Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · _intake0.944

   > you're being selfish or not that may or may not happen uh that because the Free Will of one person is going to interact with the Free Will of another it's very the the truth is subjective type of

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/free-will/006-you-re-being-selfish-or-not-that-may-or-may-not-happen-uh-th.md

2. 02 · gutenberg0.783

   The problem which I have chosen is one which is common to metaphysics and psychology, the problem of free will. What I attempt to prove is that all discussion between the determinists and their opponents implies a previous confusion of duration with extensity, of succession with simultaneity, of quality with quantity: this confusion once dispelled, we may perhaps witness the disappearance of the objections raised against free will, of the definitions given of it, and, in a certain sense, of the problem of free will itself. To prove this is the object of the third part of the present volume: th…

   gutenberg/PG-56852-time-and-free-will-an-essay-on-the-immediate-data-of-consciousness/PG-56852.txt

3. 03 · yt0.778

   Yes, well have had thought a little bit more about free will I've often thought I don't really know what it means, but I think I would like to say that I have a better idea. What I think it might mean, and it depends on you see, you could say sometimes people think free will as oh, you can have a will to do anything kind of being random. Something like this. I keep being reminded that when I was growing up my little brother was two years younger than I was, and he could beat at pretty well any game. But the thing that disturbed me the most, he could beat me at paper, stones and scissors, you s…

   yt/0nOtLj8UYCw-quantum-consciousness-debate-does-the-wave-function-actually/transcript.txt

4. 04 · yt0.777

   So it's freedom from determination by some external agent. And to state this negative view very precisely, it's freedom from being completely your actions being completely determined by some external agent. So you may say no one believes that that's crazy. Uh but in history it's maybe somewhat unfair but it's at least a very reasonable interpretation to think that for example figures like Cotton Mather who were very important in establishing what American culture in particular kind of means um believed that all of our actions were completely determined in advance by God who wound up the clockw…

   yt/v73S4BkItrc-panel-quantum-theory-and-free-will-chris-fields-henry-stapp-/transcript.txt

5. 05 · blog0.777

   For the classical compatibilist, then, free will is an ability to do what one wants. It is therefore plausible to conclude that the truth of determinism does not entail that agents lack free will since it does not entail that agents never do what they wish to do, nor that agents are necessarily encumbered in acting. Compatibilism is thus vindicated. But how convincing is the classical compatibilist account of free will? As it stands, it cries out for refinement. To cite just one shortcoming, various mental illnesses can cause a person to act as she wants and do so unencumbered; yet, intuitivel…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/compatibilism.md

6. 06 · blog0.771

   As a result, these compatibilists tell us, the truth of causal determinism poses no threat to our status as morally responsible agents (notice the enthymematic premise here: the freedom to do otherwise is sufficient for the kind of control an agent must possess to be morally responsible for her actions). Other compatibilists show less concern in rebutting the conclusion that the freedom to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism. Compatibilists of this stripe reject the idea that such freedom is necessary for meaningful forms of free will (e.g., Frankfurt 1969, 1971; Watson 1975, Dennett…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/compatibilism.md

7. 07 · _intake0.769

   > free will, then it's incomprehensible. But if you accept that is free will then it has to be that way because mathematics cannot tell you what you are going to create later on which is cannot

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/free-will/005-free-will-then-it-s-incomprehensible.md

8. 08 · yt0.765

   Well, you see, I think it's not I mean, that is an interesting question, because it doesn't seem to me necessary that consciousness is causal in some sense I can imagine somebody being paralyzed completely. I get this happens. People are completely paralyzed and nobody can tell whether that person is actually conscious or not. And later on, you find that person may wake up at some sense and you find they were conscious all the time. They knew what was going on. It's just they couldn’t influence anything in some sense this notion of being. We have a free will in the sense of affecting things is…

   yt/0nOtLj8UYCw-quantum-consciousness-debate-does-the-wave-function-actually/transcript.txt

9. 09 · blog0.765

   Familiar arguments purport to show that, if this is the case, then no one has the ability to do anything, except perhaps for what she actually does. But if (CA) is true, then agents would have the ability to perform various actions that they do not actually perform. This is a counterexample turning on precisely the kinds of contentious questions about free will and determinism that, as indicated above, we are for the moment setting aside. (We will return to the issues purportedly raised by determinism below in Section 5.1). It seems, however, that we can show that (CA) is false even relative t…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/abilities.md

10. 10 · blog0.765

    It seems not. Picking up the blond Lab was an alternative that was not available to her. In this respect, she could not have done otherwise . Given her psychological condition, she cannot even form a want to touch a blond Lab, hence she could not pick one up. But notice that, if she wanted to pick up the blond Lab, then she would have done so . Of course, if she wanted to pick up the blond Lab, then she would not suffer from the very psychological disorder that causes her to be unable to pick up blond haired doggies. The classical compatibilist analysis of ‘could have done otherwise’ thus fail…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/compatibilism.md