Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · _intake0.973

   > perception, but a world of calculation, of mathematics. Think back to Plato, right? Who says that the truth is what is super sensible and eternal because we know that what

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/godhead/006-perception-but-a-world-of-calculation-of-mathematics.md

2. 02 · blog0.832

   One signal event in this development is Frege’s insistence that the objectivity and aprioricity of the truths of mathematics entail that numbers are neither material beings nor ideas in the mind. If numbers were material things (or properties of material things), the laws of arithmetic would have the status of empirical generalizations. If numbers were ideas in the mind, then the same difficulty would arise, as would countless others. (Whose mind contains the number 17? Is there one 17 in your mind and another in mine? In that case, the appearance of a common mathematical subject matter would …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/abstract-objects.md

3. 03 · wikisource0.823

   A platonistic ontology of this sort is, from the point of view of a strictly physicalistic conceptual scheme, as much a myth as that physicalistic conceptual scheme itself is for phenomenalism. This higher myth is a good and useful one, in turn, in so far as it simplifies our account of physics. Since mathematics is an integral part of this higher myth, the utility of this myth for physical science is evident enough. In speaking of it nevertheless as a myth, I echo that philosophy of mathematics to which I alluded earlier under the name of formalism. But an attitude of formalism may with equal…

   wikisource/on-what-there-is/page.txt

4. 04 · blog0.811

   We are now able to distinguish the enduring thing-substance, on the one side, from its variable manifestations from different points of view and on different occasions, on the other, and we thereby arrive at a new fundamental distinction between appearance and reality. This distinction is then expressed in its most developed form, for Cassirer, in the linguistic notion of propositional truth and thus in the propositional copula. Here the Kantian “categories” of space, time, substance, and causality take on a distinctively intuitive or “presentational” configuration. The distinction between app…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/ernst-cassirer.md

5. 05 · gutenberg0.810

   The greater part of the dialogue is devoted to setting up and throwing down definitions of science and knowledge. Proceeding from the lower to the higher by three stages, in which perception, opinion, reasoning are successively examined, we first get rid of the confusion of the idea of knowledge and specific kinds of knowledge,--a confusion which has been already noticed in the Lysis, Laches, Meno, and other dialogues. In the infancy of logic, a form of thought has to be invented before the content can be filled up. We cannot define knowledge until the nature of definition has been ascertained…

   gutenberg/PG-1726-theaetetus/PG-1726.txt

6. 06 · gutenberg0.801

   The Platonic doctrine of reminiscence is then adduced as a confirmation of the pre-existence of the soul. Some proofs of this doctrine are demanded. One proof given is the same as that of the Meno, and is derived from the latent knowledge of mathematics, which may be elicited from an unlearned person when a diagram is presented to him. Again, there is a power of association, which from seeing Simmias may remember Cebes, or from seeing a picture of Simmias may remember Simmias. The lyre may recall the player of the lyre, and equal pieces of wood or stone may be associated with the higher notion…

   gutenberg/PG-1658-phaedo/PG-1658.txt

7. 07 · blog0.800

   ( Ratio and intellectus may recall in some ways dianoia and noesis in Plato’s famous image of the divided line.) The title, On Conjectures , is also intriguing because here Cusanus makes explicit the limits of human knowing only hinted at in On Learned Ignorance and in his later The Layman: On Mind . As his Prologue puts it, “You have seen that the exactness of truth cannot be attained. The consequence is that every positive human assertion of the truth is a conjecture…. And so the unattainable Oneness of truth is known in conjectural otherness and the conjecture of otherness is itself known i…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/cusanus-nicolaus-nicolas-of-cusa.md

8. 08 · blog0.800

   If mathematicians talk about triangles, numbers, etc., the account of mathematical objects should at least explain the discourse. This is the problem of non-revisionism (sometimes also called naturalism ). So Aristotle says (Met. xiii.3 1077b31-33) of his own account of mathematics that “it is unqualifiedly true to say of the mathematicals that thay exist and are such as they <the mathematicians say>” (cf. Phys . iii.7 207b27-34 for an application of the principle). To solve the problems of separation and precision, contemporary philosophers such as Speusippus and possibly Plato posited a univ…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/aristotle-and-mathematics.md

9. 09 · yt0.799

   And I would say that the contemporary answer to this these basic questions, in other words, the contemporary world view is really strictly speaking the diametric opposite of the Platonist. They are antipodal because the uh contemporary world view is really premised upon the belief that the the things that compose our cosmos are made up of tiny little particles, however conceived. In other words, that it consists of holes which are the merely the sum of parts. And I would say that the basic ontological premise of not only Platonism, but all the ancient the profound ancient metaphysical schools …

   yt/V_ZWBkSNMFg-platonic-physics-in-dialogue-with-wolfgang-smith/transcript.txt

10. 10 · gutenberg0.798

    1. In reply to the first, we have only probabilities to offer. Three main points have to be decided: (a) Would Protagoras have identified his own thesis, 'Man is the measure of all things,' with the other, 'All knowledge is sensible perception'? (b) Would he have based the relativity of knowledge on the Heraclitean flux? (c) Would he have asserted the absoluteness of sensation at each instant? Of the work of Protagoras on 'Truth' we know nothing, with the exception of the two famous fragments, which are cited in this dialogue, 'Man is the measure of all things,' and, 'Whether there are gods or…

    gutenberg/PG-1726-theaetetus/PG-1726.txt