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hegel

are constrained. Hegel says the truth is neither and both. Freedom is the process of working through the contradiction, not escaping it. And this process never ends. Every resolution creates new
Concept
hegel
Score
9 · rule · never · causes
Status
candidate — not yet promoted to canon

Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

  1. 01 · blog0.792

    The speculative moment is thus “truly not empty, abstract nothing , but the negation of certain determinations ” (EL-GSH §82). When the result “is taken as the result of that from which it emerges”, Hegel says, then it is “in fact, the true result; in that case it is itself a determinate nothingness, one which has a content” (PhG-M §79). As he also puts it, “the result is conceived as it is in truth, namely, as a determinate negation [ bestimmte Negation]; a new form has thereby immediately arisen” (PhG-M §79). Or, as he says, “[b]ecause the result, the negation, is a determinate negation [bes

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/hegel-s-dialectics.md

  2. 02 · blog0.791

    In the Phenomenology of Spirit , which presents Hegel’s epistemology or philosophy of knowledge, the “opposing sides” are different definitions of consciousness and of the object that consciousness is aware of or claims to know. As in Plato’s dialogues, a contradictory process between “opposing sides” in Hegel’s dialectics leads to a linear evolution or development from less sophisticated definitions or views to more sophisticated ones later. The dialectical process thus constitutes Hegel’s method for arguing against the earlier, less sophisticated definitions or views and for the more sophist

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/hegel-s-dialectics.md

  3. 03 · blog0.785

    So long as we think that what has always and alone to be decided is whether a certain action was done freely or was not, we get nowhere: but so soon as we turn instead to the numerous other adverbs used in the same connexion (“accidentally”, “unwillingly”, “inadvertently”, &c.), things become easier, and we come to see that no concluding inference of the form “Ergo, it was done freely (or not freely)” is required. Like freedom, truth is a bare minimum or an illusory ideal (the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about, say, the battle of Waterloo or the Primavera ). (1950a: 130;

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/john-langshaw-austin.md

  4. 04 · yt0.783

    Um from Kant, he accepts the claim that our cognitive apparatus is limited, that we do not fully grasp the thing in itself, the other things in the world external to thought. However, he reject rejects the strict separation between noumena and phenomena, maintaining that we can attain partial, fragmented knowledge of objects, even if they're never their totality. From Hegel, he takes dialectical thinking, the attention to contradiction as revealing something deeper about the object, but rejects the Hegelian resolution or reconciliation of contradiction into identity, where contradiction is see

    yt/l1Qt3tznA78-adorno-hegel-and-negative-dialectics-professor-martin-saar-f/transcript.txt

  5. 05 · blog0.780

    Stepping up, full-strength paraconsistentists treat inconsistent models, in which contradictions hold, as useful mathematical tools without committing to them as representing real possibilities. And stepping up again, industrial-strength paraconsistentists may hold that, though truth at the actual world is consistent, still entailment must preserve what holds in peculiar non-actual situations, some of which may be inconsistent (see Berto 2007a, Ch. 5, and Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb 2004, p. 6). The first three levels appear to be independent of dialetheism. (But for reason to worry that the

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/dialetheism.md

  6. 06 · yt0.778

    Such a contradiction cannot be brought under any unity without manipulation, without the insertion of some wretched cover concepts that will make the crucial differences vanish. All right. So it's a little bit opaque. Um so between the self-defin that an individual has and knows versus the role that the individual is playing. He says, "Nor is it possible to unify the contradiction that the exchange principle, remember I pointed out when it says barter, he means exchange." Just a bad translation of that word, which in present society enhances the productive forces. So the exchange principle um

    yt/88CFLcDqNak-chris-cutrone-lecture-on-adorno-s-negative-dialectics-2/transcript.txt

  7. 07 · yt0.775

    Uh and um likewise the printing press for obvious reasons is going to change the way things are going to be going on. So, it's not the case that Hegel claims that say, as he's often portrayed, I think wrongly as saying that the only thing that matters is whether people change their minds or the ideas that are going on in their head and so on. Uh the other thing is that Hegel is of course a firm opponent of all these kinds of traditional metaphysical dualisms. You might say there's materialism versus idealism and he would say, well, actually no. The correct form of idealism, as he says, is in f

    yt/3deVNo03awg-slavoj-zizek-vs-terry-pinkard-how-to-read-hegel/transcript.txt

  8. 08 · blog0.774

    By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; this is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. (8.1; Hume 1748, 72) Of course, Hume and many of those who have followed him have been attempting to do something rather more than to offer a theory of ability. Hume’s intent was to show that disputes over ‘question of liberty and necessity, the most contentious question of metaphysics’ ha

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/abilities.md

  9. 09 · yt0.774

    Um It's I see it as situated between Kant and Hegel, and these are also two main figures of reference. Um from Kant, he accepts the claim that our cognitive apparatus is limited, that we do not fully grasp the thing in itself, the other things in the world external to thought. However, he reject rejects the strict separation between noumena and phenomena, maintaining that we can attain partial, fragmented knowledge of objects, even if they're never their totality. From Hegel, he takes dialectical thinking, the attention to contradiction as revealing something deeper about the object, but rejec

    yt/OCTgcESeCMM-adorno-hegel-and-negative-dialectics-prof-martin-saar-frankf/transcript.txt

  10. 10 · blog0.772

    Similar to She Came To Stay , which bears the imprint of Hegel’s account of the fight to the death that sets the stage for the master-slave dialectic, and Pyrrhus and Cinéas , which works through the Cartesian implications of our existential situation, The Ethics of Ambiguity redeploys concepts of canonical philosophical figures. Here Beauvoir takes up the phenomenologies of Husserl and Hegel to provide an analysis of intersubjectivity that accepts the singularity of the existing individual without allowing that singularity to justify an epistemological solipsism, an existential isolationism o

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/simone-de-beauvoir.md

Curation checklist

  • ☐ Verify excerpt against source recording
  • ☐ Tag tier (axiom · law · principle · primary derivation · observation)
  • ☐ Cross-cite to ≥1 primary source (PubMed / arXiv / archive.org)
  • ☐ Promote to bucket-canon/07-mind/