Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · blog0.742

   Hence, it is arguable that Schier and Wollheim mistook a disanalogy between pictures and words for a disanalogy between pictures and conventional signs in general. (3) invites two questions. First, what explains the fact that a picture has a particular denotation, e.g., that Goya’s portrait denotes the Duke of Wellington? Second, denotation is a relation—the relation between a name and its bearer, or between a predicate and the members of its extension. So Goodman’s theory also faces the question raised earlier about resemblance theories of depiction, regarding pictures of fictional individual…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/depiction.md

2. 02 · blog0.736

   Because these features are temporary and fleeting, they do not belong to the real nature of things, so the perceptions do not qualify as true; but (assuming our senses are functioning normally) they are features the things do actually manifest on particular occasions. As for the epistemological interpretation, some scholars have suggested that the manuscripts are in error at this point, and that what the text should say is “ on account of the fact that ( dia to ) neither our sensations nor our opinions tell the truth or lie”. The change is justified on linguistic grounds; it is alleged that th…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/pyrrho.md

3. 03 · blog0.736

   This may be seen as a disadvantage vis-à-vis “perceptual” theories of depiction such as those proposed, for instance, by Richard Wollheim (1987) and Kendall Walton (1990) (cf. Robinson 2000). Yet concerns on Goodman’s treating the concept of depiction as ambiguous are misplaced, for the phrase “picture of” and its cognates can be easily shown to admit two different interpretations. What can be called the phrase’s relational sense has to do with what, if anything, a picture refers to; the non-relational sense, instead, has to do with, as Goodman would say, the sort of picture it is, or better w…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/goodman-s-aesthetics.md

4. 04 · yt0.735

   The second thing is that it's [snorts] not just individuals that have to make these choices between two different ways of viewing the world. [snorts] And most most of the time we we don't obviously consciously choose. It just happens. In a society that relentlessly feeds back to us a mechanistic rationalistic vision of the world, there is no room for all the things that really matter to us. And this is where I want to come back to the implicit. Everything that matters to you is degraded when it is made explicit. The most obvious example is a joke. Once you've made it explicit, it's just not fu…

   yt/FOsX666lCPk-how-left-brain-thinking-is-killing-civilization-dr-iain-mcgi/transcript.txt

5. 05 · blog0.734

   For comparison, the referential relation between the indexical “now” and the time it refers to is neither reflexive nor symmetric, but this does not prevent us from explaining how “now” refers to a specific time in terms of simultaneity (between the use of the word and the time referred to), which is both. However, the example of a portrait brings us to another objection to resemblance theories of depiction, which Goodman mentions in passing (1968: 25), and others have accorded greater weight (Hopkins 1998b; Abell 2009). For if resemblance is a relation, and if the relata of a relation must be…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/depiction.md

6. 06 · yt0.732

   And that, too, is an intuitive way of saying, "Yeah, however rigorously we can define it or defend it, something like this does seem to go on in our minds at certain kinds of moments of experience." We just feel differently looking at a certain work of art or a certain landscape, let's say, than we feel looking at other sorts of things. Maybe we don't know why. Maybe we doubt that the difference is absolute in the way that Kant wants to insist it is. Nevertheless, we have in tendency feelings of this kind and we should acknowledge them because again, at least in terms of a weak understanding o…

   yt/mT7roDHocuc-5-the-idea-of-the-autonomous-artwork/transcript.txt

7. 07 · blog0.731

   Furthermore, it is hard to see how one can paint an inaccurate portrait of someone, just as it is hard to see how one can use an inaccurate description to refer to someone (e.g., “ The man drinking a martini is my brother”, when he is actually drinking a daiquiri), if whom one refers to depends purely on the syntax and semantics of the phrase (Kripke 1977). Regarding the second question, concerning pictures of fictional individuals and genre pictures, Goodman argues that the verbs “depict” and “represent” are “highly ambiguous” (1968: 22). In the sentence “Goya’s portrait represents the Duke o…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/depiction.md

8. 08 · blog0.728

   But is this reintroduction of the concept of resemblance compatible with his nominalist theory of properties and his attack on the doctrine of the “innocent eye”? The second difficulty with (1) is that digital photographs would normally be classified as pictures along with analog ones (Bach 1970; Kulvicki 2006); and some diagrams, which would not normally be classified as pictures, are analog and relatively replete (Peacocke 1987). Furthermore, outline drawings are less replete than diagrams in which not only shape but also colour affects what they represent, but the former would normally be c…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/depiction.md

9. 09 · gutenberg0.727

   This discontinued way of writing may have occasioned, besides others, two contrary faults, viz., that too little and too much may be said in it. If thou findest anything wanting, I shall be glad that what I have written gives thee any desire that I should have gone further. If it seems too much to thee, thou must blame the subject; for when I put pen to paper, I thought all I should have to say on this matter would have been contained in one sheet of paper; but the further I went the larger prospect I had; new discoveries led me still on, and so it grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in…

   gutenberg/PG-10615-an-essay-concerning-humane-understanding-volume-1-mdcxc-based-on-the-2/PG-10615.txt

10. 10 · blog0.726

    But in Broad’s view this could not be so: “If he carefully inspects the objective constituents of these perceptual situations he will certainly find that they seem to be of different shapes and sizes” (1925, p. 158). The objective constituent will in most of the situations seem elliptical rather than circular. This indicates, Broad claims, that in each perceptual situation, the constituent—the sensuously manifested item—cannot be the top of the penny. What happens is that instead of being immediately aware of the circular surface of the penny (as he takes himself to be) he is immediately aware…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/charlie-dunbar-broad.md