bucket foundation — inverse omegabucket.foundation

consciousness

doesn't do full Justice to the phenomenal experience of doine as sketched out above dine always comes into existence along with a world it is never a free floing subject that
Concept
consciousness
Score
6 · always · never
Status
candidate — not yet promoted to canon

Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

  1. 01 · blog0.735

    But in the case of the art object, Heidegger is pointing out, the adventure beyond subjectivity and back again is a particularly intense, meaningful, or enlivening one: A “lived experience” is an experience that makes us feel “more alive,” as Heidegger suggests by emphasizing the etymological connection between Erleben and Lebens , “lived experience” and “life.” The second point Heidegger is trying to make is that when artworks become objects for subjects to have particularly meaningful experiences of, these artworks themselves also get understood thereby as meaningful expressions of an artist

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/heidegger-s-aesthetics.md

  2. 02 · gutenberg0.730

    Green's critique of Sensationalism, 278. Relations are as immediately felt as terms are, 280. The union of things is given in the immediate flux, not in any conceptual reason that overcomes the flux's aboriginal incoherence, 282. The minima of experience as vehicles of continuity, 284. Fallacy of the objections to self-compounding, 286. The concrete units of experience are 'their own others,' 287. Reality is confluent from next to next, 290. Intellectualism must be sincerely renounced, 291. The Absolute is only an hypothesis, 292. Fechner's God is not the Absolute, 298. The Absolute solves no

    gutenberg/PG-11984-a-pluralistic-universe-hibbert-lectures-at-manchester-college-on-the-p/PG-11984.txt

  3. 03 · blog0.726

    It seems best to say here that this would not count as an aesthetic experience because it does not bear the value of actually involving a subjective response that is itself of value. But this could lead to trouble with dissociation in the other direction, which is also clearly possible: you could have a pleasurable experience as of some object’s meriting that very kind of pleasurable experience, while also being incorrect that it merits that. If the value of aesthetic experience rests exclusively or primarily on the value of the pleasure itself, then it seems that this inappropriate experience

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/aesthetic-experience.md

  4. 04 · blog0.725

    First, it is a relation that is phenomenally manifest in that it figures in the characterization of what it is like to be a subject at a moment, and second, it is singularizing in that when this relation obtains between a set of experiences the experiences together form a single phenomenal whole. We call this a working characterization partly because it already borders on philosophical controversy. Some theorists reject the idea that phenomenal unity is a relation among experiences. On such views, a phenomenally unified consciousness contains only one experience and therefore phenomenal unity

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-unity-of-consciousness.md

  5. 05 · blog0.722

    Leave aside the special cases of music and poetry, which Richard Wollheim notes have the special feature that they can be written down (see Wollheim 1972). Why not conceive painting, for example, as the creation of certain painted objects? This would be consistent with the thesis that painting is a not craft. The answer given by Collingwood is clear, but leads to trouble when we consider the question of interpretation. An experience of a painting involves a great deal that no one would say is ‘in the painting’, which is, after all, a nearly flat canvas with paint on it. Not only do we see thin

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/collingwood-s-aesthetics.md

  6. 06 · blog0.721

    Proponents of EP may thus reply to James by pointing out that they never intended to give a compositional account of unified conscious states in terms of their parts. EP might be true even if there is no way for experiential parts to combine to form complex experiences. But even those who accept the compositional version of EP can resist James’ argument. This is clearer under the second reading of the argument. On this reading, the argument has two premises: (a) combining experiences in a manner that gives rise to complex experiences involves getting new subjects by combining distinct subjects

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-unity-of-consciousness.md

  7. 07 · gutenberg0.721

    "To see the object as in itself it really is," has been justly said to be the aim of all true criticism whatever; and in aesthetic criticism the first step towards seeing one's object as it really is, is to know one's own impression as it really is, to discriminate it, to realise it distinctly. The objects with which aesthetic criticism deals--music, poetry, artistic and accomplished forms of human life--are indeed receptacles of so many powers or forces: they possess, like the products of nature, so many virtues or qualities. What is this song or picture, this engaging personality presented i

    gutenberg/PG-2398-the-renaissance-studies-in-art-and-poetry/PG-2398.txt

  8. 08 · blog0.720

    The artwork is an object of hermeneutical investigation not because of any provenance in psychological events but because of the fact that it says something to us (PH 98). Hermeneutic involvement is required because the meaning transmitted can never be fully complete and unambiguous. It demands interpretive involvement. Hermeneutics is required wherever there is a restricted transposition of thought. The historical finitude of meaning and the fact that no meaning can be given completely necessitates hermeneutical involvement in our experience of an artwork. The task of interpretation is to pro

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/gadamer-s-aesthetics.md

  9. 09 · blog0.717

    We will discuss the debate between the proponents of EP and NEP in the next section. But before doing so, a brief discussion of the potential relationship between this debate and the debate over the nature of unity is in order. Tye 2003 has argued that many contemporary analyzes of unity are problematic because they are committed to EP. Obviously, the plausibility of Tye’s argument depends partly on whether EP should be rejected. But is the debate over the nature of the unity deeply dependent on the debate between EP and NEP? Arguably, the answer is negative. Let us assume that NEP is correct.

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-unity-of-consciousness.md

  10. 10 · blog0.717

    Of course, most activity is undertaken with a some purpose in mind or other, in which case it is craft, however hum-drum the theory of it might be. For example, I just ate an orange which I took from a bowl; the theory of what I did could be written down in a practical guide to eating oranges. But surely I was conscious of eating the orange; by Collingwood’s theory, then, was I not expressing something? In that case, by the same theory, just by being conscious, was I not engaged in art? And is that not absurd? Collingwood says nothing in direct reply to this worry, but I think it obvious that

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/collingwood-s-aesthetics.md

Curation checklist

  • ☐ Verify excerpt against source recording
  • ☐ Tag tier (axiom · law · principle · primary derivation · observation)
  • ☐ Cross-cite to ≥1 primary source (PubMed / arXiv / archive.org)
  • ☐ Promote to bucket-canon/07-mind/