Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · _intake0.961

   > se as a characteristic of broader reality. See, I've always had this this issue with entropy because entropy always seemed to be to be by necessity subjectively defined. It has to be

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/entropy/001-se-as-a-characteristic-of-broader-reality.md

2. 02 · _intake0.788

   - [`001-se-as-a-characteristic-of-broader-reality-see-i-ve-always-ha`](entropy/001-se-as-a-characteristic-of-broader-reality-see-i-ve-always-ha.md) — score=7 `00:51:46.280` — se as a characteristic of broader reality. See, I've always had this this issue with entropy because entropy always seem - [`002-it-will-naturally-happen-that-it-becomes-messy-over-time-if-`](entropy/002-it-will-naturally-happen-that-it-becomes-messy-over-time-if-.md) — score=7 `00:25:44.370` — it will naturally happen that it becomes messy over time. If your office or room is messy, it will never clean itself up - [`003-…

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated/INDEX.md

3. 03 · _intake0.788

   - [`001-se-as-a-characteristic-of-broader-reality-see-i-ve-always-ha`](entropy/001-se-as-a-characteristic-of-broader-reality-see-i-ve-always-ha.md) — score=7 `00:51:46.280` — se as a characteristic of broader reality. See, I've always had this this issue with entropy because entropy always seem - [`002-it-will-naturally-happen-that-it-becomes-messy-over-time-if-`](entropy/002-it-will-naturally-happen-that-it-becomes-messy-over-time-if-.md) — score=7 `00:25:44.370` — it will naturally happen that it becomes messy over time. If your office or room is messy, it will never clean itself up - [`003-…

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/INDEX.md

4. 04 · blog0.776

   (There are two other senses of “per se” given here, and although it is reasonably supposed they have no bearing on demonstration, some medieval commentators tried to make something of them.) The middle term of a demonstration must express the cause why the predicate of the conclusion belongs to its subject. The predicate of the conclusion, the “attribute,” will not be part of the essence of the subject, but will somehow follow on its essence. It was disputed in the Middle Ages whether the middle term in the highest sort of demonstration would be the real definition of the subject, or the real …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/medieval-theories-of-demonstration.md

5. 05 · blog0.763

   But as before, if one has no objection to sense-data or immaterial properties, one will be unmoved. The neurophysiological type-identity theorist would protest here too, though the same rejoinders apply. A less commissive objection is that, contra Dretske, there are candidate relations besides that of representing: some wide functional relation, perhaps, or a typical-cause relation (where neither of these is itself taken to constitute representing). 3.2. The Argument from Veridicality We distinguish between veridical and nonveridical visual experiences. How so? It is fairly uncontentious that …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/representational-theories-of-consciousness.md

6. 06 · yt0.762

   When I take that basic cognitive framework, which is this very dynamic, bottom-up, top-down way in which outside and grounding propositionality, which intelligibility is co-created with the world, I come to the conclusion that either that bottom-up, top-down dynamism is has nothing to do with ontological structure, in case in which in which case if there is no way in which that fundamental grammar of intelligibility creation touches the structure of ontology, then we're doomed to skepticism and solipsism. And so I propose that it's more likely, as the Neoplatonic tradition held, that reality i…

   yt/QvLSkzes_II-convergence-to-neoplatonism-w-wolfgang-smith/transcript.txt

7. 07 · blog0.761

   Supporting this latter contrast is that (as per Sorites phenomena, and ordinary perceptual experience of macro-objects) our perceptions of properties such as color and shape do not appear to be of maximal determinates, as would be the case if determinables were disjunctions of determinates (since every instance of a disjunction is an instance of one of its disjuncts). Of course, appearances can be deceiving, and there are strategies for treating determinables and their mode of specification in deflationary terms. Whether these strategies succeed or fail is no small matter. For the seemingly di…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/determinables-and-determinates.md

8. 08 · blog0.761

   (Bradley 1893:17) To understand what Bradley means by this, we need to keep in mind that he is here presupposing a bundle view of particulars and that he is using “is” to indicate the identity of the subject with the bundle of qualities (see Wollheim (1959), Bonino (2012) and Baxter (1996) for an interpretation that reads his “is” as an “is” of identity in this context). His concern is thus with the relationship between the whole, conceived as a bundle of qualities, and the qualities themselves. He is worried that if a given quality, say blackness , is different from the whole, and separate fr…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/bradley-s-regress.md

9. 09 · yt0.761

   The world or nature behaves as though these fictions were true until it doesn’t And then we replace the convenient fictions with other ones. For instance, Newton proposed the convenient fiction that there is an invisible force called gravity, pulling celestial bodies to one another invisibly and at a distance, and instantly. And it took the French about half a century to stop laughing of this mystical idea of these invisible forces pulling things towards one another. but we know how that ended. And yet, in the early 20th century, Einstein showed that there is no such force. There is no such in…

   yt/DyzHYnOqIoU-10k-subscribers-a-q-a-with-bernardo-kastrup/transcript.txt

10. 10 · blog0.760

    If we can make sense of discovering that cats are automata, then our word “cat” may be true of (satisfied by) the very things—automata as it turns out—that we have called cats all along, even if our presupposition that “cat” is a natural kind term is false. Putnam thinks we can also make sense of discovering that a term such as “pencil,” which we believe to be an artifact term, is in fact a natural kind term. In short, we may discover that a term we take to be a natural kind term is an artifact term, and we may discover that a term we take to be an artifact term is a natural kind term, without…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/content-externalism-and-skepticism.md