Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · _intake0.924

   > the present in its totality and whitehead's saying that's never the case because there's always this ingression of possibility into each moment um that disturbs any determinism that might

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/free-will/001-the-present-in-its-totality-and-whitehead-s-saying-that-s-ne.md

2. 02 · blog0.804

   Furthermore, from the very nature of the case the general notion of physical object “cannot have been derived by abstraction from observed instances of it, as the notion of ‘red’ no doubt has been.” [ 9 ] In fact, general concept of a physical object “is not ‘got out of’ experience until it has been ‘put into’ experience. It is best described as an innate principle of interpretation which we apply to the data of sense-perception” (1925, p. 217). 3. Time It is possible to distinguish roughly three different phases in Broad’s philosophy of time. In his (1921a) Broad defends a Russellian theory o…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/charlie-dunbar-broad.md

3. 03 · blog0.801

   Causal notions can, if at all, only be legitimately employed in contexts in which we can isolate a small set of factors of interest as those responsible for the occurrence of an event—the dominant cause or causes—by drawing a distinction between causes and background conditions. Yet such a distinction, it is argued, cannot be drawn in physics. Call this the dominant cause challenge. Causes necessitate their effects, but the fundamental laws of physics are non-deterministic. This is the determinism challenge. Causal relations are relations among spatio-temporally localized events, yet fundament…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/causation-in-physics.md

4. 04 · yt0.800

   Okay, the objectivity of contradiction. So just very quickly rather than go through in in close detail the objectivity of contradiction um namely contradiction is not a subjective phenomenon. Contradiction is not merely on the side of the subject or in what the subject is doing but the contradiction is in reality itself. It's not just in our ideas or our concepts or in our use of them. But contradiction is actually in reality itself. In that sense, contradiction is objective. Now again, it's in reality in our reality in reality as it presents itself to us. It's in the objective reality that pr…

   yt/88CFLcDqNak-chris-cutrone-lecture-on-adorno-s-negative-dialectics-2/transcript.txt

5. 05 · gutenberg0.799

   Dynamism and mechanism, 140-142; Two kinds of determinism, 142; Physical determinism, 143-155: and molecular theory of matter, 143, and conservation of energy, 144, if conservation universal, physiological and nervous phenomena necessitated, but perhaps not conscious states, 145-148, but is principle of conversation universal? 149, it may not apply to living beings and conscious states, 150-154, idea of its universality depends on confusion between concrete duration and abstract time, 154-155; Psychological determinism, 155-163: implies associationist conception of mind, 155-158, this involves…

   gutenberg/PG-56852-time-and-free-will-an-essay-on-the-immediate-data-of-consciousness/PG-56852.txt

6. 06 · blog0.796

   Within the metaphysical project the vagueness challenge arguably looms especially large for defenders of metaphysically “rich” causal notions, such as notions of causal production. Here the challenge may be part of more general empiricist scruples about rich causal notions of production or “bringing about” along the lines of what has traditionally been taken to be Hume’s criticism of causation. Yet the vagueness challenge can also be presented as a challenge to broadly Humean accounts of causation, such as David Lewis’s account (Lewis 1973). On most accounts of causation causal claims closely …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/causation-in-physics.md

7. 07 · blog0.795

   The determinism challenge can be raised as part of each of the three philosophical projects we distinguished: one might argue that our intuitive concept of cause is deterministic or that only a deterministic concept of cause could serve fulfil certain useful cognitive functions. But Norton’s dilemma that a causal constraint either has to place a constraint on all sciences—that is, is a universal constraint— or would amount to a mere honorific is perhaps most easily resisted within the functional project. As Woodward (2014) emphasizes, it is compatible with causal judgments playing an important…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/causation-in-physics.md

8. 08 · blog0.794

   Now it is surely quite evident that, if the beginning of a certain process at a certain time is determined at all, its total cause must contain as an essential factor another event or process which enters into the moment from which the determined event or process issues. I see no prima facie objection to there being events which are not completely determined. But, in so far as an event is determined, an essential factor in its total cause must be other events . How could an event possibly be determined to happen at a certain date if its total cause contained no factor to which the notion of da…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/charlie-dunbar-broad.md

9. 09 · blog0.794

   The following reconstruction assumes that, in addition to (I) and (II), the argument rests on a couple of further principles, which might have been generally taken to be valid and thus not worth mentioning, or else which might have been generally accepted by the Stoics and for this reason omitted by Epictetus. The first additional principle is (V) If something is the case now, then it has always been the case that it will be the case. For instance, if I am in Athens now, then it has always in the past been the case that I would be in Athens (at some time). This principle gains historical plaus…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/dialectical-school.md

10. 10 · blog0.794

    Here is where the difficulties begin, culminating in the passage with which Aristotle concludes and (apparently) summarizes his account: It is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea-battle tomorrow; but it not necessary for a sea-battle to take place tomorrow, nor for one not to take place—though it is necessary for one to take place or not to take place. So, since statements are true according to how the actual things are, it is clear that wherever these are such as to allow of contraries as chance has it, the same necessarily holds for the contradictories also. This happens with things…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/contradiction.md