Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · yt0.817

   Well, you see, I think it's not I mean, that is an interesting question, because it doesn't seem to me necessary that consciousness is causal in some sense I can imagine somebody being paralyzed completely. I get this happens. People are completely paralyzed and nobody can tell whether that person is actually conscious or not. And later on, you find that person may wake up at some sense and you find they were conscious all the time. They knew what was going on. It's just they couldn’t influence anything in some sense this notion of being. We have a free will in the sense of affecting things is…

   yt/0nOtLj8UYCw-quantum-consciousness-debate-does-the-wave-function-actually/transcript.txt

2. 02 · blog0.800

   To see how the notion of experience might occasion such disputes, consider: Christopher Hill (2009) acknowledges that you may say that both being struck by a thought (e.g., that the email you just received is a scam), and feeling a sensation (say, a tingling in your foot) are “experiences”. But he maintains this is ambiguous: only the second is properly an experience, hence conscious, in the phenomenal sense. On this view, it seems episodic thought and sensation would count as univocally experiential, hence conscious, only if the former is identified with imagery. By contrast, Charles Siewert …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/consciousness-and-intentionality.md

3. 03 · yt0.799

   And there are basically three approaches that people can be using when they talk about consciousness. The first one is about this experience of what it's like which we call phenomenology. And there are several aspects to the terminology of consciousness for me that uh in the way in which I use the word refer to what this what it's likeness and the first one is consciousness is always happening now in this moment. And it also seems to be what creates the sense of nowness. So this what characterizes now is what's currently the case in my perception. And then there is um a beyond this present als…

   yt/oR-BQTSpL5U-joscha-bach-the-operation-of-consciousness-agi-25/transcript.txt

4. 04 · _intake0.798

   > in something. Uh you can't have just an illusion without consciousness. It's utterly incoherent. But never mind. Let's pass over all that. Consciousness being the one thing that is self-evident

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/consciousness/009-in-something.md

5. 05 · _intake0.789

   - **9** [never/must/causes/because] · `00:58:14.799` [Iain McGilchrist ~ Active Inference Insights 023 ~ Hemispher](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKVZykutOD0&t=3494) > that needs to be held as distinct from an ontological premise that the brain causes Consciousness so it might be I never know this I can never prove it because of David Charmers and Nagle and - **8** [must/because/only] · `00:28:45.179` [Sam Harris 2018 - Our Perception As A Controlled Hallucinati](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GDKLt5MA5M4&t=1725) > consciousness here I think it's there are very few areas in science where th…

   _intake/claims-allbranch/BY-CONCEPT.md

6. 06 · yt0.789

   You say, "Many philosophers and scientists believed and still believe that sentience serves no purpose, no physical purpose." Throughout the book, you persuade us of the plausibility of an alternative interpretation. And you suggest that feelings, as I mentioned, are part of nature, that they are not fundamentally different from other natural phenomena, and that they do something within the causal matrix of things. Consciousness Consciousness, you determine and you demonstrate is about feeling and feeling in turn is about how well or badly we are doing in life. Almost like a compass to try and…

   yt/JRlS5EY1-zc-mark-solms-the-hidden-spring-part-1-of-9/transcript.txt

7. 07 · yt0.787

   And it those encounters take place in consciousness. Now Now my view of consciousness is that it is the ultimately ontological primitive. You cannot get behind it. Nothing can have given rise to consciousness. I mean people have been trying for 100 years to find a way in which they can get consciousness out of the brain or out of matter. And nobody has got the slightest bit near to a workable plausible idea of how that could happen. So I'm convinced that um consciousness is the is the primary thing. Matter we've never seen. Nobody has ever seen matter. All they've seen in their consciousness a…

   yt/Kclh9hSs8d0-iain-mcgilchrist-on-what-truly-matters/transcript.txt

8. 08 · blog0.787

   \(R_1\) should itself be an experience, otherwise it would not make a difference to the phenomenal character of the complex conscious state, as phenomenal unity should. But then this experience must itself stand in a phenomenal unity relation with \(E_1, \ldots, E_n\). Call this relation \(R_2\). We can apply the same line of reasoning about \(R_1\) to \(R_2\), generating the need for \(R_3\), and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, EP results in an infinity of experiences. So, we have a reductio against EP. [ 19 ] There are multiple ways to resist this argument. Perhaps the most promising line of …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-unity-of-consciousness.md

9. 09 · blog0.784

   Whether facts about experience are indeed epistemically limited in this way is open to debate (Lycan 1996), but the claim that understanding consciousness requires special forms of knowing and access from the inside point of view is intuitively plausible and has a long history (Locke 1688). Thus any adequate answer to the What question must address the epistemic status of consciousness, both our abilities to understand it and their limits (Papineau 2002, Chalmers 2003). (See the entry on self-knowledge .) 4.5 Self-perspectival organization The perspectival structure of consciousness is one asp…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/consciousness.md

10. 10 · blog0.783

    If our consciousness is instantaneous and transient it is difficult to see how we could ever be conscious of succession, and this is the stance Reid adopts: It may here be observed that, if we speak strictly and philosophically, no kind of succession can be an object either of the senses or of consciousness; because the operations of both are confined to the present point of time, and there can be no succession in a point of time; and on that account the motion of a body, which is a successive change of place, could not be observed by the senses alone without the aid of memory. (EIP: III.5, pp…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/temporal-consciousness.md