Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · _intake0.890

   > that needs to be held as distinct from an ontological premise that the brain causes Consciousness so it might be I never know this I can never prove it because of David Charmers and Nagle and

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/consciousness/001-that-needs-to-be-held-as-distinct-from-an-ontological-premis.md

2. 02 · _intake0.875

   What if - **7** [never/must/causes] · `00:58:12.440` [Iain McGilchrist ~ Active Inference Insights 023 ~ Hemispher](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKVZykutOD0&t=3492) > that the brain creates Consciousness that needs to be held as distinct from an ontological premise that the brain causes Consciousness so it might be I never know this I can never prove it - **7** [never/causes/because] · `00:58:16.680` [Iain McGilchrist ~ Active Inference Insights 023 ~ Hemispher](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKVZykutOD0&t=3496) > an ontological premise that the brain causes Consciousness so it might be I …

   _intake/claims-allbranch/BY-CONCEPT.md

3. 03 · _intake0.859

   - [`001-that-needs-to-be-held-as-distinct-from-an-ontological-premis`](consciousness/001-that-needs-to-be-held-as-distinct-from-an-ontological-premis.md) — score=9 `00:58:14.799` — that needs to be held as distinct from an ontological premise that the brain causes Consciousness so it might be I never - [`002-consciousness-here-i-think-it-s-there-are-very-few-areas-in-`](consciousness/002-consciousness-here-i-think-it-s-there-are-very-few-areas-in-.md) — score=8 `00:28:45.179` — consciousness here I think it's there are very few areas in science where the accepted explanation is totally a brute…

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated/INDEX.md

4. 04 · _intake0.859

   - [`001-that-needs-to-be-held-as-distinct-from-an-ontological-premis`](consciousness/001-that-needs-to-be-held-as-distinct-from-an-ontological-premis.md) — score=9 `00:58:14.799` — that needs to be held as distinct from an ontological premise that the brain causes Consciousness so it might be I never - [`002-consciousness-here-i-think-it-s-there-are-very-few-areas-in-`](consciousness/002-consciousness-here-i-think-it-s-there-are-very-few-areas-in-.md) — score=8 `00:28:45.179` — consciousness here I think it's there are very few areas in science where the accepted explanation is totally a brute…

   _intake/claims-allbranch/curated-low/INDEX.md

5. 05 · _intake0.841

   - **9** [never/must/causes/because] · `00:58:14.799` [Iain McGilchrist ~ Active Inference Insights 023 ~ Hemispher](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKVZykutOD0&t=3494) > that needs to be held as distinct from an ontological premise that the brain causes Consciousness so it might be I never know this I can never prove it because of David Charmers and Nagle and - **8** [must/because/only] · `00:28:45.179` [Sam Harris 2018 - Our Perception As A Controlled Hallucinati](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GDKLt5MA5M4&t=1725) > consciousness here I think it's there are very few areas in science where th…

   _intake/claims-allbranch/BY-CONCEPT.md

6. 06 · yt0.812

   If you're going to theory of consciousness which just is comp- computation, it's a bit hard to see how it's going to explain how you can prove um Fermat's Last Theorem if it requires all these levels of depth of of logic. It's It's so I'm I'm trying to kind of parse the steps in the in the argument. You know, given Gödel's theorem to be absolute that establishes mathematics cannot be a a a complete system in itself, and that mathematicians have to understand that with through their consciousness. Not sure what the step then is to go to where a brain operating under a computational functionalis…

   yt/vC4HNcqTQXk-roger-penrose-on-mind-consciousness-closer-to-truth-chats/transcript.txt

7. 07 · gutenberg0.804

   Evolutionary Psychology demands a Mind-dust. Some alleged proofs that it exists. Refutation of these proofs. Self-compounding of mental facts is inadmissible. Can states of mind be unconscious? Refutation of alleged proofs of unconscious thought. Difficulty of stating the connection between mind and brain. 'The Soul' is logically the least objectionable hypothesis. Conclusion.

   gutenberg/PG-57628-the-principles-of-psychology-volume-1-of-2/PG-57628.txt

8. 08 · yt0.802

   [music] >> Roger, let's talk about and do a retrospective on the mind in general, consciousness in particular, in which you have staked out extraordinarily fascinating positions, uh uh very contrarian views where you challenge the conventional wisdom of computational functionalism as a uh as applied to the mind. So, you argue that the mind is not computational, and even more provocatively that the known laws of physics cannot explain consciousness. So, why non-computational and why the known laws of physics cannot explain consciousness? Well, with the why non-computational, my question i…

   yt/vC4HNcqTQXk-roger-penrose-on-mind-consciousness-closer-to-truth-chats/transcript.txt

9. 09 · yt0.800

   When I take that basic cognitive framework, which is this very dynamic, bottom-up, top-down way in which outside and grounding propositionality, which intelligibility is co-created with the world, I come to the conclusion that either that bottom-up, top-down dynamism is has nothing to do with ontological structure, in case in which in which case if there is no way in which that fundamental grammar of intelligibility creation touches the structure of ontology, then we're doomed to skepticism and solipsism. And so I propose that it's more likely, as the Neoplatonic tradition held, that reality i…

   yt/QvLSkzes_II-convergence-to-neoplatonism-w-wolfgang-smith/transcript.txt

10. 10 · blog0.799

    But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in it self. (PHK 22–23) The argument seems intended to establish that we cannot actually conceive of mind-independent objects, that is, objects existing unperceived and unthought of. Why not? Simply because in order to conceive of any such things, we must ourselves be conceiving, i.e., thinking, of them. However, as Pitcher (1977, 113) nicely observes, such an argument seems to conflate the representatio…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/george-berkeley.md