Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · blog0.740

   Firstly, introspection might be constrained by informational bottlenecks that may not apply to phenomenal consciousness. Secondly, introspection might lack sensitivity to disunity, that is, in those cases that our conscious experience is disunified, we may not be able to introspectively tell that it is so. Lastly, introspection could itself be a mechanism for unifying otherwise disunified experiences. Whether these observations undermine the epistemic significance of introspection is not a straightforward matter. [ 21 ] 3. Disorders of Unity Several disorders have been historically discussed a…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-unity-of-consciousness.md

2. 02 · blog0.731

   The Metaphysics of Unity 2.1 The Nature of Unity 2.1.1 Oneness-first Views 2.1.2 Relation-first Views 2.1.3 Does Unity Have a Uniform Nature? 2.1.4 Unity and Experiential Parts 2.2 Experiential Parts or No Experiential Parts 2.2.1 Arguments Against EP 2.3 The Unity Thesis 3. Disorders of Unity 3.1 Split-Brains 3.1.1 Models of Consciousness in Split-Brain Subjects 3.1.2 The Two-streams Model and its Variants 3.1.3 The Switch Model 3.1.4 The Partial Unity Model 3.1.5 Split-Brains and the Unity Thesis 3.2 Other Disorders of Unity 3.2.1 Dissociative Identity Disorder 3.2.2 Schizophrenia 4. Unity A…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-unity-of-consciousness.md

3. 03 · yt0.729

   Suppose that each function in the brain occurred in 10 different places at random. Then, if you removed half the brain, how many functions would you lose? Well, almost no arithmetic tells you would lose about one part in the 1,000. And so, in fact, you would never be able to detect it. So this idea that the brain has enormous redundancy-- well, now change that number to five. Suppose each function is somewhat supported in five different parts of the brain. Then if you take off half the brain, then-- what am I saying? One part in 32 chance of losing some significant function, so probably lots o…

   yt/6AS48fTXBBs-2-falling-in-love/transcript.txt

4. 04 · blog0.729

   When an arrangement breaks apart (or “passes away”) the ingredients are dissociated from one another (through separation) and can be re-mixed to form (or “become”) different arrangements, i.e., other perceptible objects. One way to think of Anaxagoras’ point in B17 is that animals, plants, human beings, the heavenly bodies, and so on, are natural constructs . They are constructs because they depend for their existence and character on the ingredients of which they are constructed (and the pattern or structure that they acquire in the process). Yet they are natural because their construction oc…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/anaxagoras.md

5. 05 · pubmed0.727

   In two recent papers, Paul Smolensky responds to a challenge Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn posed for connectionist theories of cognition: to explain the existence of systematic relations among cognitive capacities without assuming that mental processes are causally sensitive to the constituent structure of mental representations. Smolensky thinks connectionists can explain systematicity if they avail themselves of "distributed" mental representation. In facts, Smolensky offers two accounts of distributed mental representation, corresponding to his notions of "weak" and "strong" compositional …

   pubmed/PMID-2354612-connectionism-and-the-problem-of-systematicity-why-smolensky/info.md

6. 06 · blog0.726

   This case demonstrates the elegance and the power of the possible-worlds framework. Our model of Fred’s doxastic state is obviously finite, and not only that, it is quite small, to boot: three nodes interconnected by four arrows. And yet, this very simple finite structure supports infinitely many beliefs about beliefs. At the same time, our model of Fred’s doxastic state raises doubts about the framework. It is widely agreed, and with good reason, that it is psychologically challenging to have higher-order mental states, let alone mental states of any order (Armstrong forthcoming). This consen…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/common-ground-in-pragmatics.md

7. 07 · blog0.726

   The bulk of the entry is devoted to synchronic phenomenal unity, the phenomenal unity of experiences had during the same interval of time. We will discuss two broad topics: the metaphysics of synchronic unity and disorders of unity. In the section on the metaphysics of unity we will focus on some interrelated questions about the nature of unity. The section on disorders of unity focuses on the contemporary debate over unity in split-brain subjects and a few other disorders. We will review several positions about the structure of consciousness in these conditions. Synchronic phenomenal unity is…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-unity-of-consciousness.md

8. 08 · yt0.725

   so the association creates a cognitive boundary within a single mind that leads to the appearance of multiple disconnect centers of awareness in Psychiatry these different centers of awareness go under the technical name alters for alternative personalities Studies by Harvard show that 25 of people with dissociative identity disorder have dreams in which multiple authors partake at the same time they experience the same dream each from its own perspective and they see one another as characters within the dream they can even Club each other over the head speak to One Another Touch one another a…

   yt/57Oguwg7omc-are-we-dissociated-alters-of-a-universal-mind-understanding-/transcript.txt

9. 09 · blog0.725

   It is an open question how common this practice is, nor is it certain at all that we covertly engage in such attributions on a regular basis. But while these issues remain to be settled, the least we can say for now is that the mentalist view on common ground is coherent and receives some support from empirical facts. Provided, that is, that common ground is bounded. For, if it is a structure of mental states, the notion that common ground is unbounded, i.e., that this structure is infinitely large, is very much in dispute: the arguments in its favour are weak, at best, and although the argume…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/common-ground-in-pragmatics.md

10. 10 · yt0.724

    So I'm not saying it's   the brain that causes the crisis we're in, but  the brain has become hijacked in a way by the   way we are thinking now, and that that's important  for us to realize. So in the books, essentially   they start from a few interesting questions, which  puzzled me a lot and were not talked about in my   medical training. Why is the brain divided at all?  If it's this supercomputer, why waste computing   power by dividing it into two chunks in this way?  I don't believe it is a computer by the way. &…

    yt/dogVQDydRGQ-iain-mcgilchrist-wisdom-nature-and-the-brain-the-great-simpl/transcript.txt