this question, in speaking of bound variables, or variables of quantification, in connection with Russell’s theory of descriptions. We can very easily involve ourselves in ontological commitments by saying, for example, that there is something (bound variable) which red houses and sunsets have in common; or that there is something which is …

   wikisource/on-what-there-is/page.txt

9. 09 · blog0.728

   The structure that results is a kind of laminated structure, a metaphysical “onion” with several layers. On this picture, of course, substantial and accidental forms are both “layers of the onion” in exactly the same sense. The distinction between essential and accidental features of a thing would therefore have to be drawn in some other way. If this reconstruction is more or less correct, then it is clear why universal hylomorphism and plurality of forms can be viewed as conceptually linked. Both fit nicely with the view that the structure of reality is accurately mirrored in true predication…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/binarium-famosissimum.md

10. 10 · blog0.727

    I am necessarily human, in the sense that it is impossible that I am a nonhuman. (It may be possible that it is not the case that I am human, insofar as it is possible that I never existed at all, in which case I would not have been, in that possibility, among the class of humans. But that is a different matter.) All contingent properties are accidents and all essences are necessary but, according to the Aristotelian, some necessary properties are accidents. A thing’s essential properties are inseparable from the bearer, not only in the sense that the property is necessarily had by that object…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/existence.md