Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · blog0.818

   It can well be fundamental to the nature of mind that its states can be of or about things or “point beyond themselves”. But getting a satisfactory grasp of such mental pointing in all its generality presents theoretical challenges. A second approach to intentionality may start from the idea that the potential reference to the non-existent just discussed is closely associated with the potential for falsehood, error, inaccuracy, illusion, hallucination, and dissatisfaction. What makes it possible to believe (or even just suppose) something about Shangri La is that one can falsely believe (or su…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/consciousness-and-intentionality.md

2. 02 · gutenberg0.817

   _M._ As if it did not follow that whatever you speak of in that manner either is or is not. Are you not acquainted with the first principles of logic? For this is the first thing they lay down, Whatever is asserted (for that is the best way that occurs to me, at the moment, of rendering the Greek term [Greek: axiôma]; if I can think of a more accurate expression hereafter, I will use it), is asserted as being either true or false. When, therefore, you say, "Miserable M. Crassus," you either say this, "M. Crassus is miserable," so that some judgment may be made whether it is true or false, or y…

   gutenberg/PG-14988-cicero-s-tusculan-disputations-also-treatises-on-the-nature-of-the-god/PG-14988.txt

3. 03 · blog0.817

   Under the supposition that \(k\) is true, we have thus derived a conditional together with its antecedent. Using modus ponens within the scope of the supposition, we now derive the conditional’s consequent under that same supposition: (3) Under the supposition that \(k\) is true, it is the case that time is infinite . The rule of conditional proof now entitles us to affirm a conditional with our supposition as antecedent: (4) If \(k\) is true then time is infinite. But, since (4) just is \(k\) itself, we thus have (5) \(k\) is true. Finally, putting (4) and (5) together by modus ponens , we ge…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/curry-s-paradox.md

4. 04 · blog0.807

   Will this not also involve an apparent reference to the nonexistent? (For discussion of these issues, see Thomasson 1999 and Crane 2013.) And questions about the proper understanding of the relationship among perception, illusion and hallucination remain. A third important way to conceive of intentionality, one particularly central to the analytic tradition derived from the study of Frege and Russell (see Section 4), is based on the notion of mental (or intentional) content . Often it is assumed: to have intentionality is to have content. But what is content? Here appeal is sometimes made to t…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/consciousness-and-intentionality.md

5. 05 · blog0.805

   Given the pressures just noted in favor of the inclusive reading of the interaction principle, we shall assume that it applies to all mental events in what follows. The interaction claim itself should be understood in terms that bring out the all-important extensional understanding of causation for Davidson, as follows: events that have a mental description cause and are caused by events that have a physical description. This formulation brings out his view that events are causally related no matter how they are described, and also leaves open the possibility, which Davidson will subsequently …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/anomalous-monism.md

6. 06 · blog0.804

   (McDaniel 2016: 308) Thus McDaniel, like Olafson, argues that Heidegger uses the word ‘being’ in equivocal ways (see McDaniel 2016: 317). Heidegger’s (apparent) answer to the being-question is that time (or temporality ) is what allows us to make sense of being—that time is “the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being” (SZ 1). Thus, Heidegger intended to argue in Being and Time that only if and when “temporality temporalizes itself” “can entities manifest themselves as entities” (GA26: 274/211–2). Consequently, “[t]he fundamental subject of research in ontology … is temporal…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/martin-heidegger.md

7. 07 · blog0.802

   ‘Ronald McDonald’ seems like a referring term, open to existential generalization, in the sense that a sentence like ‘Ronald McDonald does not exist’ entails ‘There is something that does not exist’, and ‘exists’ seems like a predicate that applies or fails to apply to the designation of subject-place terms, on a par with a predicate like ‘sits’. The Meinongian embraces these appearances and concludes that reality includes referents for empty names and those referents do not exist. The Meinongian trades logical and semantic simplicity for metaphysical abundance. Meinongianism is the thesis tha…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/existence.md

8. 08 · blog0.802

   Some Brentano scholars have recently argued that this immanent reading of the intentionality thesis is too strong. In the light of other texts by Brentano from the same period they argue that he distinguishes between intentional correlate and object, and that the existence of the latter does not depend on our being directed towards it. When Brentano’s students took up his notion of intentionality to develop more systematic accounts, they often criticized it for its unclarity regarding the ontological status of the intentional object: if the intentional object is part of the act, it was argued,…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/franz-brentano.md

9. 09 · blog0.800

   2.1 Some Expressions that Have Been Said to Be Indexicals 2.2 Strict Contextualism, Invariantism with Hidden Indexicals, and Invariantism with Unarticulated Constituents 2.3 Strategies for Resisting Attributions of Context-Sensitivity 2.4 Proposed Tests for Indexicality 3. Kaplan’s Theory of Indexicals 3.1 An Example (Again) and Kaplan’s Distinctions 3.2 Some Basics of Kaplan’s Theory 3.3 True Demonstratives in Kaplan’s Theory 3.4 Character 3.5 Direct Reference and Rigid Designation 3.6 Utterances and Expressions in Kaplan’s Theory 3.7 Kaplan’s Logic for Indexicals: A Few Formal Details 3.8 Mo…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/indexicals.md

10. 10 · blog0.800

    Because the thought of pure Being is undetermined and so is a pure abstraction, however, it is really no different from the assertion of pure negation or the absolutely negative (EL §87). It is therefore equally a Nothing (SL-M 82; SL-dG 59). Being’s lack of determination thus leads it to sublate itself and pass into the concept of Nothing (EL §87; SL-M 82; SL-dG 59), which illustrates the dialectical moment. But if we focus for a moment on the definitions of Being and Nothing themselves, their definitions have the same content. Indeed, both are undetermined, so they have the same kind of unde…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/hegel-s-dialectics.md