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intentionality

because he warned us against that we should never talk about like this is touching the other because then you are basically attributing both understanding activity subjectivity intentionality to
Concept
intentionality
Score
5 · never · because
Status
candidate — not yet promoted to canon

Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

  1. 01 · yt0.799

    It would seem like if you're just slapping a label on things, you're actually preserving the thing separately from the concept. But no, he says it it sort of suggests not that preservation of the nonidentity of the object, but just it's what he calls it suppression or its occlusion, right? sort of hidden under the concept. Conversely, when we try to articulate what something essentially is, that would seem to be a collapsing of the difference between concept and object. And yet, it's just in that attempt to do so that the nonidentity of the object with its concept is expressed. is revealed mea

    yt/88CFLcDqNak-chris-cutrone-lecture-on-adorno-s-negative-dialectics-2/transcript.txt

  2. 02 · blog0.791

    Given the pressures just noted in favor of the inclusive reading of the interaction principle, we shall assume that it applies to all mental events in what follows. The interaction claim itself should be understood in terms that bring out the all-important extensional understanding of causation for Davidson, as follows: events that have a mental description cause and are caused by events that have a physical description. This formulation brings out his view that events are causally related no matter how they are described, and also leaves open the possibility, which Davidson will subsequently

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/anomalous-monism.md

  3. 03 · blog0.789

    (LA: 14) But there is, as he next says, a “Why?” to such a case of aesthetic discomfort, if not a cause (on the conventional simplified-scientific, cause-and-effect model). But both the question and its multiform answers can take significantly different forms in different cases. Again, if what he suggested before concerning the importance of context for the determination of meaning is correct, the very meaning of the “Why?”-question will vary case to case. It is important to note that this is not a weaker thesis concerning variation on the level of inflection, where the underlying structure of

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/wittgenstein-s-aesthetics.md

  4. 04 · yt0.782

    He re realized that uh the new situation disclosed that I quote in the process we may have to learn what the word understanding really means again it's fantastic in other words with hideer famous being and time if I am it means for me to be and I'm constantly taking care of it this organ and if I choose not to wash my hair not to drink carsburg is not my case uh or to believe in objective reality or uh to theory of everything. It is only one from nalist possibilities of continually taking care of my being all the time and thus I constantly somehow understand how to be or our being. So everyday

    yt/CHBrHX0ijvs-grygar-bohr-s-framework-of-complementarity-in-the-light-of-h/transcript.txt

  5. 05 · yt0.781

    This is at one level a direct response to Moore, yet how uncanny these lines become in light of the narrative disclosure of the family catastrophe. If any of you are prompted to read Wittgenstein "On Certainty" after hearing this paper, you'll be astonished to discover how often the philosopher returns to the hand as his exemplary question. For example, if I don't know whether someone has two hands, say whether they've been amputated or not, I shall believe his assurance that he has two hands if he is trustworthy. Or, the idealist's questions would be something like, what right have I not to d

    yt/PXONvpL2S40-on-uncertainty-wittgenstein-habits-of-thought-and-thoughts-o/transcript.txt

  6. 06 · yt0.781

    So we will see that subject and object theory and practice thinking and acting right there is a significance to the fact that he is saying thinking rather than theory that he's saying thinking rather than consciousness part of this is in uh the sections of negative dialectics that we're not reading in the course and that's the discussion of Haidiger He does make mention of it elsewhere. So, Haidiger certainly uses the term thinking rather than concepts and rather than consciousness. Meaning he tries to radicalize philosophy by restricting it to a function of thinking. and what our thinking ind

    yt/88CFLcDqNak-chris-cutrone-lecture-on-adorno-s-negative-dialectics-2/transcript.txt

  7. 07 · blog0.780

    And in working underground in this way, he reveals the analogies to cases of genuine scientific explanation, where the “tracing of a mechanism” just is the process of giving a causal account, i.e., where the observed effect is described as the inevitable result of prior links in the causal chain leading to it. If, to take his example, an architect designs a door and we find ourselves in a state of discontentment because the door, within the larger design of the façade (within its stylistic “language-game”, we might say), is too low, we are liable to describe this on the model of scientific exp

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/wittgenstein-s-aesthetics.md

  8. 08 · blog0.779

    After all, Locke himself diagnosed the difficulty: Body as far as we can conceive being able only to strike and affect body; and Motion, according to the utmost reach of our Ideas , being able to produce nothing but Motion, so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, or the Idea of a Colour, or Sound, we are fain to quit our Reason, go beyond our Ideas , and attribute it wholly to the good Pleasure of our Maker. (Locke 1975, 541; Essay 4.3.6) And, when Descartes was pressed by Elizabeth as to how mind and body interact, [ 4 ] she rightly regarded his answers as unsatisfactory. The ba

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/george-berkeley.md

  9. 09 · yt0.777

    So certainly he doesn't want to do and this is why it's in the dialectics of identity. He doesn't want to do a romantic capital R romantic. You know what Robert Pippen called the romantic recoil from modernity. He doesn't want to do what he calls back to nature. Right? So it says we too finally need to free ourselves from universal coercion just as freedom can come to be real only through coercive civilization and not by way of any back to nature. So when he says object he also means everything that's objectified he also means what has been objectivated to use that language again that we first

    yt/88CFLcDqNak-chris-cutrone-lecture-on-adorno-s-negative-dialectics-2/transcript.txt

  10. 10 · yt0.776

    But the the objective side is that there's certain things, whatever they may be, which don't depend significantly, which we can agree on in common and don't depend significantly on how we think. Well, I'm thinking of relative to dualistic thinking, the idea of us and them, you and me. And in some ways, that's part of the problem, isn't it? Yes, it's it's part of the problem. You see because if I think of I as the subject and you are an object right I I could then manipulate you for to my use you as a means to my ends right or I may even think of myself as I split myself in two say I am the sub

    yt/tzlx1AXVp7s-essential-reality-david-bohm/transcript.txt

Curation checklist

  • ☐ Verify excerpt against source recording
  • ☐ Tag tier (axiom · law · principle · primary derivation · observation)
  • ☐ Cross-cite to ≥1 primary source (PubMed / arXiv / archive.org)
  • ☐ Promote to bucket-canon/07-mind/