And the original justifications given by — it was originally Penrose, Geroch, and a few others back in the 60s in the golden era. You look at the justifications there, and it's very much metaphysics. It's Leibnizian metaphysics. It's the idea that, oh, well, nature — why would nature stop when nature could keep building? So she has to keep building. And so these extendable models are unreasonable because that's just not how nature works.
- Concept
- penrose
- Score
- 4 · must · because
- Status
- candidate — not yet promoted to canon
Corpus evidence — top 10 passages
Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).
- 01 · yt0.831
They can become bigger. And so physicists are going to want to say, hey, that's not a physically reasonable space-time. That's not a physically reasonable model of GR. And you ask, well, what's your reason? Why not? And the original justifications given by — it was originally Penrose, Geroch, and a few others back in the 60s in the golden era. You look at the justifications there, and it's very much metaphysics. It's Leibnizian metaphysics. It's the idea that, oh, well, nature — why would nature stop when…
yt/iGOGxaZZHwE-it-s-not-that-we-don-t-know-it-s-that-we-can-t/transcript.txt
- 02 · blog0.818
He refutes arguments purporting to show the actual sempiternity of the world, but not arguments adduced to show that such sempiternity is possible , while he characterizes traditional would-be proofs of a temporal beginning as invalid (“sophistic”). The central piece of the work is a demonstration that no branch of philosophy can prove the “newness” of the world. The natural scientist cannot, because that would require relying on an assumption that is not included in the principles of his science and would make them an inconsistent set if included. The natural scientist can explain how somethi…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/boethius-of-dacia.md
- 03 · blog0.799
The following reconstruction assumes that, in addition to (I) and (II), the argument rests on a couple of further principles, which might have been generally taken to be valid and thus not worth mentioning, or else which might have been generally accepted by the Stoics and for this reason omitted by Epictetus. The first additional principle is (V) If something is the case now, then it has always been the case that it will be the case. For instance, if I am in Athens now, then it has always in the past been the case that I would be in Athens (at some time). This principle gains historical plaus…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/dialectical-school.md
- 04 · blog0.798
According to Du Châtelet once this principle as stated is acknowledged, one can divide claims into the impossible and the possible: ‘It follows from this [principle] that the impossible is that which implies contradiction, and the possible does not imply it at all’ (IP §5). The possibles include the possibilities from among which God created the world. But the PC does more work for Du Châtelet than just separating out the possible from the impossible, and on this point, she leans more toward Leibniz's use of this principle than toward Wolff's use of it, for the PC secondarily divides the categ…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/milie-du-ch-telet.md
- 05 · blog0.798
The previous objection is related to another difficulty raised by Caterus. In order to illustrate that the inference from the mental to the extra-mental commits a logical error, critics have observed that if such inferences were legitimate then we could proliferate ontological arguments for supremely perfect islands, existing lions, and all sorts of things which either do not exist or whose existence is contingent and thus should not follow a priori from their concept. The trick is simply to build existence into the concept. So, while existence does not follow from the concept of lion as such,…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/descartes-ontological-argument.md
- 06 · blog0.798
Let us consider all possible things as an “aggregate” ( jumlah) . This raises two assumptions: (1) the aggregate is self-caused, or (2) the aggregate is caused by an external cause (Avicenna, al-Najāt : 2: 89). Avicenna excludes the former assumption, explaining that the nature of what is possible in itself cannot change without a cause. Hence, an aggregate of possible things remains possible in itself; it must be caused by another cause to become necessary. Given that the series of causes and effects cannot progress ad infinitum , we must conclude that the existence of an aggregate of possibl…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/isaac-albalag.md
- 07 · blog0.797
Averroes, at the beginning of his commentary on Book II follows his Master Aristotle and defines Nature as “principle and cause by reason of which that in which it is changes [primarily and per se ] and by reason of which that in which it is rests primarily and by itself” (LC 49B TC3). Aristotle’s definition in Phys. 192b21–23, reads perhaps more clearly: “Nature is the principle and cause of motion and rest in that in which [Nature] inheres primarily and by itself, and not accidentally.” According to Averroes the existence of Nature is self-evident as well as its definition; the metaphysician…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/ibn-rushd-s-natural-philosophy.md
- 08 · blog0.795
According to Du Châtelet, one must explain how a mechanism can produce a plant relying, for example, upon an explanation of how each particle of matter is able to produce the effect that it does (IP §10 and §12, p. 131–2) through simple motion. Accounting for natural change by appeal to bits of matter interacting through lawful motion and contact—but not by appeal to plastic natures and vegetative souls—is consistent with the PSR. The second point of particular importance in Du Châtelet's discussion of first principles of knowledge is what may be taken as her moderate form of nativism, in cont…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/milie-du-ch-telet.md
- 09 · blog0.793
Parmenides can be seen as arguing that any acceptable cosmological account must be rational, i.e., in conformity with the canons for proper inquiry, and must begin with metaphysically acceptable entities that are wholly and completely what they are; are not subject to generation, destruction, or alteration; and are wholly knowable i.e., graspable by thought and understanding (Parmenides B2, B3, B7, B8; see Mourelatos 2008a). Anaxagoras bases his account of the natural world on three principles of metaphysics, all of which can be seen as grounded in these Eleatic requirements: No Becoming or Pa…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/anaxagoras.md
- 10 · blog0.791
Thus, it seems that there is no convincing justification for why a separate mathematical object must be the cause of its sensible counterpart, let alone the cause (or principle) of any other natural thing. Avicenna takes this argument as refuting (PM) . These arguments show that mathematical objects are neither separate entities fully detached from the sensible world nor the causes of natural things. Avicenna’s refutation of Platonism and Pythagoreanism regarding mathematical objects was so convincing and influential that these approaches almost completely disappeared in post-Avicennian philos…
blog/plato-stanford-edu/arabic-and-islamic-philosophy-of-mathematics.md
Curation checklist
- ☐ Verify excerpt against source recording
- ☐ Tag tier (axiom · law · principle · primary derivation · observation)
- ☐ Cross-cite to ≥1 primary source (PubMed / arXiv / archive.org)
- ☐ Promote to
bucket-canon/06-cosmology/