Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · yt0.779

   But, I would say, "Yeah, but there's enough of a ho- [snorts] homology so that the immune system can get a grip and get rid of the molecule." Now, and we're running around the world. This is a very good analogy because we're running around the world trying to get a grip all the time. And we assume that the map that we've made of the world is sufficiently real if we get a good enough grip to perform the operation that we're intending to perform. But, that But, that's still to me that still implies that there's some level of representation that has at least the echo of a genuine homology. So, I'…

   yt/SPnyxnvU4ko-is-reality-an-illusion-dr-donald-hoffman-ep-387/transcript.txt

2. 02 · yt0.779

   So you can't just say, "Oh, these are just two ways of talking about the same account of the world." They're clearly contradictory accounts of the world. Absolutely. And and where did the word, if you happen to know, interpretation in quantum mechanics first get in? And and the reason I ask is in classical physics there are of course distinct formulations of classical mechanics. You can write down Newton's equations in a straightforward differential form. you can write down a Hamiltonian approach to it. Uh I mean often we don't call those different interpretations. We call them maybe different…

   yt/VbXEc9vpeIM-what-we-ve-gotten-wrong-about-quantum-physics-world-science-/transcript.txt

3. 03 · wikisource0.773

   However, I feel no reluctance toward refusing to admit meanings, for I do not thereby deny that words and statements are meaningful. McX and I may agree to the letter in our classification of linguistic forms into the meaningful and the meaningless, even though McX construes meaningfulness as the having (in some sense of ‘having’) of some abstract entity which he calls a meaning, whereas I do not. I remain free to maintain that the fact that a given linguistic utterance is meaningful (or significant, as I prefer to say so as not to invite hypostasis of meanings as entities) is an ultimate and …

   wikisource/on-what-there-is/page.txt

4. 04 · blog0.771

   The idea is that the content of the description could consist solely of that property. For example, when we say that ‘Aristotle might have been run over by a chariot’ we would in effect be saying there is a possible world in which the unique individual who has the property of being Aristotle was run over by a chariot. It seems that charges of circularity are not so easily advanced here, although the view does raise questions about the nature of these rigid properties and our epistemic access to them. (See Parsons (1982) for an account of the logic of rigid properties.) Another class of respons…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/descriptions.md

5. 05 · yt0.770

   Um, well, it's a curious word you used there, which was explain. Ah, because Yes. Yeah. I I should take that back, right? Yes. You know, because the the right I mean, I don't think this was exactly Boore's attitude. The common attitude is calculate. Predict tell me what the numbers will be, and if the numbers are right, that's all I want. Absolutely. Boore was actually trying to make a much more profound argument which was that a certain sort of explanation which had been provided by classical physics was no longer available. Just could not could not be found. There wasn't that nature didn't p…

   yt/VbXEc9vpeIM-what-we-ve-gotten-wrong-about-quantum-physics-world-science-/transcript.txt

6. 06 · blog0.769

   In other words, according to this sort of descriptivist, it is really only a matter of happenstance that uses of names ever co-refer. That might seem a rather large bullet to bite. On the other hand, once we move away from classical descriptivism, explaining how names can refer to different individuals in different circumstances becomes significantly more challenging. Consider a descriptivist in the Strawsonian mold, one for whom an utterance of the name ‘ N ’ refers in accord with the plurality of the beliefs of the relevant experts. What are we to do with a name like ‘Boris’ then, which can …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/reference.md

7. 07 · blog0.769

   The descriptions that we associate with names routinely do not describe the individuals that we intend to refer to. Asked to come up with a description to substitute for the name ‘Einstein’, many people would write ‘The inventor of the atom bomb’ (which of course he was not). Others might write ‘the inventor of the theory of relativity’, but then asked what the theory of relativity was would respond ‘the theory that Einstein invented’. The descriptive information that we associate with names just is not sufficient to pick out the intended referent. Kripke’s positive proposal—suggestion really—…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/descriptions.md

8. 08 · yt0.768

   Very, very good point, yeah. And the um, that undermining of nominalism, right? Of you called propositional tyranny earlier. That's so key, right? Because that is it opens the door to a new ontology. Yes. In the beginning you talked about an ontology that's consistent with science, right? And we've also, like Wolfgang has introduced the word being. And being is actually what science denies. Yes. So when we get to kind of what's real and what's not real, is science dealing with the real? Science is not entirely dealing with the real. Because science has, um, this is a term from Eric Voegelin, d…

   yt/QvLSkzes_II-convergence-to-neoplatonism-w-wolfgang-smith/transcript.txt

9. 09 · blog0.768

   In effect, the proposal preserves something of the causal theory—by allowing that baptisms and passings-on of names are the right sort of thing to determine the set of possible referents associated with a name at any given time—while appealing to some further feature of the context to do the work of selecting an individual from this set. In contrast to the pure indexicals like ‘I’ or ‘here’, however, there is no obvious candidate for which aspect of the context serves to make this selection. Things get worse still once we consider contexts in which multiple people bearing the same name are all…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/reference.md

10. 10 · yt0.767

    Because if there's no private if you had a private language, there's no way you can be right or wrong because you can't be corrected in any fashion. And And it doesn't make any sense. And then if you if you really seriously think that you're that right? That language is is an illusion for you, think of how much of your cognition and your science and your rationality become illusory. And then if you commit to it, you're committed to the fact that interpersonal dialogue is especially privileged at disclosing the fact that there are minds other than yours, and they can make meaning other than you…

    yt/1Lm3y_4a--0-wolfgang-smith-and-john-vervaeke-the-perpetual-promise-inexh/transcript.txt