Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · _intake0.843

   > it right. He didn't figure out the second law. As we now know, sort of the paradigmatic ideas that you need to figure out the second law come from ideas about computation and so on, which were another close to 100 years in the future, so to speak. But it's sort of interesting that he was applying those kinds of philosophical thinking ideas. And it was a misfire in thermodynamics. It was a hit in relativity, in the photoelectric effect, and the existence of photons, and also

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/photoelectric/003-it-right.md

2. 02 · blog0.789

   Beeckman described his form of natural philosophy as “physico-mathematics” (see AT 10: 67–77 and Schuster 2013), and the two men discussed and corresponded about problems in mathematics and natural philosophy, including problems in the theory of music, hydrostatics, and the dynamics of falling bodies (see AT 10: 46–47, 51–63, 67–74, 75–78, 89–141, 331–348; Shea 1991: 1–121; Damerow et al. 1992; Schuster 2013: 99–167). While it is difficult to determine when Descartes composed his principal methodological treatise , Rules for the Direction of the Mind (Regulae ad directionem ingenii ), it is wi…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/descartes-method.md

3. 03 · blog0.782

   There, Kant is explicit that he begins by assuming that mathematical natural science provides us with genuine objective knowledge, and that it contains synthetic a priori principles; Kant is likewise explicit that his task is to identify the necessary conditions of those principles’ possibility, and that doing so will explain the objectivity of mathematical natural science. (Kant is also explicit that this method, which in the Prolegomena he calls the ‘analytic method,’ is not the method he uses in the Critique of Pure Reason , nor would it be suitable for the full project of the Critique . Co…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/hermann-cohen.md

4. 04 · blog0.781

   Behind this one sees the lawyer’s mind at work that, if it is all a matter of philosophy, then there is nothing in the United States Constitution which bars the teaching of Creationism in schools. (For better or for worse, one sees the heavy hand of Thomas Kuhn here, and his claim in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that the change from one paradigm to another is akin to a political revolution, not ultimately fueled by logic but more by extra-scientific factors, like emotions and simple preferences. In the Arkansas trial, Kuhn was as oft mentioned by the prosecutors as was Popper.) …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/creationism.md

5. 05 · blog0.780

   By the time of the composition of the Principles , Descartes had formulated a method that, like the Scholastics, strived to explain natural phenomena based on the allegedly simple and irrefutable “facts” and/or observations, drawn from rational reflection on concepts or from everyday experience, about the most fundamental aspects of reality. These supposedly basic facts thereby provide the requisite metaphysical foundation for his physical hypotheses: in other words, one proceeds from our “clear and distinct” knowledge of general metaphysical items, such as the nature of material substance and…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/descartes-physics.md

6. 06 · blog0.777

   Yet all this is predicated on some further, background explanatory principles such as the efficacy of structural explanations as well as certain claims about ontological reduction. In particular, Boyle was committed to what we might call the Familiarity Condition: all explanations of the unobserved must be made in terms of properties, causes and laws with which we are already familiar. He claims that to explain a phenomenon is “to deduce it from something else in Nature more known to Us, then the thing to be explain’d by It” (BW, 5:351–2; see also Anstey 2000, 55–7). Thus, “the Mechanical affe…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/robert-boyle.md

7. 07 · blog0.775

   History and Background 2.1. A brief historical survey: from scholasticism to modern economics 2.2. Background of the contemporary debate 3. A Framework for the Discussion: Distinguishing exclusive/ comparative and definite/indefinite ceteris paribus laws 3.1. Comparative vs. exclusive cp-laws 3.2 Definite versus indefinite cp-laws 4. The Challenge: Exclusive Ceteris Paribus Laws Between Falsity and Triviality 5. Exclusive CP-laws: The Method of Completers 5.1. Semantic and epistemic completers 5.2. Criticisms: triviality and accidentality 6. Invariance & Stability Theories 6.1. Counterfactuall…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/ceteris-paribus-laws.md

8. 08 · yt0.775

   He derived it from Greek and Latin roots common to words for both simple and complex. >> Simple and complex. So what was he studying with plexics? >> Essentially the interplay between the two. How do the incredibly simple fundamental laws of nature >> like the laws governing electromagnetism or gravity? >> Exactly. How do those simple rules give rise to all the incredibly complex things we see? evolution, ecosystems, human societies, galaxies, all of it. >> It's the big question, isn't it? The ultimate, how did we get here? >> Precisely. He wrestled with thi…

   yt/1YXbS7rrDPo-murray-gell-mann-from-quarks-to-complexity-and-conservation/transcript.txt

9. 09 · blog0.773

   As Cohen would later put it, experience, conceived as the evolving doctrines of mathematical natural science, is “given as a task” [ aufgegeben ] to philosophy: while experience is given with synthetic a priori principles already contained in it, it is the task of philosophy to identify and articulate those principles, and in so doing to explain how they make objective experience possible. It can be difficult to see how this method allows for any philosophically critical evaluation of theories in the history of science – a kind of evaluation Cohen never shies away from. On the transcendental m…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/hermann-cohen.md

10. 10 · blog0.773

    In that sense, at least some of Albert’s non-logical forays have to do with his desire to bring to light a deeper explanatory reason. Second, Albert is sometimes commenting on works that contain or are seen by him as containing non-logical points or developments. Thus, Albert believes that even if the Categories is overall a work in logic, some of the properties of the ten categories treated by Aristotle are non-logical and belong to the supreme genera whether we know and reason about them or not ( De praedicamentis , 2, 6, p.30, l.64–31, l.2; 2, 8, p.36, l.46–51; 2, 9, p.38, l.53–55; 2, 12, p…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/albert-the-great.md