Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · blog0.826

   So we are not overly inclined to think that Turing’s response to the Lovelace Objection is poor; and we are even less inclined to think that Turing lacked the resources to provide a satisfactory response on this point. 2.7 Argument from Continuity of the Nervous System The human brain and nervous system is not much like a digital computer. In particular, there are reasons for being skeptical of the claim that the brain is a discrete-state machine. Turing observes that a small error in the information about the size of a nervous impulse impinging on a neuron may make a large difference to the s…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-turing-test.md

2. 02 · blog0.805

   Critics of CCTM often object that the mind is not a programmable general purpose computer (Churchland, Koch, and Sejnowski 1990). Since classical computationalists need not claim (and usually do not claim) that the mind is a programmable general purpose computer, the objection is misdirected. Second, CCTM is not intended metaphorically. CCTM does not simply hold that the mind is like a computing system. CCTM holds that the mind literally is a computing system. Of course, the most familiar artificial computing systems are made from silicon chips or similar materials, whereas the human body is m…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-computational-theory-of-mind.md

3. 03 · yt0.794

   If you're going to theory of consciousness which just is comp- computation, it's a bit hard to see how it's going to explain how you can prove um Fermat's Last Theorem if it requires all these levels of depth of of logic. It's It's so I'm I'm trying to kind of parse the steps in the in the argument. You know, given Gödel's theorem to be absolute that establishes mathematics cannot be a a a complete system in itself, and that mathematicians have to understand that with through their consciousness. Not sure what the step then is to go to where a brain operating under a computational functionalis…

   yt/vC4HNcqTQXk-roger-penrose-on-mind-consciousness-closer-to-truth-chats/transcript.txt

4. 04 · blog0.793

   At the very least, much more argument is required to overthrow the view that the Turing Test could remain a very high quality statistical test for the presence of mind and intelligence even if digital computers differ from human beings in being subject to the Lucas-Penrose constraint. (See Bowie 1982, Dietrich 1994, Feferman 1996, Abramson 2008, and Section 6.3 of the entry on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems , for further discussion.) 2.4 The Argument from Consciousness Turing cites Professor Jefferson’s Lister Oration for 1949 as a source for the kind of objection that he takes to fall under …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-turing-test.md

5. 05 · blog0.791

   He argues that certain possible machines pass the Turing test even though these machines do not come close to genuine thought or intelligence. See the entry the Turing test for discussion of Block’s objection and other issues surrounding the Turing Test. For discussion of the Turing test in relation to ChatGPT and similar models, see (Bayne and Williams 2023; Floridi and Chiriatti 2020; Mahowald, Ivanova, Blank, et al. 2024). For more on AI, see the entry logic and artificial intelligence . For much more detail, see Russell and Norvig (2022). 3. The classical computational theory of mind Warre…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-computational-theory-of-mind.md

6. 06 · blog0.790

   It is not an unwelcome appendage but instead is a straightforward consequence of tenets that she takes to be obvious. Cavendish is also cornering her opponent into explaining what the sense is in which minds move or are housed in our brains if they are not material. A figure like Leibniz is comfortable elucidating the nature of (immaterial) minds in terms of the language of mirrors, dizziness, and spatial perspective ( Monadology , sections 83, 21, 57). Cavendish is insisting that the language of dimension and motion applies to bodies alone. An objection of course is that there is something od…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/margaret-lucas-cavendish.md

7. 07 · yt0.789

   So, so there there is a minimum and not only that, it has to have a certain causal structure, right? And we can we can kind of debate that and that's really in line too with surl you know in the Chinese room argument which is like look a dictionary is not doesn't have understanding because it doesn't have the right causal structure. You have to have a certain causal structure or a certain minimum complexity and then you reach this whatever it is whether it's consciousness we're talking about understanding agency all of these things right so I guess my question to you is will we be able to buil…

   yt/PNYWi996Beg-your-brain-is-a-prediction-machine-not-a-processor-karl-fris/transcript.txt

8. 08 · yt0.788

   [music] >> Roger, let's talk about and do a retrospective on the mind in general, consciousness in particular, in which you have staked out extraordinarily fascinating positions, uh uh very contrarian views where you challenge the conventional wisdom of computational functionalism as a uh as applied to the mind. So, you argue that the mind is not computational, and even more provocatively that the known laws of physics cannot explain consciousness. So, why non-computational and why the known laws of physics cannot explain consciousness? Well, with the why non-computational, my question i…

   yt/vC4HNcqTQXk-roger-penrose-on-mind-consciousness-closer-to-truth-chats/transcript.txt

9. 09 · yt0.785

   So all mental mathematics or mental activity can be described in mathematical terms. And the classical mathematicians say that there are some mathematical objects that cannot be computed. They cannot be constructed but they nevertheless exist. And the computationalists say no no that doesn't make sense. You are hallucinating these objects. You cannot just posit the existence of these objects. And we can show that if you actually do this at some point you run into contradictions. And instead what you have to do is you take a simple table of automatter and then you can build everything up from t…

   yt/oR-BQTSpL5U-joscha-bach-the-operation-of-consciousness-agi-25/transcript.txt

10. 10 · blog0.784

    Church did this by using the methods of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem to show that the set of satisfiable formulas of first-order logic is not r.e., i.e., they cannot be systematically listed out by a function computable by the lambda calculus. Turing introduced his machines and proved many interesting theorems some of which we will discuss in the next section. In particular, he proved the unsolvability of the halting problem . He obtained the unsolvability of the entscheidungsproblem as a corollary. Hilbert was very disappointed because his program towards a decision procedure for all of mat…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/computability-and-complexity.md