Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · _intake0.918

   > idea that's the truth and the reason why they don't have an earthly idea that's the truth is because w a price didn't know it why because when he wrote the book quantum mechanics was still being

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/quantum-mech/008-idea-that-s-the-truth-and-the-reason-why-they-don-t-have-an-.md

2. 02 · gutenberg0.769

   Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and distinct--that is, a true--idea of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same as saying that a false idea was true--in short, the height of absurdity. It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And we can hence conclude by another process…

   gutenberg/PG-3800-ethics/PG-3800.txt

3. 03 · gutenberg0.768

   Something is always mere fact and _givenness_; and there may be in the whole universe no one point of view extant from which this would not be found to be the case. "Reason," as a gifted writer says, "is {ix} but one item in the mystery; and behind the proudest consciousness that ever reigned, reason and wonder blushed face to face. The inevitable stales, while doubt and hope are sisters. Not unfortunately the universe is wild,--game-flavored as a hawk's wing. Nature is miracle all; the same returns not save to bring the different. The slow round of the engraver's lathe gains but the breadth o…

   gutenberg/PG-26659-the-will-to-believe-and-other-essays-in-popular-philosophy/PG-26659.txt

4. 04 · yt0.764

   Um, well, it's a curious word you used there, which was explain. Ah, because Yes. Yeah. I I should take that back, right? Yes. You know, because the the right I mean, I don't think this was exactly Boore's attitude. The common attitude is calculate. Predict tell me what the numbers will be, and if the numbers are right, that's all I want. Absolutely. Boore was actually trying to make a much more profound argument which was that a certain sort of explanation which had been provided by classical physics was no longer available. Just could not could not be found. There wasn't that nature didn't p…

   yt/VbXEc9vpeIM-what-we-ve-gotten-wrong-about-quantum-physics-world-science-/transcript.txt

5. 05 · blog0.761

   Schulz (2009), however, the trivalent characterization proposed by Adams—or indeed Dubois and Prade—differs from the one entertained by McGee (it asks for more than the preservation of a fixed set of designated values, and allows quantification over subsets of the premises). [ 1 ] As discussed by Schulz, whether a similar characterization can be given for the non-flat logics of Stalnaker and Lewis is an open question. 3. Possible Worlds Models Trivalent accounts suppose that the truth value of a conditional depends only on the truth values of its parts. However, this assumption does not accoun…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-logic-of-conditionals.md

6. 06 · blog0.759

   The problem with the standard account, in either version, is that it does not allow for fallibilistic knowledge of necessary truths. If it is necessarily true that p , then the subject’s belief that p could not have been false, regardless of what her justification for it may be like. And, if it is necessarily true that p , then everything—including the subject’s justification for her belief—will entail or guarantee that p . Our attempt to account for certainty encounters the opposite problem: it does not allow for a subject to have a belief regarding a necessary truth that does not count as ce…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/certainty.md

7. 07 · blog0.757

   Our question will be: are the truth conditions of “If \(A, B\)” of the simple, extensional, truth-functional kind, like those of “\(A\) and \(B\)”, “\(A \text{ or } B\)” and “It is not the case that \(A\)”? That is, do the truth values of \(A\) and of \(B\) determine the truth value of “If \(A, B\)”? Or are they non-truth-functional, like those of “\(A\) because \(B\)”, “\(A\) before \(B\)”, “It is possible that \(A\)”? That is, are they such that the truth values of \(A\) and \(B\) may, in some cases, leave open the truth value of “If \(A, B\)”? The truth-functional theory of the conditional …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/indicative-conditionals.md

8. 08 · blog0.756

   We can thus press the point even more by noting that we make claims and construct arguments that appear to involve quantification over properties, with quantifiers reaching (i) over predicate positions, or even (ii) over both subject and predicate positions (Castañeda 1976). [ 2 ] As regards (i) consider: this apple is red; this tomato is red; hence, there is something that this apples is and this tomato also is. As for (ii), consider: wisdom is more important than beauty; Mary is wise and Elisabeth is beautiful; hence, there is something that Mary is which is more important than Mary is. Espe…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/properties.md

9. 09 · blog0.754

   For if we suppose that an idea contains something which was not in its cause, it must have got this from nothing; yet the mode of being by which a thing exists objectively (or representatively) in the intellect by way of an idea, imperfect though it may be, is certainly not nothing, and so it cannot come from nothing. (AT VII 40–1; CSM II 28–9) The challenge in the examination of the idea of God is to account for the origin of the idea’s level of objective reality. He determines that the formal reality possessed by his own mind cannot be its origin. He concludes that there must be some being t…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/descartes-theory-of-ideas.md

10. 10 · blog0.753

    But on Hook’s account, the conditional is false only if the consequent is false. I think the consequent is true: I think a sufficient condition for the truth of the conditional obtains. 2.4 Grice’s Pragmatic Defence of Truth-Functionality H. P. Grice famously defended the truth-functional account, in his William James lectures “Logic and Conversation”, delivered in 1967 (see Grice (1989); see also Thomson (1990)). There are many ways of speaking the truth yet misleading your audience, given the standards to which you are expected to conform in conversational exchange. One way is to say somethi…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/indicative-conditionals.md