Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · _intake0.929

   > still have the self and not have the free will never mind at the same time do they go at the same time this is the same yeah it's the same thing that they're always holding hands

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/free-will/003-still-have-the-self-and-not-have-the-free-will-never-mind-at.md

2. 02 · blog0.775

   And, as Buchanan and Brock see it, the earlier self has “something like a property right… to determine what happens to [his] nonperson successor” (166). That is, if one ceases to exist by turning into a nonperson, one retains a quasi-property right to control the resulting nonperson, presumably in much the same way that, when one ceases to exist by turning into a corpse, one has a quasi-property right to control the resulting corpse. Hence, on this approach, even if the earlier and current self are distinct individuals, the earlier self has the authority to determine what happens to the curren…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/advance-directives-and-substitute-decision-making.md

3. 03 · blog0.760

   If a thing-at-\(t_{1}\) were identical with a thing-at-\(t_{2}\), then they should share all their properties. What sort of identity is it, if not that? But if the properties at different times are incompatible, then a contradiction follows. Because they emphatically took the view that contradictions are never true, the great Buddhist logicians Dharmakirti (C7th CE) and his commentator Dharmottara (C8–9th CE), who had certainly read their Aristotle, deduced that identity over time does not exist (see Scherbatsky (1930) vol 2). This is the Buddhist doctrine of moments, essentially an ontology o…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/change-and-inconsistency.md

4. 04 · blog0.755

   Although most psychologists would without hesitation accept the causal interaction of minds and bodies, a small but growing number of empirical researchers have insisted that the evidence supports some version of epiphenomenalism , the thesis that mental states, while caused by physical happenings, exert no efficacy in return. Wegner, a psychologist, contends that accumulated empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports epiphenomenalism, at least with respect to conscious willing (Wegner 2002, 2004). He draws on influential work by Libet (1985, 2001, 2004) and others to argue that conscious inte…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/mental-causation.md

5. 05 · yt0.752

   It controls the right hand, which  for most of us is the one which we do the grabbing   and the manipulating, and it helps us maintain  power. But all the rest of the understanding of   everything else that humans are capable of,  the life, the spirit, the life of morality,   of beauty, of goodness, of truth, all these things  are somehow left out of this picture and become   somehow marginalized or trivialized as they have  done, I believe in our culture at the moment.   And so why I wrote The Matter With Things was  b…

   yt/dogVQDydRGQ-iain-mcgilchrist-wisdom-nature-and-the-brain-the-great-simpl/transcript.txt

6. 06 · blog0.751

   And a person persists “as far as” the exercise of those capacities “reaches” (II.xxvii.9): “For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). Thus the way is clear for Locke to assert that one and the same person may be resurrected even if that person comes to inhabit an altogether different body than any with which she was previously associated (II.xxvii.15). It is in the context of his solution to this problem that Locke introduces the famous thought experiment involving the prince and the cobbler—not a…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/animalism.md

7. 07 · gutenberg0.750

   The problem which I have chosen is one which is common to metaphysics and psychology, the problem of free will. What I attempt to prove is that all discussion between the determinists and their opponents implies a previous confusion of duration with extensity, of succession with simultaneity, of quality with quantity: this confusion once dispelled, we may perhaps witness the disappearance of the objections raised against free will, of the definitions given of it, and, in a certain sense, of the problem of free will itself. To prove this is the object of the third part of the present volume: th…

   gutenberg/PG-56852-time-and-free-will-an-essay-on-the-immediate-data-of-consciousness/PG-56852.txt

8. 08 · blog0.748

   On Locke’s view, it is in virtue of their capacities for self-consciousness and rationality that persons not only persist through time, but also are prudentially concerned and morally and legally responsible for actions committed at other times. According to Locke, a person should be punished only for those actions that she can remember having committed (II.xxvii.20). This is true not only in the case of divine law carried out on judgment day—when “ the secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open ” and rewards and punishments meted out for the good and bad deeds undertaken throughout the course o…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/animalism.md

9. 09 · yt0.748

   On the other hand the individuals become a way of effect that the reproduction of their own life depends essentially on social cooperation and uncollective service solution. It's this dependence on the shared objective mind, so to say this objective mind also depends on where of the self is an individual mind. Thus, the individual must have encountered the complex social organism simultaneously is exact of an overwhelming force and yet is upon us of a redemptive force. Yet, protects and guarantees survival and security. From the perspective of the individual the power of the collectivity must …

   yt/qA4iw3V0o1c-j-rgen-habermas-lecture-myth-and-ritual/transcript.txt

10. 10 · blog0.747

    Although, once again, when the relevant skeptical possibilities are not raised, those experiences qualify as evidence sufficient for truthful ascriptions of “knowledge” that I have hands. Finally, some theorists have suggested that the context-sensitivity of sentences involving ‘know’ is owing to a more general context-sensitivity in certain explanatory relations and claims. For example, Steven Rieber (1998) has proposed that, in general, S knows that P iff “ the fact that P explains why S believes that P ” (1998, 194). According to Rieber, however, explanations are always at least implicitly …

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/epistemic-contextualism.md