Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · yt0.784

   But we still need to accept this validity of classical concepts inside a certain domain to be able to go further towards uh micro objects ruled by quantum rules and quantum theories. So the classical ordering of experience around us on at the m microscopical level is a condition of possibility of quantum knowledge according to bore. And therefore I could call that an anthropological condition of possibility of microscopic of macrofysical knowledge. And this was formulated beautifully by Heisenberg who unders understood well some parts of Neilsb's thinking. He said that what Kant had not forese…

   yt/pYRLapWBqJY-bohr-s-complementarity-and-kant-s-epistemology/transcript.txt

2. 02 · yt0.780

   Um, well, it's a curious word you used there, which was explain. Ah, because Yes. Yeah. I I should take that back, right? Yes. You know, because the the right I mean, I don't think this was exactly Boore's attitude. The common attitude is calculate. Predict tell me what the numbers will be, and if the numbers are right, that's all I want. Absolutely. Boore was actually trying to make a much more profound argument which was that a certain sort of explanation which had been provided by classical physics was no longer available. Just could not could not be found. There wasn't that nature didn't p…

   yt/VbXEc9vpeIM-what-we-ve-gotten-wrong-about-quantum-physics-world-science-/transcript.txt

3. 03 · arxiv0.780

   `Philosophy' was speakable for John Bell but is not for many physicists. The border between philosophy and physics is here illustrated through Brownian motion and Bell experiments. `Measurement', however, was unspeakable for Bell. His insistence that the physics of quantum measurement should not be confined to the laboratory and that physics is concerned with the big world outside leads us to examples from zoology, meteorology and cosmology.

   arxiv/quant-ph_0012021-speakable-and-unspeakable-after-john-bell/info.md

4. 04 · blog0.779

   But he finds real interest in Anderson’s conception of the categories, as elaborated in the lectures on Samuel Alexander, recently published as Space, Time and the Categories: Lectures on Metaphysics ( STC – published from typescript lectures in Armstrong’s possession and originally presented in 1949–50). In his introduction to these lectures, Armstrong writes: The categories of being dive so deep that though quantum physics and other physics may have interesting things to say to philosophy – in particular whether causation is in fact deterministic – the issues are not susceptible of being res…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/john-anderson.md

5. 05 · blog0.775

   Reductive causal explanations function in precisely the same way in aesthetics, and this links directly to the problems in philosophical methodology that he adumbrated in the Blue and Brown Books (BB: 17–19), particularly where he discusses what he calls “the craving for generality” and the attendant “contemptuous attitude toward the particular case”. If the paradigm of the sciences (which themselves, as he observes in passing, carry an imprimatur of epistemic prestige and the image of incontrovertibility) is Newtonian mechanics, and we then implant that model under our subsequent thinking abo…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/wittgenstein-s-aesthetics.md

6. 06 · archive0.771

   must occupy a place among the natural sciences side by side with mechanics ; for mechanics treats of matter as a system of ponderable points having scarcely any individuality and only standing in a certain state of mobile equilibrium. For chemistry, matter is an entire world of life, with an infinite variety of individuality both in the elements and in their combinations. In studying the general uniformity from a mechanical point of view, I think that the highest point of knowledge of nature cannot be attained without taking into account the indi- viduality of things in which chemistry is set …

   archive/principlesofchem01menduoft/principlesofchem01menduoft_djvu.txt

7. 07 · wikisource0.771

   A platonistic ontology of this sort is, from the point of view of a strictly physicalistic conceptual scheme, as much a myth as that physicalistic conceptual scheme itself is for phenomenalism. This higher myth is a good and useful one, in turn, in so far as it simplifies our account of physics. Since mathematics is an integral part of this higher myth, the utility of this myth for physical science is evident enough. In speaking of it nevertheless as a myth, I echo that philosophy of mathematics to which I alluded earlier under the name of formalism. But an attitude of formalism may with equal…

   wikisource/on-what-there-is/page.txt

8. 08 · blog0.768

   We are now able to distinguish the enduring thing-substance, on the one side, from its variable manifestations from different points of view and on different occasions, on the other, and we thereby arrive at a new fundamental distinction between appearance and reality. This distinction is then expressed in its most developed form, for Cassirer, in the linguistic notion of propositional truth and thus in the propositional copula. Here the Kantian “categories” of space, time, substance, and causality take on a distinctively intuitive or “presentational” configuration. The distinction between app…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/ernst-cassirer.md

9. 09 · yt0.767

   Um He had a wonderful So, philosophy is not a quest for knowledge, it's a quest for understanding. Understanding of what? Understanding of our conceptual scheme and the way it hangs together. The the the network of concepts we employ in our everyday thought and language hang together by logical connections of certain sorts. I mean, if something is red, then it's colored. If something's red all over, it can't be green all over at the same time. If something is is red, then it's more like something orange than it is like something yellow. These are necessary truths. These are structural truths. …

   yt/sVKWlEq09tQ-wittgenstein-s-contribution-to-philosophy/transcript.txt

10. 10 · blog0.767

    His own initial account of inference is that it is ‘ideal experiment’: ‘ideal’ in that these are thought-experiments which remain in the realm of idea, but nevertheless experiments in that their results are not guaranteed in advance by a complete set of logical laws which infallibly determine their own application (a view reminiscent of Wittgenstein). But later, after a long and tangled consideration of the question of how it is possible for a deductive inference to be reflected in reality, he comes up with a revised account: ‘Every inference is the ideal self-development of an object taken as…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/francis-herbert-bradley.md