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consciousness

of um uh literary relativity was that literature is always something which is being constantly reinterpreted and being reinborn in your Consciousness that in a way you can never
Concept
consciousness
Score
6 · always · never
Status
candidate — not yet promoted to canon

Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

  1. 01 · yt0.792

    And that, too, is an intuitive way of saying, "Yeah, however rigorously we can define it or defend it, something like this does seem to go on in our minds at certain kinds of moments of experience." We just feel differently looking at a certain work of art or a certain landscape, let's say, than we feel looking at other sorts of things. Maybe we don't know why. Maybe we doubt that the difference is absolute in the way that Kant wants to insist it is. Nevertheless, we have in tendency feelings of this kind and we should acknowledge them because again, at least in terms of a weak understanding o

    yt/mT7roDHocuc-5-the-idea-of-the-autonomous-artwork/transcript.txt

  2. 02 · yt0.784

    In representing not things as they are but things as they should be, it transforms reality. All right. So this is an argument which in outline, once again, justifies the idea of literature as form, as that which brings form to bear on the chaos and messiness of the real. Now I don't mean to say things just stood still as Sidney said they were until you get to Kant. A great deal happens, but one aspect of Kant's famous "Copernican revolution" in the history of philosophy is his ideas about aesthetics and the beautiful and about the special faculty that he believes has to do with and mediates ou

    yt/mT7roDHocuc-5-the-idea-of-the-autonomous-artwork/transcript.txt

  3. 03 · blog0.782

    Parmenides maintained that whatever one speaks about or thinks about must in some sense exist; if it did not exist then it is nothing, so one would be speaking or thinking about nothing, which would be empty. From this thesis, it is deduced that the existing thing cannot have come into existence, because to say that it could would be to speak of a time when it did not exist. By similar reasoning, existing things are eternal because they cannot go out of existence. It is now a small step to conclude that change is an illusion, on the grounds that a change in a thing implies that there was a tim

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/change-and-inconsistency.md

  4. 04 · blog0.779

    Since the mythical world does not consist of stable and enduring substances that manifest themselves from various points of view and on various occasions, but rather in a fleeting complex of events bound together by their affective and emotional “physiognomic” characters, it also exemplifies its own particular type of causality whereby each part literally contains the whole of which it is a part and can thereby exert all the causal efficacy of the whole. Similarly, there is no essential difference in efficacy between the living and the dead, between waking experiences and dreams, between the n

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/ernst-cassirer.md

  5. 05 · yt0.775

    It is a distillation or quintessence. It is a model in other words for the way in which literature can be understood as world-making-- not a representation, again, of things as they are but of things as they should be; whereby "things as they should be" is not necessarily an ideal but rather that which is formal, that which is organized, and that which has a coherence and makes sense self-sufficiently and within itself. That's why the poem, the lyric poem, is privileged among the forms of literary discourse in the New Criticism. All literature is by implication a "poem," > but the poem is t

    yt/mT7roDHocuc-5-the-idea-of-the-autonomous-artwork/transcript.txt

  6. 06 · blog0.773

    If a thing-at-\(t_{1}\) were identical with a thing-at-\(t_{2}\), then they should share all their properties. What sort of identity is it, if not that? But if the properties at different times are incompatible, then a contradiction follows. Because they emphatically took the view that contradictions are never true, the great Buddhist logicians Dharmakirti (C7th CE) and his commentator Dharmottara (C8–9th CE), who had certainly read their Aristotle, deduced that identity over time does not exist (see Scherbatsky (1930) vol 2). This is the Buddhist doctrine of moments, essentially an ontology o

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/change-and-inconsistency.md

  7. 07 · yt0.772

    The unconscious then is structured like a language, which is not the same thing as to say it is a language. Okay. Structured like a language. This means--and this is where there is this enormous gulf between Lacan and most other practitioners of psychoanalysis-- the unconscious is not, in that case, to be understood as the seat of the instincts. It's not to be understood as something prior, in other words, to those forms of derivative articulation, those forms of articulation emerging through maturity that we're accustomed to call "language." If the unconscious is structured like a language, t

    yt/lkAXsR5WINc-13-jacques-lacan-in-theory/transcript.txt

  8. 08 · yt0.772

    In any case, it's another example that we can take from our experience of the uneasy sense we may have that to infer a spatial moment from which the irreducibly temporal nature of experience is derived-- to infer a moment from the fact of this experience as a necessary cause of it-- is always problematic. It always necessarily must, as Derrida would say, put this sense of a spatial full presence of everything there at once in systematic order-- as Derrida would say, must put that "under erasure." In other words, in a certain sense you can't do without it. Derrida never really claims that you c

    yt/Np72VPguqeI-10-deconstruction-i/transcript.txt

  9. 09 · blog0.771

    The philosophical question here is how to construe such statements of identity and nonidentity, and it seems that the problem of universals is the main issue. A narrower usage of “change” is exemplified by change in the properties of a body over time, that is temporal change. This essay will focus on temporal change. We begin by separating the concept of change from several cognate concepts, specifically cause, time and motion. Then we briefly survey attempts by such thinkers as Parmenides and McTaggart to deny change. There follows an account of the problem of the instant of change, where it

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/change-and-inconsistency.md

  10. 10 · blog0.770

    A peculiar feature of special relativity (as opposed Newtonian physics) is that each inertial frame defined by an “observer” passing through the chosen origin and moving with some constant non-zero velocity that is less than the speed of light (the only coordinate systems or frames of reference that will be considered in our discussion of the special theory) picks out a distinct set of points as simultaneous with the origin. This feature of special relativity is called the relativity of simultaneity. The relativity of simultaneity is a consequence of two startling assumptions. First, each of t

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/being-and-becoming-in-modern-physics.md

Curation checklist

  • ☐ Verify excerpt against source recording
  • ☐ Tag tier (axiom · law · principle · primary derivation · observation)
  • ☐ Cross-cite to ≥1 primary source (PubMed / arXiv / archive.org)
  • ☐ Promote to bucket-canon/07-mind/