bucket foundation — inverse omegabucket.foundation

planck

the divergences so um this prompted a empirical search because this is science if lawrence environs is broken at the planck scale that's where you need to
Concept
planck
Score
4 · must · because
Status
candidate — not yet promoted to canon

Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

  1. 01 · archive0.780

    At the end of the last century my disquisitions on mechanics fared well as a rule ; it may have been felt that the empirico-critical side of this science was the most neglected. But now the Kantian traditions have gained power once more, and again we have the demand for an a priori foundation of mechanics. Now, I am indeed of the opinion that all that can be known a priori of an empirical domain must become evident to mere logical circum spection only after frequent surveys of this domain, but I do not believe that investigations like those of G. Hamel1 do any harm to the subject. Both sides o

    archive/sciemechacritica00machrich/sciemechacritica00machrich_djvu.txt

  2. 02 · yt0.772

    Whereas design theory has de facto disqualified the Darwinian mechanism it has in no way discredited the Darwinist concept of common descent which thus remains entrenched as a scientist dogma. And common descent obviates metaphysics in a domain which happens to be incurably metaphysical. Um I just thought it was a marvelous argument and uh I mean maybe it's too complex to get into here, but he says it only compounds bad science with heretical theology. For authentic evolution is indeed an unfolding. Wherever there is an outside, there also has to be an inside. And and the picture that you gave

    yt/8NWHGX53agc-dr-wolfgang-smith-renowned-physicist-on-vertical-causation-i/transcript.txt

  3. 03 · blog0.769

    Opposing these inductive-empiricist scientists were those whose roots were mostly in the theoretical side of natural science, most especially mathematical physics. To them, there was another, more logically sound, method to construct theories. First, hypotheses could be generated in any fashion, although most believed that imagining hypotheses which were based upon very general, very reasonable concepts—that the Universe’s physical processes had simple mathematical descriptions, for example—was the best place to begin; this is classic rationalist epistemology. Once the hypothesis had been gene

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/cosmology-methodological-debates-in-the-1930s-and-1940s.md

  4. 04 · blog0.768

    The nature of this proposed underdetermination of theory by evidence, and appropriate responses to it, have been central topics in philosophy of science (Stanford 2009 [2016]). Although philosophers have identified a variety of distinct senses of underdetermination, they have generally agreed that underdetermination poses a challenge to justifying scientific theories. There is a striking contrast with discussions of underdetermination among scientists, who often emphasize instead the enormous difficulty in constructing compelling rival theories. [ 16 ] This contrast reflects a disagreement reg

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/philosophy-of-cosmology.md

  5. 05 · archive0.764

    If statements of fact themselves depend upon the person who observes them, how much more distinct is the reflection of the per- sonality of him who gives an account of methods and of philosophical speculations which form the essence of science ! For this reason there will inevitably be much that is subjective in every objective exposi- tion of scieuce. And as an individual production is only significant in virtue of that which has preceded and that which is contemporary with it, it resembles a mirror which in reflecting exaggerates the size and clearness of neighbouring objects, and causes a p

    archive/principlesofchem01menduoft/principlesofchem01menduoft_djvu.txt

  6. 06 · blog0.764

    The functioning of a key depends on its rigidity whilst that of clocks and watches depend crucially on the weight of pendulum bobs or the elasticity of springs. On a number of occasions Boyle himself observed that explanations that appealed to such things as elasticity, gravity, acidity and the like fall short of the kind of explanations sought by a mechanical atomist (Chalmers 1993). To attempt to produce examples of reduction that conform to the ideal of the mechanical atomists is, in effect, to attempt to bolster the arguments from intelligibility with empirical arguments. The issue of empi

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/atomism-from-the-17th-to-the-20th-century.md

  7. 07 · blog0.763

    It also supports (N): (N) It is necessary that if Oscar is thinking that water is wet, then one of the following must be the case: (i) water exists, or (ii) Oscar theorizes that H 2 O exists, or (iii) Oscar is part of a community of speakers some of whom theorize that H 2 O exists. (Brueckner 1992a: 116) The above argument for (N) relies on “the actual existence of water…in order to individuate the notions we cite in specifying the propositional attitudes” (Burge 1982: 97), however, and therefore does not establish or presuppose that CE conceptually implies (N) (Brueckner 1992a: 116). If the h

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/content-externalism-and-skepticism.md

  8. 08 · blog0.762

    As a candidate for E, McKinsey may have had something like the following proposition in mind (from Brueckner 1992a: 112): (E1) Oscar inhabits an environment containing H 2 O and not XYZ. The problem with this candidate for E is that on a holistic theory of CE, as Burge explains, An individual or community might (logically speaking) have been wrong in thinking that there was such a thing as water. It is epistemically possible—it might have turned out—that contrary to an individual’s belief, water did not exist. (Burge 1982: 97) We may read “epistemically possible” here as “epistemically possibl

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/content-externalism-and-skepticism.md

  9. 09 · _intake0.762

    Feynman made that statement about the space shuttle disaster 30 years ago, but it fits better today with our infatuation with non-native EMF from technology gadgets. Nature cannot be fooled, but we certainly can be. In fact, we are the easiest people to be fooled by ourselves. Moreover, some professions are fooled everyday they go to work and never realize it. ***Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence!** *This is why in science, words and publications can often be meaningless, especially when they are used in such a way that no sharp conclusions can be drawn.

    _intake/kruse-blog-corpus/articles/energy-epigenetics-11-force.md

  10. 10 · yt0.762

    The world or nature behaves as though these fictions were true until it doesn’t And then we replace the convenient fictions with other ones. For instance, Newton proposed the convenient fiction that there is an invisible force called gravity, pulling celestial bodies to one another invisibly and at a distance, and instantly. And it took the French about half a century to stop laughing of this mystical idea of these invisible forces pulling things towards one another. but we know how that ended. And yet, in the early 20th century, Einstein showed that there is no such force. There is no such in

    yt/DyzHYnOqIoU-10k-subscribers-a-q-a-with-bernardo-kastrup/transcript.txt

Curation checklist

  • ☐ Verify excerpt against source recording
  • ☐ Tag tier (axiom · law · principle · primary derivation · observation)
  • ☐ Cross-cite to ≥1 primary source (PubMed / arXiv / archive.org)
  • ☐ Promote to bucket-canon/02-physics/