Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · _intake0.947

   > free will, then it's incomprehensible. But if you accept that is free will then it has to be that way because mathematics cannot tell you what you are going to create later on which is cannot

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/free-will/005-free-will-then-it-s-incomprehensible.md

2. 02 · blog0.816

   For the classical compatibilist, then, free will is an ability to do what one wants. It is therefore plausible to conclude that the truth of determinism does not entail that agents lack free will since it does not entail that agents never do what they wish to do, nor that agents are necessarily encumbered in acting. Compatibilism is thus vindicated. But how convincing is the classical compatibilist account of free will? As it stands, it cries out for refinement. To cite just one shortcoming, various mental illnesses can cause a person to act as she wants and do so unencumbered; yet, intuitivel…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/compatibilism.md

3. 03 · yt0.810

   You see, you could you could make it random, but that's not the point of free will. You could say that. You see, people often say that free will could be there if it's not deterministic. But it doesn't do you any good if it's just random. Yeah. So, the view I have is is more or less this. It's not even my It's a fairly recent view, I think. But the view is more this. There is something retrocausal about it. What free will really means and what I'm arguing for here is not that you can do anything you like and you can act randomly if you like. You're doing what you think is the right thing to do…

   yt/nok4GhijvAA-is-consciousness-related-to-quantum-physics-with-roger-penro/transcript.txt

4. 04 · yt0.810

   If everything has some level of consciousness and nothing is fully determined, what does this mean for our ability to make choices? Now, you you've mentioned two things that raise a new question for me, which is you mentioned this idea of simulation, just the simulation or self simulation, and you've mentioned us doing things. So then it would seem to me we have to tackle the question, do we really do much of anything at all in the sense, do we have free will? Yes, we do. Okay, I'm glad to hear it. I always thought we did. Well, yes, we have to have free will. Oh, I was discussing with you ear…

   yt/usDVuyx0Myc-they-will-break-your-understanding-of-everything/transcript.txt

5. 05 · gutenberg0.808

   The problem which I have chosen is one which is common to metaphysics and psychology, the problem of free will. What I attempt to prove is that all discussion between the determinists and their opponents implies a previous confusion of duration with extensity, of succession with simultaneity, of quality with quantity: this confusion once dispelled, we may perhaps witness the disappearance of the objections raised against free will, of the definitions given of it, and, in a certain sense, of the problem of free will itself. To prove this is the object of the third part of the present volume: th…

   gutenberg/PG-56852-time-and-free-will-an-essay-on-the-immediate-data-of-consciousness/PG-56852.txt

6. 06 · yt0.808

   So it's freedom from determination by some external agent. And to state this negative view very precisely, it's freedom from being completely your actions being completely determined by some external agent. So you may say no one believes that that's crazy. Uh but in history it's maybe somewhat unfair but it's at least a very reasonable interpretation to think that for example figures like Cotton Mather who were very important in establishing what American culture in particular kind of means um believed that all of our actions were completely determined in advance by God who wound up the clockw…

   yt/v73S4BkItrc-panel-quantum-theory-and-free-will-chris-fields-henry-stapp-/transcript.txt

7. 07 · yt0.804

   Dissecting free will. If you hit Apple shift P, I believe to start the thing. No. Oh, maybe it's does someone know how to start? I can start it if you if you need See, if you ever wonder why your computer never cooperates, it's because of free will. Or free won't. Yeah. Sometimes if you show them a hammer. Do we want to change the order? I could talk cuz I don't need to. Oh, yeah. Maybe we should switch and let you go ahead. Yeah. While they're doing that. How about that? Yeah. Okay. So now I'm on stage. Um, so I want to tie my um remarks not only to what's just been said but uh also to what w…

   yt/v73S4BkItrc-panel-quantum-theory-and-free-will-chris-fields-henry-stapp-/transcript.txt

8. 08 · yt0.796

   Yes, well have had thought a little bit more about free will I've often thought I don't really know what it means, but I think I would like to say that I have a better idea. What I think it might mean, and it depends on you see, you could say sometimes people think free will as oh, you can have a will to do anything kind of being random. Something like this. I keep being reminded that when I was growing up my little brother was two years younger than I was, and he could beat at pretty well any game. But the thing that disturbed me the most, he could beat me at paper, stones and scissors, you s…

   yt/0nOtLj8UYCw-quantum-consciousness-debate-does-the-wave-function-actually/transcript.txt

9. 09 · yt0.791

   You you set these are the rules that we are we adopt to prove things. Then you what Gödel shows is an amazing thing. I always thought it was amazing. There is a statement which you by virtue of your trust in these rules, you can see that it's true. Yet, you can't prove it by the rules. Now, I found this absolutely amazing because it means you're you don't use the rules to to understand things because how do you know this thing is true? Well, you know it's true but because you trust the rules. Well, it's you're you're if you're using the rules, then how do you know that using the rules only giv…

   yt/OoDi856wLPM-sir-roger-penrose-stuart-hameroff-collapsing-a-theory-of-qua/transcript.txt

10. 10 · blog0.791

    It seems not. Picking up the blond Lab was an alternative that was not available to her. In this respect, she could not have done otherwise . Given her psychological condition, she cannot even form a want to touch a blond Lab, hence she could not pick one up. But notice that, if she wanted to pick up the blond Lab, then she would have done so . Of course, if she wanted to pick up the blond Lab, then she would not suffer from the very psychological disorder that causes her to be unable to pick up blond haired doggies. The classical compatibilist analysis of ‘could have done otherwise’ thus fail…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/compatibilism.md