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shannon

impossible to solve that problem um and and the failure is clear there's you know there's for example integrated information Theory what is the integrated information that must be the
Concept
shannon
Cross-concepts
iit
Score
5 · never · must
Status
candidate — not yet promoted to canon

Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

  1. 01 · blog0.734

    Because that is the problem, a complete solution to SA will do two things (DeRose 1995): explain which of the ideas lying behind the seeming paradox should be rejected, and why; and explain too why the idea singled out for rejection struck us as plausible in the first place. 3.2 The General Form of the Contextualist Solution At first blush, it might seem that there are just three possible responses to SA: we can accept the skeptical conclusion; we can reject P2 and the closure principle upon which it trades; or we can reject P1. Essential to EC is the idea that these three options do not exhau

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/epistemic-contextualism.md

  2. 02 · blog0.733

    Is it possible to improve the theory in this respect, making allowances within it for the cost of thinking, or would that entail paradox, as I am inclined to believe but unable to demonstrate? (Savage 1967 excerpted from Savage’s prepublished draft; see notes in Seidenfeld et al. 2012) Responses to Savage’s problem include a game-theoretic treatment proposed by I.J. Good (1983), which swaps the extensional variable that is necessarily true for an intensional variable representing an accomplice who knows the necessary truth but withholds enough information from you, allowing you to be (coherent

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/bounded-rationality.md

  3. 03 · wikisource0.724

    Moreover a mathematical problem should be difficult in order to entice us, yet not completely inaccessible, lest it mock at our efforts. It should be to us a guide post on the mazy paths to hidden truths, and ultimately a reminder of our pleasure in the successful solution.

    wikisource/mathematical-problems/page.txt

  4. 04 · blog0.720

    For instance, here is a looped Liar: (2a): (2b) is true (2b): (2a) is false If what (2a) says is true, then (2b) is true. However, (2b) says that (2a) is false …. And so on: we are in a paradoxical loop. This is as old as Buridan (his Sophism no. 9: Plato saying ‘What Socrates says is true’; Socrates replying ‘What Plato says is false’). Paradoxes of this kind have been known since antiquity (the standard Liar is attributed to the Greek philosopher Eubulides, probably the greatest paradox-producer of antiquity). But they were thrown into prominence by developments in the foundations of mathema

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/dialetheism.md

  5. 05 · wikisource0.714

    It is difficult and often impossible to judge the value of a problem correctly in advance; for the final award depends upon the gain which science obtains from the problem. Nevertheless we can ask whether there are general criteria which mark a good mathematical problem. An old French mathematician said: "A mathematical theory is not to be considered complete until you have made it so clear that you can explain it to the first man whom you meet on the street." This clearness and ease of comprehension, here insisted on for a mathematical theory, I should still more demand for a mathematical pro

    wikisource/mathematical-problems/page.txt

  6. 06 · yt0.711

    It ultimately has to be the If to be and to be understood is to one, that which one's, right? Can't be grasped by anything that has any the any difference or distinction within it. This is Plotinus's famous argument. Yeah. Uh, and I I take it that that's ultimately the case. If we claimed to measure the one, it can't possibly be the one. Um, And then the last thing I just wanted to get in is Karen's comment about the control of some men by other men, right? Which is where we've gotten to with science and with nominalism, right? There is this, uh, situation now culturally where, cuz, you know,

    yt/QvLSkzes_II-convergence-to-neoplatonism-w-wolfgang-smith/transcript.txt

  7. 07 · blog0.711

    We could instead just think of \(X_i\) as set to some new value in the arrow-breaking or equation replacement manner described above, with no further restrictions on when such a setting operation is possible (or when it is permissible or legitimate to invoke it). I will call this a setting intervention . This contrasts with an alternative conception of interventions and their connection to causal claims according to which the truth of a claim like “\(X\) causes \(Y\)” requires that interventions on \(X\) must be “possible” in some non-trivial sense of this notion, which then must be specified.

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/causation-and-manipulability.md

  8. 08 · pubmed0.710

    We propose a theory of information expressed solely in terms of which transformations of physical systems are possible and which are impossible-i.e. in constructor-theoretic terms. It includes conjectured, exact laws of physics expressing the regularities that allow information to be physically instantiated. Although these laws are directly about information, independently of the details of particular physical instantiations, information is not regarded as an

    pubmed/PMID-25663803-constructor-theory-of-information/info.md

  9. 09 · blog0.705

    However, it would be a major task—which we do not intend to pursue here—to determine whether there really are any good reasons for taking these worries seriously. 2.3 The Mathematical Objection Some people have supposed that certain fundamental results in mathematical logic that were discovered during the 1930s—by Gödel (first incompleteness theorem) and Turing (the halting problem)—have important consequences for questions about digital computation and intelligent thought. (See, for example, Lucas (1961) and Penrose (1989); see, too, Hodges (1983:414) who mentions Polanyi’s discussions with T

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-turing-test.md

  10. 10 · _intake0.704

    > free will, then it's incomprehensible. But if you accept that is free will then it has to be that way because mathematics cannot tell you what you are going to create later on which is cannot

    _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/free-will/005-free-will-then-it-s-incomprehensible.md

Curation checklist

  • ☐ Verify excerpt against source recording
  • ☐ Tag tier (axiom · law · principle · primary derivation · observation)
  • ☐ Cross-cite to ≥1 primary source (PubMed / arXiv / archive.org)
  • ☐ Promote to bucket-canon/04-information/