Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · _intake0.962

   > doing that because the evidence Is that consciousness and free will which are the aspects of wanting and the aspect of knowing itself because for one to know itself it must be conscious. It must

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/consciousness/004-doing-that-because-the-evidence-is-that-consciousness-and-fr.md

2. 02 · blog0.794

   Although most psychologists would without hesitation accept the causal interaction of minds and bodies, a small but growing number of empirical researchers have insisted that the evidence supports some version of epiphenomenalism , the thesis that mental states, while caused by physical happenings, exert no efficacy in return. Wegner, a psychologist, contends that accumulated empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports epiphenomenalism, at least with respect to conscious willing (Wegner 2002, 2004). He draws on influential work by Libet (1985, 2001, 2004) and others to argue that conscious inte…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/mental-causation.md

3. 03 · yt0.789

   Well, you see, I think it's not I mean, that is an interesting question, because it doesn't seem to me necessary that consciousness is causal in some sense I can imagine somebody being paralyzed completely. I get this happens. People are completely paralyzed and nobody can tell whether that person is actually conscious or not. And later on, you find that person may wake up at some sense and you find they were conscious all the time. They knew what was going on. It's just they couldn’t influence anything in some sense this notion of being. We have a free will in the sense of affecting things is…

   yt/0nOtLj8UYCw-quantum-consciousness-debate-does-the-wave-function-actually/transcript.txt

4. 04 · _intake0.788

   - **9** [never/must/causes/because] · `00:58:14.799` [Iain McGilchrist ~ Active Inference Insights 023 ~ Hemispher](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKVZykutOD0&t=3494) > that needs to be held as distinct from an ontological premise that the brain causes Consciousness so it might be I never know this I can never prove it because of David Charmers and Nagle and - **8** [must/because/only] · `00:28:45.179` [Sam Harris 2018 - Our Perception As A Controlled Hallucinati](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GDKLt5MA5M4&t=1725) > consciousness here I think it's there are very few areas in science where th…

   _intake/claims-allbranch/BY-CONCEPT.md

5. 05 · yt0.787

   Then responds by changing its own. Result in changing the observer. And so both behaves this. The the the. The measurement becomes a symmetric operation where each, each observer and observer are actually interacting and exchanging information. Which of course in this theory this information is really only the outer aspect of the meaning. They, they want to communicate with each other. In other words, the inner state, the state that cannot be known. That state is the meaning. And that being is what is. Actually exchanged through symbols which are, that there are fields or states of fields in s…

   yt/w6cBQESNDV0-federico-faggin-merging-science-spirituality-quantum-physics/transcript.txt

6. 06 · yt0.784

   Think that, that I will in this case, since you, you, you come a right. It is in the context of knowing ourselves there are two things. One is honesty. In other words. For example, suppose I suffer. Okay, suppose. I suffer. If I try to hide into myself. That I suffer, or to, you know, to move it away from my from my, you know, my for my existence. I'm dishonest with myself. I'm not. Acknowledging. What's happening within myself. So so that honesty of acknowledging what's happening. Paying attention to everything that is happening within me. That is the first prerequisite. The second prerequisi…

   yt/w6cBQESNDV0-federico-faggin-merging-science-spirituality-quantum-physics/transcript.txt

7. 07 · blog0.777

   But, again, most epistemologists do not think we are typically able to tell, from the inside, whether we would know the proposition in question if we believed it. And yet that ability seems to be presupposed by the idea that this is an action-guiding norm. Another objection to the idea that knowledge is the norm of belief is more intuitive: knowledge seems to most of us like a different sort of accomplishment than belief, or even justified belief, or (after Gettier) even justified true belief. It is one thing to say that we acquire the concept of belief by looking at paradigm cases of knowledg…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-ethics-of-belief.md

8. 08 · blog0.774

   [ 10 ] Similar considerations apply to the mentioned issue concerning reason explanation and to other cases, such as remembering. Mele (2009b) argues that remembering something is never an intentional action, because no one has ever the intention to remember the particular content in question. But there is nevertheless a closely associated intentional mental action that one might perform: intentionally trying to bring it about that one remembers the particular content in question. See Shepherd (2015) for a defense of the view that decisions are intentional actions by construing them as extensi…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/agency.md

9. 09 · blog0.772

   As permissive as this sounds, however, James is by no means writing a blank doxastic check. In “The Will to Believe” he lays out a series of strict conditions under which an “option” counts as “genuine” and believing without sufficient evidence is permitted or required. For instance, the option must be between “live” hypotheses—i.e. hypotheses that are “among the mind's possibilities” (thus, belief in the ancient Greek gods is not a live option for us these days). There must also be no compelling evidence one way or the other, the option must be “forced” such that doing nothing also amounts to…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-ethics-of-belief.md

10. 10 · pubmed0.772

    Depth psychology finds empirical validation today in a variety of observations that suggest the presence of causally effective mental processes outside conscious experience. I submit that this is due to misinterpretation of the observations: the subset of consciousness called "meta-consciousness" in the literature is often mistaken for consciousness proper, thereby artificially creating space for an "unconscious." The implied hypothesis is that all mental processes may in fact be conscious, the appearance of unconsciousness arising from our dependence on self-reflective introspection for gaugi…

    pubmed/PMID-28904602-there-is-an-unconscious-but-it-may-well-be-conscious/info.md