bucket foundation — inverse omegabucket.foundation

standard model

as you are? ERIC: That despite the fact, I mean, it's a great question, first of all. I believe it is the only claim of a theory that starts from essentially as close to nothing as you can in mathematics to try to derive everything we see. And because we see a world that is complex and baroque, like the standard model in general relativity, that process of development and unfolding has to be fairly lengthy, just the way human development from a single fertilized egg is.
Concept
standard model
Score
8 · must · because · only
Status
candidate — not yet promoted to canon

Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

  1. 01 · yt0.799

    When I take that basic cognitive framework, which is this very dynamic, bottom-up, top-down way in which outside and grounding propositionality, which intelligibility is co-created with the world, I come to the conclusion that either that bottom-up, top-down dynamism is has nothing to do with ontological structure, in case in which in which case if there is no way in which that fundamental grammar of intelligibility creation touches the structure of ontology, then we're doomed to skepticism and solipsism. And so I propose that it's more likely, as the Neoplatonic tradition held, that reality i

    yt/QvLSkzes_II-convergence-to-neoplatonism-w-wolfgang-smith/transcript.txt

  2. 02 · yt0.799

    But the thing is is that figuring out this hierarchy is tough for physicists because they're so trapped in spaceime that they're they're focused on size. So if you see people trying to come up with a theory of everything all the time, uh it's like atom, molecule, cell, organism, planet and then you know galaxy or solar system then galaxy and then universe. This is focused on size. So you're not actually this is not a fundamental theory because it is it is built on the axiom of size already you know existing as an axiom or as a you know presupposition and that is not fundamental. So you have to

    yt/HUDEUJgZzew-vertical-causation-scientism-wolfgang-smith-richard-smith-ka/transcript.txt

  3. 03 · yt0.793

    You can collect evidence forever, any kind  of empirical evidence you could ever imagine. And   the idea of that not being enough to pin down  what the universe is like, that's something   that naturally pops up in theories of space and  time. So I don't think GR is special here. I think   you can prove a similar kind of theorem pretty  much in any space-time theory that's modeled on   a manifold with geometric structures on it.  So a Newtonian version of space-time physics,   you'd have similar results there. So I&nbsp

    yt/iGOGxaZZHwE-it-s-not-that-we-don-t-know-it-s-that-we-can-t/transcript.txt

  4. 04 · yt0.791

    You have to have a theory in which, okay, yeah, when you're talking about small things and you're talking about, you know, particles or atoms or or um molecules, as long as they're small enough, they seem to follow the Schrödinger equation. So you need to have a theory which tells you when they get big enough, they don't follow the Schrödinger equation. And the idea is here that there's a a scheme which tells you how long these superpositions can exist. And if they're very tiny, it's more or less longer than the age of the universe. But if they're sizable, it might be microsecond. So you've go

    yt/OoDi856wLPM-sir-roger-penrose-stuart-hameroff-collapsing-a-theory-of-qua/transcript.txt

  5. 05 · yt0.790

    Very, very good point, yeah. And the um, that undermining of nominalism, right? Of you called propositional tyranny earlier. That's so key, right? Because that is it opens the door to a new ontology. Yes. In the beginning you talked about an ontology that's consistent with science, right? And we've also, like Wolfgang has introduced the word being. And being is actually what science denies. Yes. So when we get to kind of what's real and what's not real, is science dealing with the real? Science is not entirely dealing with the real. Because science has, um, this is a term from Eric Voegelin, d

    yt/QvLSkzes_II-convergence-to-neoplatonism-w-wolfgang-smith/transcript.txt

  6. 06 · yt0.789

    Anybody who doesn't have a wink and a nod when they talk about their theory of everything is missing the point. I think a lot of brilliant physicists who talk about a theory of everything know that they're not talking about a theory of everything. But you they really just mean the unification of you know certain the theories that that are not unified now. But there are a lot of people who think that we could get a theory of everything. And I'm saying no. Never. Even if we worked for a billion years and had a billion Einstein's working for a billion years, we would never have the theory of ever

    yt/xaeafKPfs1M-the-greatest-discovery-about-reality-the-consciousness-behin/transcript.txt

  7. 07 · yt0.786

    Even even when he's talking about metaphysics, he needs to dig the monarchy. only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm. Okay? So, I'm not telling you that causes and effects don't exist. I'm not telling you they're illusions. I'm telling you they're not fundamental. They're not built into, and I'll explain what exactly what I mean by this. They're not built into the deepest, most comprehensive, most fundamental vocabulary we have for talking about the world. And yet, the bottle of water stops moving when I stop pushing it. Right? So the task of this talk is to reconcile those two f

    yt/rqezWO5Yba8-sean-carrol-the-big-picture-on-the-origins-of-life-meaning-a/transcript.txt

  8. 08 · blog0.783

    He refutes arguments purporting to show the actual sempiternity of the world, but not arguments adduced to show that such sempiternity is possible , while he characterizes traditional would-be proofs of a temporal beginning as invalid (“sophistic”). The central piece of the work is a demonstration that no branch of philosophy can prove the “newness” of the world. The natural scientist cannot, because that would require relying on an assumption that is not included in the principles of his science and would make them an inconsistent set if included. The natural scientist can explain how somethi

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/boethius-of-dacia.md

  9. 09 · yt0.782

    It's time we begin to question the decisions of our ancestors because many of the things that we've been led to believe to be true simply is not. I'm not saying blindly accept all of the new stuff that's coming out nowadays, but we should at least put it on the table and be able to discuss it as a global community. One other thing before we get this rolling, I want to give an overview about what sacred geometry really is. Sacred geometry is the geometry of consciousness. It revolves around the idea that all consciousness, including human, is solely based on sacred geometry. Because it is, we c

    yt/09YGgT8XN_I-flower-of-life-and-sacred-geometry-movie/transcript.txt

  10. 10 · yt0.781

    So, the first thing that the ontologist must teach the scientist is the distinction between, if you will, the really real world, which consists of irreducible wholes, and organisms are part of that, and then the empirical world, for lack of a better name, which is the world which is how the scientist the physicist the physical scientist conceives of things. And that's something entirely different. You cannot confuse these two. But the beauty is that in a certain sense that only the metaphysician can understand, you can really say that the difference between the world of the metaphysician, whic

    yt/V_ZWBkSNMFg-platonic-physics-in-dialogue-with-wolfgang-smith/transcript.txt

Curation checklist

  • ☐ Verify excerpt against source recording
  • ☐ Tag tier (axiom · law · principle · primary derivation · observation)
  • ☐ Cross-cite to ≥1 primary source (PubMed / arXiv / archive.org)
  • ☐ Promote to bucket-canon/02-physics/