Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · yt0.802

   In any case, it's another example that we can take from our experience of the uneasy sense we may have that to infer a spatial moment from which the irreducibly temporal nature of experience is derived-- to infer a moment from the fact of this experience as a necessary cause of it-- is always problematic. It always necessarily must, as Derrida would say, put this sense of a spatial full presence of everything there at once in systematic order-- as Derrida would say, must put that "under erasure." In other words, in a certain sense you can't do without it. Derrida never really claims that you c…

   yt/Np72VPguqeI-10-deconstruction-i/transcript.txt

2. 02 · yt0.800

   There's still a lot more of the text and so that first fragment a part, but I immediately begin to form an opinion about this part with respect to an imagined or supposed whole. Then, I use this sense I have of what the whole must be like to continue to read successive parts--lines, sentences, whatever they may be. I keep referring those successive parts back to a sense of the whole which changes as a result of knowing more and more parts. The circularity of this interpretative engagement has to do with moving back and forth between a certain preconception about the whole that I form from stud…

   yt/iWnA7nZO4EY-3-ways-in-and-out-of-the-hermeneutic-circle/transcript.txt

3. 03 · _intake0.798

   In physics, there is nothing that really corresponds to now or the present. Special relativity has shown us that the “present” is also subjective to the context we use it. Einstein taught us with relativity theory that time is always relative in the universe. One of the most odd aspects of the Theory of realtivity, from my perspective, is that it says our experience of the passage of time does not need to reflect a fundamental aspect of the reality we observe. Therefore, it should raise the question, if time is not fundamental, where does it come from, and why do we have vivid experience of th…

   _intake/kruse-blog-corpus/articles/reality-1-holes-reality-make-time.md

4. 04 · yt0.797

   Gadamer says, and here again he's attacking historicism: The text that is understood historically is forced to abandon its claim that it is uttering something true. We think we understand when we see the past from a historical standpoint, i.e., place ourselves in the historical situation and seek to reconstruct the historical horizon. [I've been attempting to summarize this position and so I trust that it's easily intelligible as I read it to you now.] In fact, however, we have given up the claim to find, in the past, any truth valid and intelligible for ourselves. And, by the way, this would …

   yt/iWnA7nZO4EY-3-ways-in-and-out-of-the-hermeneutic-circle/transcript.txt

5. 05 · blog0.790

   So, let us start with the simplest argument that we can formulate. If we reflect on experience in general, what we cannot deny is that experience is conditioned by time. Every experience, necessarily, takes place in the present. In the present experience, there is the kernel or point of the now. What is happening right now is a kind of event, different from every other now I have ever experienced. Yet, also in the present, I remember the recent past and I anticipate what is about to happen. The memory and the anticipation consist in repeatability. Because what I experience now can be immediate…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/jacques-derrida.md

6. 06 · yt0.788

   If you want to know do we have a free will, that's I don't agree with this, but that's the predominant opinion, you ask you ask cognitivist brain brain scientists. On the other hand, we had what I, with all the irony, call discourse post-modern historicist discourse analysis. Where ultimately they don't even approach this. They dismiss them as naive ontological questions. All amounts to uh to within which discourse a certain question moves. For example, if one were to ask Michel Foucault, do we have a free soul? His answer would have been, do you know that the question you're raising now is on…

   yt/3deVNo03awg-slavoj-zizek-vs-terry-pinkard-how-to-read-hegel/transcript.txt

7. 07 · yt0.783

   Hegel says in the encyclopedia, the difference between us The only the real difference between us and the animals is animals have purposes just like we do. But we have purposes as purposes. We entertain them in that kind of way. In that way we have political projects which say the animals will not have in this case. So, I think that there's one of the features of Hegel is that he is in fact uh right in fact trying to overcome the materialism idealism or the naturalism idealism kind of dichotomy here with a much more nuanced view about what it means to be a self-conscious life you know, that's …

   yt/3deVNo03awg-slavoj-zizek-vs-terry-pinkard-how-to-read-hegel/transcript.txt

8. 08 · blog0.778

   Furthermore, from the very nature of the case the general notion of physical object “cannot have been derived by abstraction from observed instances of it, as the notion of ‘red’ no doubt has been.” [ 9 ] In fact, general concept of a physical object “is not ‘got out of’ experience until it has been ‘put into’ experience. It is best described as an innate principle of interpretation which we apply to the data of sense-perception” (1925, p. 217). 3. Time It is possible to distinguish roughly three different phases in Broad’s philosophy of time. In his (1921a) Broad defends a Russellian theory o…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/charlie-dunbar-broad.md

9. 09 · yt0.777

   I'll say again, somewhat in advance perhaps of the time I should say it, that Gadamer thinks that there's something immoral about historicism. Why? Because it condescends toward the past. It supposes that the past is simply a repository of information, and it never supposes for a minute that if we actually merge ourselves with the moment of the past, the past may be able to tell us something we ought to know-- that is to say, it may be able actually to teach us something. Gadamer believes that historicism forgets the possibility of being taught something by past-ness or otherness. Now I think …

   yt/iWnA7nZO4EY-3-ways-in-and-out-of-the-hermeneutic-circle/transcript.txt

10. 10 · yt0.775

    I think they should actually show us a little bit more about how we can understand the organization of the things around us and within us as systems of signs. We know that we've already learned from Heidegger and the hermeneutic tradition that we know them as something, but it remained to show how we know them. That is to say, we don't know them positively. I mean, Heidegger raises the interesting fact that we spontaneously recognize something. But that's one of the things which could be dangerous for semiotics because it would make us think or assume that we know things positively-- without t…

    yt/VsMfaIOsT3M-8-semiotics-and-structuralism/transcript.txt