of course you know this is how science works is because you propose a a preposterous theory and it needs to get challenged and and the Canon Firestone team and the comet research
- Concept
- taurid
- Score
- 4 · must · because
- Status
- candidate — not yet promoted to canon
Corpus evidence — top 10 passages
Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).
- 01 · yt0.770
So science is perfectly okay to not explain the what and the wise in terms of what things are and why they do what they do. That's not for science. Science is about what will happen next. What are we going to see next? That's what the method the science scientific method allows us to do. Um so it's legitimate that science doesn't say what things are. It doesn't need to. It it it can't and it's there is that's not what its value is all about. Its value is about predicting behavior. But materialism is not science. Materialism is a metaphysics and as such it is a statement about what things are. …
yt/DrMEL20o5KE-why-materialism-is-complete-nonsense-bernardo-kastrup/transcript.txt
- 02 · yt0.768
Right, because I mean, you hear people say all the time like believe the science, trust the science. And that to me is them stating that there's a group of people who have approached truth sufficiently that you should believe in what it is that they say. And that's always been the case. That's my point. Seems like that's For science? Yeah. Well, yeah, for whatever was called science before science, as far as explaining the natural world. But it seems like especially with this, like it seems like there was a transition period where like if you if you believe that natural philosophy became becam…
yt/6orsFlmg1K4-inexplicable-artifacts-michael-cremo-forbidden-archeology/transcript.txt
- 03 · yt0.765
Uh This is basically uh the on ontological position that bifurcation imposes upon us, not because it's true or has been verified, say, by empirical means, but simply because, a priori, it leaves no other alternative but atoms and the void. And incidentally, this uh philosophical postulate of Democritus was very much attacked by Plato and the and his school, and was very quickly abandoned, but the well-informed. So, for about 2,000 years, the philosophically informed public knew that this was a a primitive heresy that had been disproved, and they did not entertain a bifurcationist Weltonschauun…
yt/V_ZWBkSNMFg-platonic-physics-in-dialogue-with-wolfgang-smith/transcript.txt
- 04 · yt0.764
Now, I um I've written three long chapters on science and three long chapters on reason in the matter with things extolling these as very important ways of arriving at an understanding of the world. But not on their own. They need supplementation by two other powers intuition and imagination. And of course they say, "Well, you know, but intuition, where's the security in that? Where's the security in imagination? It can lead us astray." But I can demonstrate that reason can easily lead you astray. In fact, as uh G. K. Chesterton, I think very wisely said about madness, that the madman is not s…
yt/TDC9W1K4Rso-iain-mcgilchrist-how-to-escape-left-brain-thinking/transcript.txt
- 05 · blog0.763
Opposing these inductive-empiricist scientists were those whose roots were mostly in the theoretical side of natural science, most especially mathematical physics. To them, there was another, more logically sound, method to construct theories. First, hypotheses could be generated in any fashion, although most believed that imagining hypotheses which were based upon very general, very reasonable concepts—that the Universe’s physical processes had simple mathematical descriptions, for example—was the best place to begin; this is classic rationalist epistemology. Once the hypothesis had been gene…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/cosmology-methodological-debates-in-the-1930s-and-1940s.md
- 06 · yt0.762
And one of the things I've seen about scientists, it's it's fascinating is that there is is one way of thinking that says we take all the evidence and we force it into a pre-existing model like all the new discoveries trying to force that into Darwin's theory of evolution or we allow the new evidence to lead to the story that it tells. And this is where science is stuck right now because the old theory Darwin's theory of evolution is in trouble and it's the DNA is is the reason it's in trouble. It's no longer superficial or you know fossil evidence. I mean the DNA is telling the story. Uh and …
yt/J3Wqw8Az7TA-joe-rogan-experience-2387-gregg-braden/transcript.txt
- 07 · blog0.761
Obviously Dingle is simply wrong; it never occurred to his opponents that hypotheses would not be followed immediately by attempts at deductive prediction of observational consequences. But it was enough, in Dingle’s mind, that they didn’t use induction, for them to come under blame. 6.3 Wrong from the Very Start But there is something else at work here as well. Dingle doesn’t object solely to his opponents’ lack of inductive logic. Of equal importance is the fact that they find the source of their hypotheses in fairly general principles, wide-ranging rational proposals about the structure of …
blog/plato-stanford-edu/cosmology-methodological-debates-in-the-1930s-and-1940s.md
- 08 · blog0.756
Of course, such a proposal did presume that all of our concepts were somehow “derived” either from logic or experience, but this seemed in keeping with the then prevailing presumptions of empiricism, which, they assumed, had been vindicated by the immense success of the empirical sciences. For the Positivists, earlier empiricists, such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume, had erred only in thinking that the mechanism of construction was mere association. But association can’t account for the structure of even a simple judgment, such as Caesar is bald . This is not merely the excitation of its constitu…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-analytic-synthetic-distinction.md
- 09 · archive0.755
If statements of fact themselves depend upon the person who observes them, how much more distinct is the reflection of the per- sonality of him who gives an account of methods and of philosophical speculations which form the essence of science ! For this reason there will inevitably be much that is subjective in every objective exposi- tion of scieuce. And as an individual production is only significant in virtue of that which has preceded and that which is contemporary with it, it resembles a mirror which in reflecting exaggerates the size and clearness of neighbouring objects, and causes a p…
archive/principlesofchem01menduoft/principlesofchem01menduoft_djvu.txt
- 10 · yt0.755
And it's a science is also a game that's can be played according to certain rules. The rules don't always have to be the same, but scientists have chosen to play their game by certain rules. And one of the rules is no non-material substance. Not a no. I mean you have to explain everything in terms of atoms and molecules, subatomic particles and things of that sort. But it's funny that they play by those rules, but they readily admit they don't understand what holds these things together. Yeah. You know what I mean? Another rule is no intentionality. What do you mean? You can't have the idea th…
yt/aj8FypyKR3o-jsp-4-michael-cremo-did-man-live-with-dinosaurs-forbidden-ar/transcript.txt
Curation checklist
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