Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · gutenberg0.776

   The above remarks relate to the _matter_ of our critical inquiry. As regards the _form_, there are two indispensable conditions, which any one who undertakes so difficult a task as that of a critique of pure reason, is bound to fulfil. These conditions are _certitude_ and _clearness_.

   gutenberg/PG-4280-the-critique-of-pure-reason/PG-4280.txt

2. 02 · blog0.769

   These last two are seen to be connected with what we call cut-inductivity and id-inductivity of specifically sequent-calculus rules, via, in the former case, a proposal identifying the existence of a connective (with prescribed logical behaviour, given the perspective provided by a logic not explicitly providing such a connective) with conservative extension (of the given logic by rules for the new connective detailing that behaviour). This proposal was made by N. D. Belnap; some problems for conservative extension as a sufficient condition for granting the existence or intelligibility of a ne…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/sentence-connectives-in-formal-logic.md

3. 03 · yt0.769

   And Kant wrestled with this and I don't think I agree with his solution, but the point is there has to be a through line to all of the aspects. And the through line is not itself an aspect. It is that which binds all the aspects together. And it's so it is something beyond perception, it is something well, properly Platonic. Um and I think you can see the same thing when it comes to cultural relativism. Yes, there are different cultures and different frames, as you said, Karen. But through lines are possible. I can translate between languages. I can move between cultures. I seem to have the ab…

   yt/1Lm3y_4a--0-wolfgang-smith-and-john-vervaeke-the-perpetual-promise-inexh/transcript.txt

4. 04 · gutenberg0.767

   Indeed the structure of the whole, which is organic, not a mere chain, makes it necessary sometimes to touch on the same point twice. Moreover this construction, and the very close connection of all the parts, has not left open to me the division into chapters and paragraphs which I should otherwise have regarded as very important, but has obliged me to rest satisfied with four principal divisions, as it were four aspects of one thought. In each of these four books it is especially important to guard against losing sight, in the details which must necessarily be discussed, of the principal tho…

   gutenberg/PG-38427-the-world-as-will-and-idea-vol-1-of-3/PG-38427.txt

5. 05 · gutenberg0.766

   Proof.--Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.

   gutenberg/PG-3800-ethics/PG-3800.txt

6. 06 · blog0.765

   25–28), Burley mentions two previous accounts of the problem of the number and distinction of the ten categories. The first (from Simon of Faversham’s commentary, q. 12) claims that the categories really divide entities according to their modes of being. The second, inspired by Henry of Ghent, admits that being-in-relation-to-something-else ( esse ad aliud ), i.e., the mode of being of the seven non-absolute categories, does not involve a res distinct from substance, quantity, and quality, but only their real aspects. Although Burley does not explicitly endorse either interpretation, he is not…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/walter-burley.md

7. 07 · blog0.763

   At least one feature of such an entity, Ibn Sīnā argues, is that it must be absolutely simple. His argument assumes two modest mereological claims: one, a whole ( jumla ) exists through its parts and, two, parts are other than the whole. Now assume that the whole of the necessary existent through itself is not simple and so consists of parts. On the basis of the first mereological assumption, if the whole of the necessary existent through itself consisted of parts, then its necessary existence would be through those parts ; however, from the second assumptions those parts are other than the wh…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/arabic-and-islamic-philosophy-of-religion.md

8. 08 · blog0.763

   \(P\) determines \(Q\) iff: for a thing to be \(P\) is for it to be \(Q\), not simpliciter , but in a specific way. The parallel is useful in suggesting that determination is, like identity, a particularly intimate relation, in that determinable and determinate types and/or tokens may not be wholly distinct, and also in suggesting a modal treatment of determination. Hence just as the characterization of identity is illuminated by the following modal condition (stemming from the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals): (I) \(P\) is identical to \(Q\) only if: necessarily, for all \(x\)…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/determinables-and-determinates.md

9. 09 · blog0.762

   According to Du Châtelet once this principle as stated is acknowledged, one can divide claims into the impossible and the possible: ‘It follows from this [principle] that the impossible is that which implies contradiction, and the possible does not imply it at all’ (IP §5). The possibles include the possibilities from among which God created the world. But the PC does more work for Du Châtelet than just separating out the possible from the impossible, and on this point, she leans more toward Leibniz's use of this principle than toward Wolff's use of it, for the PC secondarily divides the categ…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/milie-du-ch-telet.md

10. 10 · blog0.760

    The Categorical Imperative comes in different formulations that Kant regards as equivalent (G 4: 421, 429, 431, 433); ultimately, it is the requirement that in deliberating, we test our motives by considering whether the principle they express can be adopted as a universal law, a principle that applies to and binds all agents endowed with rational capacities. To this extent, Kant is committed to the “constitutivist view” that the source of the categorical force of moral obligations lies in the constitutive features of rational agency (Rawls 2000: 263–265; O’Neill 1989a, Korsgaard 1996a: 236ff)…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/constructivism-in-metaethics.md