bucket foundation — inverse omegabucket.foundation

consciousness

workers. And the critical theorists have to ask why didn't this happen? And their approach is to say because it's not always at least that the material conditions create consciousness.
Concept
consciousness
Score
7 · always · causes · because
Status
candidate — not yet promoted to canon

Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

  1. 01 · _intake0.784

    You see, so if you start - **7** [always/causes/because] · `01:15:43.280` [Harold Bloom Lectures on Shakespeare's major tragedies](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ii6phXev37A&t=4543) > Claudius goes which creates I think a special problem for Hamlet's Consciousness because he does not like Claudius and there is an outside possibility always which he's not - **7** [always/causes/because] · `00:18:54.799` [What they didn’t tell you about Critical Theory: Horkheimer ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jAAA11vEwiI&t=1134) > workers. And the critical theorists have to ask why didn't this happen? And

    _intake/claims-allbranch/BY-CONCEPT.md

  2. 02 · yt0.781

    We're all the same in some fundamental way. And then the person who attains power, who feels that he's not the same, who feels that he has the the right even to dominate the system, will find them as putty in his hands. that democracy prepares the way for fascism in many ways. So in some sense the the critical theorists arise in response to this question. Why did the promise of enlightenment ultimately prove insufficient? Why does it seem to undo itself? And you can't answer that question through strictly Marxist dialectical materialism or at least not very convincingly because if you have to

    yt/jAAA11vEwiI-what-they-didn-t-tell-you-about-critical-theory-horkheimer-a/transcript.txt

  3. 03 · gutenberg0.762

    The above remarks relate to the _matter_ of our critical inquiry. As regards the _form_, there are two indispensable conditions, which any one who undertakes so difficult a task as that of a critique of pure reason, is bound to fulfil. These conditions are _certitude_ and _clearness_.

    gutenberg/PG-4280-the-critique-of-pure-reason/PG-4280.txt

  4. 04 · pubmed0.747

    Contemporary science is based on the claim that all reality is material or physical. There is no reality but material reality. Consciousness is a by-product of the physical activity of the brain. Matter is unconscious. Evolution is purposeless. This view is now undergoing a credibility crunch. The biggest problem of all for materialism is the existence of consciousness. Panpsychism provides a way forward. So does the recognition that minds are not confined to brains.

    pubmed/PMID-23906099-setting-science-free-from-materialism/info.md

  5. 05 · pubmed0.744

    Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of representation, or an added property some states have; it is the very mutual acce

    pubmed/PMID-11164029-are-we-explaining-consciousness-yet/info.md

  6. 06 · gutenberg0.733

    Would the idea ever have occurred to us to doubt this absolute value of our knowledge if philosophy had not shown us what contradictions our speculation meets, what dead-locks it ends in? But these difficulties and contradictions all arise from trying to apply the usual forms of our thought to objects with which our industry has nothing to do, and for which, therefore, our molds are not made. Intellectual knowledge, in so far as it relates to a certain aspect of inert matter, ought, on the contrary, to give us a faithful imprint of it, having been stereotyped on this particular object. It beco

    gutenberg/PG-26163-creative-evolution/PG-26163.txt

  7. 07 · yt0.732

    And you might think the fact of the bridge will be a fact, and the answer to the question, which would be yes or no, will be a fact, and that's that. It's all self-evident. It's sort of like the behaviorists assuming that the stimulus was self-evident. It's very much analogous to that. Okay, but here's the problem. There's a a whole set of assumptions built into that question that people don't even notice. And so, let me walk through some of the assumptions. It's like well, I can't build a bridge if you want it to last 50 million years. So, I could build a bridge that would last a century or t

    yt/SPnyxnvU4ko-is-reality-an-illusion-dr-donald-hoffman-ep-387/transcript.txt

  8. 08 · yt0.730

    It's widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of how and why it so arises." Now this is the way the Chalmers formulated the hard problem. But of course, this is not a new problem, as David said. It's something we've been pondering for millennia. But in particular, I've emphasized this phrase, something it is like, in order to make a link back to another philosopher, Tom Nagel, who wrote in 1974, "An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism, something it's like for the organism."

    yt/CmuYrnOVmfk-the-source-of-consciousness-with-mark-solms/transcript.txt

  9. 09 · yt0.729

    Now I think in defense of pansychism it would not just be the table but everything being conscious but your argument basically means that that consciousness is kind of an epiphenomenon. It doesn't seem to have much causal power except but of course it has causal power in our kind of beings. It makes certain kinds of people to create conferences about consciousness or talk about it which is interesting because there is an infinite number of properties that we don't have that we don't talk about. So even if you argued that yeah actually zombie philosophers would be having consciousness studies i

    yt/IzbtOzXMLOo-joscha-bach-anders-sandberg-ai-consciousness-and-the-cyborg-/transcript.txt

  10. 10 · yt0.729

    And they were then, they were not standing out as starkly against what you call the zeitgeist, as they would have been, if they had insisted on normal physics. - Yeah, it kind of reminds me of that famous quote attributed to Steven Weinberg. I think it's actually accurate, where he said something along the lines of, "It's not that we take our mathematical theories..." How did he say it? He's basically saying, "We don't take our mathematical theories seriously enough." It's not that we take them too seriously, it's that we don't take them seriously enough, right? So if you apply that to quantum

    yt/Af5LICjFIBc-what-is-quantum-mechanics-really-telling-us-world-science-fe/transcript.txt

Curation checklist

  • ☐ Verify excerpt against source recording
  • ☐ Tag tier (axiom · law · principle · primary derivation · observation)
  • ☐ Cross-cite to ≥1 primary source (PubMed / arXiv / archive.org)
  • ☐ Promote to bucket-canon/07-mind/