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periodic table

laws of periodicity which are also the laws by which motion is governed it must not be forgotten that all that Manor's creation is the result of motion which is due to the opposing impulses of
Concept
periodic table
Score
4 · must · because
Status
candidate — not yet promoted to canon

Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

  1. 01 · blog0.749

    When he submits that there is no motion besides the categories ( Physics 3.1, at 200b32–201a3), he does not assign motions to the categories of action and passion. After mentioning that the entities in the categories come in oppositions, Aristotle claims a few lines later (at 201a8–9) that there are as many kinds of motion and change as there are kinds of being. This means that motions are grouped here with the entities of the category where they effect change. [ 9 ] Nevertheless, when making this claim, Aristotle speaks about four kinds of motion and change only—those in substance, in quality

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/aristotle-s-natural-philosophy.md

  2. 02 · blog0.749

    Although many aspects of Aristotle’s causal theories were extensively and critically debated, this basic hylomorphism persisted throughout; and it is this, rather than anything more arcane, which often poses the greatest problems in assimilating, or evaluating, medieval thought on these topics. 1. Causality and Motion 1.1 Motion in General 1.2 Local Motion 2. Causality, Self-Motion, and the Will 3. Causal Accounts of Perception 4. Causality, Knowledge and Necessity 4.1 Causality and Necessity 4.2 Knowing Causal Propositions: Demonstration 5. Final Causes Bibliography Primary Literature Seconda

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/medieval-theories-of-causation.md

  3. 03 · blog0.742

    Taken together, these considerations imply that we have a complete account of the physical domain once we have a thorough description of what is natural to the entities in that domain, together with a specification of all the circumstances in which they operate. [ 41 ] Bk. 8 of the Physics argues for the additional thesis that for each motion, whether natural or contrary to nature, there needs to exist a mover. [ 42 ] In cases of forced motion, movers are present in a conspicuous way. This need not be so, however, in cases of natural motion. Apart from the cases where the nature of the entity

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/aristotle-s-natural-philosophy.md

  4. 04 · blog0.740

    Concerning the more prominent sort of change, namely, accident-replacement, two further questions were debated: one, “Does change form a single kind or not?” and two, “Where does locomotion occur, that is to say, do the initial atoms prior to the motion or the subsequent atoms after the motion receive the accident of motion?” One argument used to show that there are several kinds of motion observed that a single kind cannot bring about contradictory things, as for example, a fire does not produce cooling and heating; however, motions do bring about contraries such as being to the right or bein

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/arabic-and-islamic-natural-philosophy-and-natural-science.md

  5. 05 · blog0.739

    First, the causal relevance of these forms shows that not any arrangement or configuration can qualify as a full-fledged form. While it is true that privations are also forms in some sense ( Physics 2.1, 193b19–20), this is not the sense in which the causally operative forms, describable in evaluative terms, can be called forms. Moreover, the causal relevance of forms allows Aristotle to switch (e.g. in De generatione et corruptione 1.7) without notice between the craftsman and the craft itself as the appropriate specification of the efficient cause in these cases. We should note that in the l

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/aristotle-s-natural-philosophy.md

  6. 06 · blog0.737

    Whenever we ask for the reason of products of Nature or of the arts, the answer we get is their final cause, for instance, why does a saw have sharp teeth? To cut wood. The answer however is completely different in the case of the eternal beings. An eternal being acts because of its essence, its activity is because of itself, propter ipsum , and necessity is unconditional (LC 83F TC88). 6. Change or Motion In Book III Aristotle defines motion once as “the perfection of that which is in potentiality under the aspect that it is in potentiality” (201a10–11) and another as “the perfection of that

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/ibn-rushd-s-natural-philosophy.md

  7. 07 · blog0.736

    [ 13 ] After these considerations the crucial two categories of action and passion are eliminated. They cannot possibly house motions in the same way as the other four categories do. This is so because such a motion would require that there should be motion or change of an action or a passion. But there are no motions of motions, so even though actions and passions qualify as motions, or at least are intimately linked to motions, we can set aside action and passion as types in which motions can occur. [ 14 ] This leaves us with the shorter list of relevant categories, (1) substance, (2) qualit

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/aristotle-s-natural-philosophy.md

  8. 08 · blog0.735

    Based on the best systems account, we may now appeal to laws of nature in order to determine which events are similar and which are dissimilar. Suppose it is a law that all events \(a\) of type \(A\) are followed by events \(b\) of type \(B\). Then the events or objects similar to \(a\) are just the other instantiations of type \(A\), and likewise for type \(B\). But the law-making feature depends on epistemic considerations, and so the types determined by those laws depend on epistemic considerations. Hence, falling back to a Humean regularity theory does not solve the issue. We still need a

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/regularity-and-inferential-theories-of-causation.md

  9. 09 · yt0.734

    counting cycles while you mistake the clicking for a force. Picture a deck of cards being shuffled into mess while you try to remember the original order. You want a definition you can't unsee. Here it is. Time is the price tag [music] you attach to change so you can compare it. Time is the numbering system you use to keep track [music] of transformation. Time is not what moves. Time is what you write down when things move. And if you're still clinging to the river, ask yourself one final question that should sting. If time is the current, why can different clocks disagree? Because the current

    yt/q95GYzJlyYY-werner-heisenberg-explains-time-like-you-ve-never-seen-befor/transcript.txt

  10. 10 · blog0.732

    See the above-mentioned entry on Newton’s view of space, time, and motion as well as the entries on Leibniz’s philosophy of physics , classical theories of absolute and relational space and motion , post-Newtonian theories of absolute and relational space and motion , and the hole argument. 3. The Topology of Time It’s natural to think that time can be represented by a line. But a line has a shape. What shape should we give to the line that represents time? This is a question about the topology, or structure, of time. One natural way to answer our question is to say that time should be represe

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/time.md

Curation checklist

  • ☐ Verify excerpt against source recording
  • ☐ Tag tier (axiom · law · principle · primary derivation · observation)
  • ☐ Cross-cite to ≥1 primary source (PubMed / arXiv / archive.org)
  • ☐ Promote to bucket-canon/03-chemistry/