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consciousness

All of us in neuroscience like to believe that we're close to cracking the puzzle of consciousness. But the fact is we're probably just at the foot of the mountain. And it's always possible, just
Concept
consciousness
Score
7 · rule · always
Status
candidate — not yet promoted to canon

Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

  1. 01 · _intake0.834

    And their approach is to say because it's not al - [`014-all-of-us-in-neuroscience-like-to-believe-that-we-re-close-t`](consciousness/014-all-of-us-in-neuroscience-like-to-believe-that-we-re-close-t.md) — score=7 `00:44:47.680` — All of us in neuroscience like to believe that we're close to cracking the puzzle of consciousness. But the fact is we'r - [`015-and-realizing-that-they-were-never-truly-separate-to-begin-w`](consciousness/015-and-realizing-that-they-were-never-truly-separate-to-begin-w.md) — score=7 `00:26:02.000` — and realizing that they were never truly separate to begin with.

    _intake/claims-allbranch/curated/INDEX.md

  2. 02 · blog0.782

    According to actualist HOT theory, then, it seems you would need to have a distinct activated HOT for each distinct aspect of your experience—either that, or just a few such thoughts with immensely complex contents. Either way, the objection is the same. For it seems implausible that all of this higher-order activity should be taking place (albeit non-consciously) every time someone is the subject of a complex conscious experience. What would be the point? And think of the amount of cognitive/neural space that these thoughts would take up! (In contrast, we know that neural tissue and activity

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/higher-order-theories-of-consciousness.md

  3. 03 · yt0.778

    Again, because my view is that consciousness is  local, that it's something that brains create,   my view is when a brain is more sophisticated, if  we don't rely on human exceptionalism, but just   sort of look at our own brains, then it creates  the kind of consciousness that you and I are aware   of. When a brain hasn't reached that level of  complexity, it has some version of consciousness,   but perhaps different from the experiences that we  have. But fundamentally, it's just stuff moving in   a coordinated manner

    yt/qFuYUSWwn7s-when-physics-meets-fiction-brian-greene-dan-brown-world-scie/transcript.txt

  4. 04 · pubmed0.773

    Numerous theories of consciousness hold that there are separate neural correlates of conscious experience and cognitive function, aligning with the assumption that there are 'hard' and 'easy' problems of consciousness. Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A 'perfect experiment' illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal

    pubmed/PMID-21807333-consciousness-cannot-be-separated-from-function/info.md

  5. 05 · yt0.771

    All of this goes to show how much the brain is an active interpreter of sensory input. Our perception of the external world is actually much less objective than we'd like to believe. Most of the world around us is very real, but you just never lived there, okay? You lived in your mind, which is a perception of that world that's being filtered through a bunch of salt water sacks of proteins and electrochemical signals, which can't possibly be making completely accurate determinations of what's actually in the outside world. Not convinced? Or maybe you're just asking, "Why?" Well, try watching f

    yt/HU6LfXNeQM4-your-brain-perception-deception-full-documentary-nova-pbs/transcript.txt

  6. 06 · yt0.767

    So I would be thrilled if you could   convince me of those anomalies, and I really  mean that seriously, because one point where   I think I slightly disagree with you is I don't  feel like local consciousness is the intuitive   answer. It's like consciousness, at least as  I experienced it and as I've read others have   experienced it across the ages, it feels bigger  than something that can fit inside the human head,   and yet science, as I understand it, is driving  us to that perspective that it's just the chemical&

    yt/qFuYUSWwn7s-when-physics-meets-fiction-brian-greene-dan-brown-world-scie/transcript.txt

  7. 07 · yt0.767

    And I'm going to argue that we should be looking elsewhere. We should be looking in a far more primitive structure, the brainstem, in particular, the reticular activating system at the core of the brainstem. And not at these higher cognitive functions that are performed by the cortex and, in particular, by the human cortex, but rather at far more basic functions of the kind that are performed in the brainstem, specifically raw feelings. I'm going to argue that raw feelings are the fundamental form of consciousness in all sorts of ways. And that if we shift our attention from higher cognition t

    yt/CmuYrnOVmfk-the-source-of-consciousness-with-mark-solms/transcript.txt

  8. 08 · _intake0.767

    Few live in it commonly. And for those who do not live in it, well, no one believes it is possible. Everything about this pathway in the human brain is about optimal mammalian functioning. It is as good, as good gets. My entire life now consists of living within the confines of this pathway. Not everyone will choose too, but when they do get a taste of it, they are just bowled over. The more we induce it, the more beneficial it will be to our health and to our longevity especially when our environment is altered.

    _intake/kruse-blog-corpus/articles/cold-thermogenesis-6-the-ancient-pathway.md

  9. 09 · pubmed0.766

    Neurophilosophy embraces the hypothesis that what we call "the mind" is in fact a level of brain activity. A corollary of this hypothesis states that we can learn much about the reality of mental function by studying the brain at all levels of organization. Until fairly recently, many philosophers preferred to believe that important domains of mental function could never be addressed using the tools of empirical science. Nevertheless, co-evolutionary progress by psychology and the neurosciences on many topics, including consciousness, free will and the nature of knowledge, have meant that such

    pubmed/PMID-18182125-neurophilosophy-the-early-years-and-new-directions/info.md

  10. 10 · pubmed0.764

    The so-called hard problem of consciousness is a chimera, a distraction from the hard question of consciousness, which is once some content reaches consciousness, 'then what happens?'. This question is seldom properly asked, for reasons good and bad, but when asked it opens up avenues of research that promise to dissolve the hard problem and secure a scientifically sound theory of how the human brain produces the (sometimes illusory) convictions that mislead us.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

    pubmed/PMID-30061456-facing-up-to-the-hard-question-of-consciousness/info.md

Curation checklist

  • ☐ Verify excerpt against source recording
  • ☐ Tag tier (axiom · law · principle · primary derivation · observation)
  • ☐ Cross-cite to ≥1 primary source (PubMed / arXiv / archive.org)
  • ☐ Promote to bucket-canon/07-mind/