bucket foundation — inverse omegabucket.foundation

standard model

they've shown that it's not they're not gonna do that it's it's always positive on one side and it's it's always supporting the standard model because it is the standard model that's
Concept
standard model
Score
5 · always · because
Status
candidate — not yet promoted to canon

Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

  1. 01 · _intake0.674

    “It was claimed” is suitably cautious. I’d not be surprised if this were true, however. The rest of the article ought to disturb people’s complacency, too, but I’m not sure it will.

    _intake/kruse-blog-corpus/articles/organizational-structural-failure-7-autophagy-fail.md

  2. 02 · yt0.672

    speaker is also great this descriptor is correct with respect to this this picture is correct with respect to three D Q equal a E is true respect to is not to with respect to three in the sense please not better than anything in the sense that later on when you measure something we should not use the fact that you agree because they're both branches is still needed to compute a probability and when they want to measure the distribution for a beautiful P that he has to compute some see some a value of P is equal subside model sphere and then that is the so the whole of the story is my statement

    yt/SR3uwW_SX0o-scientific-realism-lecture-by-prof-carlo-rovelli/transcript.txt

  3. 03 · blog0.663

    If we read Brentano’s remark charitably, he appeals to introspective knowledge that a presentation can purport to be directed on an object in terms of marks. The judgement that is based on this presentation and rejects the object the presentation purports to be directed on as well as the judgement that acknowledges it, share the content of the presentation (the marks in terms of which the presentation is directed on something). Hence, negative and positive judgements can have the same content. This gives Brentano a reason to endorse claim (5) . His argument once more rules out a propositional

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/brentano-s-theory-of-judgement.md

  4. 04 · blog0.661

    To think it likely that \({\sim}A\) is to think it likely that a sufficient condition for the truth of “\(A \supset B\)” obtains. Take someone who thinks that the Republicans won’t win the election \(({\sim}R)\), and who rejects the thought that if they do win, they will double income tax \((D)\). According to Hook, this person has grossly inconsistent opinions. For if she thinks it’s likely that \({\sim}R\), she must think it likely that at least one of the propositions, \(\{{\sim}R, D\}\) is true. But that is just to think it likely that \(R \supset D\). (Put the other way round, to reject \

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/indicative-conditionals.md

  5. 05 · blog0.660

    These approaches resolve the doxastic paradox either by denying that self-deceivers hold the unwelcome but warranted belief ~p (Talbott 1995; Barnes 1997; Burmúdez 2000; Mele 2001), denying they hold the welcome but unwarranted belief p (Audi 1982, 1988; Funkhouser 2005; Gendler 2007; Fernández 2013; Jordan 2020, 2022), denying they hold either belief p or ~p (Archer 2013; Porcher 2012), or contending they have shifting degrees of belief regarding p (Chan and Rowbottom 2019). Lauria et al. (2016) argue for an integrative approach that accommodates all these products of self-deception on the ba

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/self-deception.md

  6. 06 · blog0.657

    Hopkins (2007: 613; 2011: 139–32) has suggested that we mark the division between pessimism and optimism as follows: pessimists hold that there is a principle or norm which is active in the aesthetic case, but which is not active in the mundane case which thwarts the possibility for aesthetic testimony to serve as a source of legitimate aesthetic judgement while optimists deny this (see Robson 2023: 24–6 for discussion as to why this nuance may not be that helpful.) If we were to accept Hopkin’s suggestion, an approach which denies that there are any distinct/non-standard epistemic (or non-epi

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/aesthetic-testimony.md

  7. 07 · blog0.656

    But given a corresponding affirmation and negation, one will always be true and the other false; the negation “Socrates is not sick” is true whether the snub-nosed philosopher is healthy or non-existent: “for if he does not exist, ‘he is sick’ is false but ‘he is not sick’ true” (13b26–35). Members of a canonical pair of contradictories are formally identical except for the negative particle: An affirmation is a statement affirming something of something, a negation is a statement denying something of something…It is clear that for every affirmation there is an opposite negation, and for every

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/contradiction.md

  8. 08 · blog0.655

    It’s because they have high hopes for what’s known as the Footian Procedure (Portmore 2011: 112), a procedure for generating an act-consequentialist counterpart theory for any plausible target non-consequentialist theory. To follow this procedure, we simply combine act-consequentialism’s view that an act is permissible if and only if its outcome is not outranked by that of any available alternative with the assumption that an act’s outcome is not outranked by that of any available alternative if and only if it is F , where “ F ” stands for whatever feature of actions that the target non-conseq

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/consequentializing.md

  9. 09 · blog0.655

    (SCC) has often been invoked as a means to ensure the fulfilment of the following condition (see, e.g., Hesse 1975, 88; Horwich 1983, 57): Predictive inference condition (PIC) For any \(e, k \in \bL\), if \(e\) confirms \(\forall x(Fx \rightarrow Gx)\) relative to \(k\), then \(e\) confirms \(F(a) \rightarrow G(a)\) relative to \(k\). In fact, (PIC) readily follows from (SCC) and so it is satisfied by Hempel’s theory. It says that, if evidence \(e\) confirms “all \(F\)s are \(G\)s”, then it also confirms that a further object will be \(G\) if it is \(F\). Notably, this does not hold for HD-con

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/confirmation.md

  10. 10 · yt0.655

    The one cannot be had without the other and together they make up what it is to be a magnet. And together the things that we think of as the big opposites go to make up something important. For example, I'm a strong believer that deaths which people nowadays are terrified of and start running away from as soon as they can even bring themselves to look at the concept that one day they're going to die buster. they they just start running away from it and won't talk about it and do all kinds of self-punitive things in order to they make their lives that little bit longer. And death is not in any

    yt/LZ5C11mlTH4-your-brain-has-2-masters-and-one-is-leading-us-astray-dr-iai/transcript.txt

Curation checklist

  • ☐ Verify excerpt against source recording
  • ☐ Tag tier (axiom · law · principle · primary derivation · observation)
  • ☐ Cross-cite to ≥1 primary source (PubMed / arXiv / archive.org)
  • ☐ Promote to bucket-canon/02-physics/