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penrose

What was without going into the detail, what was it about? Is this Penrose's forgotten theorem? This is Penrose's theorem which hasn't even been seen because it was never published.
Concept
penrose
Score
5 · never · because
Status
candidate — not yet promoted to canon

Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

  1. 01 · blog0.750

    After all, both those with knowledge and those without it suppose that this is so—although only those with knowledge are actually in this condition. Hence, whatever is known without qualification cannot be otherwise. ( APo 71b9–16; cf. APo 71b33–72a5; Top . 141b3–14, Phys . 184a10–23; Met. 1029b3–13) For this reason, science requires more than mere deduction. Altogether, then, the currency of science is demonstration ( apodeixis ), where a demonstration is a deduction with premises revealing the causal structures of the world, set forth so as to capture what is necessary and to reveal what is

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/aristotle.md

  2. 02 · yt0.730

    I think it must have been in my second year when I did maths. I discovered a theorem which I believe is a still unknown. And I never published it. But I gave a seminar at when I was in my second year as an undergraduate Yeah. on this thing. And my father attended in must have heard about it. Yes. What was without going into the detail, what was it about? Is this Penrose's forgotten theorem? This is Penrose's theorem which hasn't even been seen because it was never published. Ah, this is this could be an exclusive. I I never did it. Yes. It was a theorem about conics. Yeah. It's not so hard to

    yt/JiDWGbsVEno-why-did-the-mathematician-cross-the-road-with-roger-penrose/transcript.txt

  3. 03 · blog0.722

    Parmenides maintained that whatever one speaks about or thinks about must in some sense exist; if it did not exist then it is nothing, so one would be speaking or thinking about nothing, which would be empty. From this thesis, it is deduced that the existing thing cannot have come into existence, because to say that it could would be to speak of a time when it did not exist. By similar reasoning, existing things are eternal because they cannot go out of existence. It is now a small step to conclude that change is an illusion, on the grounds that a change in a thing implies that there was a tim

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/change-and-inconsistency.md

  4. 04 · blog0.720

    But Nothing’s moment of understanding is also one-sided or restricted: like Being, Nothing is also an undefined content, which is its determination in its dialectical moment. Nothing thus sublates itself : since it is an undefined content , it is not pure absence after all, but has the same presence that Being did. It is present as an undefined content . Nothing thus sublates Being: it replaces (cancels) Being, but also preserves Being insofar as it has the same definition (as an undefined content) and presence that Being had. We can picture Being and Nothing like this (the circles have dashed

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/hegel-s-dialectics.md

  5. 05 · blog0.719

    This supposition, which we may call the Rylean account (since it is most explicitly defended in Ryle 1949, 25–61), has been challenged by intellectualists about know how, notably Stanley and Williamson (2001). Intellectualists argue that knowing how to perform an action is a matter of knowing a certain proposition. Stanley and Williamson’s account draws on observations about the standard treatment of embedded questions (‘know who’, ‘know where’, and so forth; see Karttunen 1977) to defend this idea. Specifically, they propose that knowing how to A is knowing that some way is a way for one to A

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/abilities.md

  6. 06 · yt0.719

    is there any nothingness the trouble sustaining multiple voids may push us to the most extreme answer to why is there something rather than nothing namely there must not only be something but there must not be any emptiness at all Parmenides maintain that it is self-defeating to say that something does not exist the linguistic rendering of this Insight is the problem of negative existentials Atlantis does not exist is about Atlantis a statement can be about something only if that something exists no relation without relata therefore Atlantis does not exist cannot be true paramenity is in his d

    yt/OiAPjAIcXVE-nothingness-stanford-encyclopedia-of-philosophy/transcript.txt

  7. 07 · yt0.718

    >> And and the thing >> I know Hilbert because it's Hilbert Space. Hbert Space. >> Tell me about that in a minute. But in this particular story, Einstein had visited Hilbert in June of 1915, showed him everything that he'd worked out for 10 years. Then Hilbert took it the final step and published before him. In the end of the day, Hilbert said, "No, no, it's your theory. It's your theory, Albert. I I'm not trying to take it from you." But he did publish a little before him. >> Even though he would not have published had Einstein not visited him. >> Yeah. He wouldn

    yt/NxMMd5kMu7o-exploring-hidden-dimensions-with-brian-greene/transcript.txt

  8. 08 · blog0.718

    From Physics iv, we have claims such as ‘There is place,’ and ‘There is no void.’ However, the examples that Aristotle uses in the Posterior Analytics are claims such as that the genus exists, or specifically that there are units, or that there are points and lines. Aristotle also points out that sometimes the hypothesis of the genus is omitted as too obvious. Only by comparing these general claims with their use in Aristotelian mathematics can we get a sense of what Aristotle means. Aristotle intends us to understand that prior to the demonstrations in a scientific treatise, the treatise shou

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/aristotle-and-mathematics.md

  9. 09 · blog0.717

    Because the thought of pure Being is undetermined and so is a pure abstraction, however, it is really no different from the assertion of pure negation or the absolutely negative (EL §87). It is therefore equally a Nothing (SL-M 82; SL-dG 59). Being’s lack of determination thus leads it to sublate itself and pass into the concept of Nothing (EL §87; SL-M 82; SL-dG 59), which illustrates the dialectical moment. But if we focus for a moment on the definitions of Being and Nothing themselves, their definitions have the same content. Indeed, both are undetermined, so they have the same kind of unde

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/hegel-s-dialectics.md

  10. 10 · blog0.716

    For if we suppose that an idea contains something which was not in its cause, it must have got this from nothing; yet the mode of being by which a thing exists objectively (or representatively) in the intellect by way of an idea, imperfect though it may be, is certainly not nothing, and so it cannot come from nothing. (AT VII 40–1; CSM II 28–9) The challenge in the examination of the idea of God is to account for the origin of the idea’s level of objective reality. He determines that the formal reality possessed by his own mind cannot be its origin. He concludes that there must be some being t

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/descartes-theory-of-ideas.md

Curation checklist

  • ☐ Verify excerpt against source recording
  • ☐ Tag tier (axiom · law · principle · primary derivation · observation)
  • ☐ Cross-cite to ≥1 primary source (PubMed / arXiv / archive.org)
  • ☐ Promote to bucket-canon/06-cosmology/