Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · blog0.763

   Since the critical principle expressed in premise 1 is open to counter-example, no matter what property we substitute for p, Isenberg concludes that we cannot plausibly interpret the critic as arguing for her verdict. Rather than defend the principle expressed in premise 1, Davies and Bender both posit alternative principles, consistent with the fact that no property is good-making in all artworks, which they ascribe to the critic. Davies proposes that we interpret the critic as arguing deductively from principles relativized to artistic type, that is, from principles holding that artworks of …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/the-concept-of-the-aesthetic.md

2. 02 · blog0.748

   Again, this study shows that people have mostly sonicist intuitions—they believe that the identity of musical works mostly depends on their acoustic properties, and this is considered to be a much more important criterion in judgments of identity compared to the overall purpose of the work as intended by the composer. Elzė Mikalonytė and Clément Canonne (forthcoming) found that judgments of the identity of artworks—both musical works and paintings—are partially normative. Their results provide some support for the Phineas Gage effect—according to which, changes in valued qualities, and especia…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/experimental-philosophy-of-art-and-aesthetics.md

3. 03 · blog0.748

   If we read Brentano’s remark charitably, he appeals to introspective knowledge that a presentation can purport to be directed on an object in terms of marks. The judgement that is based on this presentation and rejects the object the presentation purports to be directed on as well as the judgement that acknowledges it, share the content of the presentation (the marks in terms of which the presentation is directed on something). Hence, negative and positive judgements can have the same content. This gives Brentano a reason to endorse claim (5) . His argument once more rules out a propositional …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/brentano-s-theory-of-judgement.md

4. 04 · blog0.747

   106; Croce does not, it seems, consider the possibility that certain states of the perceiver might be privileged, but it is evident that he would discount this possibility). Now the Crocean formulation—to intuit is to express—perhaps begins to make sense. For ‘intuition’ is in some sense a mental act , along with its near-cognates ‘representation’, ‘imagination’, ‘invention’,‘vision’, and ‘contemplation.’ Being a mental act, something we do, it is not a mere external object. 4.2 The Role of Feeling Feeling, for Croce, is necessarily part of any (mental) activity, including bare perception—inde…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/croce-s-aesthetics.md

5. 05 · blog0.745

   If this is right, the objection also fails to show that the concept of resemblance is unsuited to explaining generic depiction (cf. Blumson 2014). Goodman places more weight on a third objection to resemblance theories of depiction. A theory of this kind, he maintains, would need to specify the visible aspect or aspects of its object that a picture imitates or copies. But every object can be seen in many ways, depending on the experience, interests, and attitudes of the viewer: “the object before me is a man, a swarm of atoms, a complex of cells, a fiddler, a friend, a fool and much more” (196…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/depiction.md

6. 06 · gutenberg0.745

   Some years ago, in conversation with an artist whose works, perhaps, alone, in the present day, unite perfection of drawing with resplendence of color, the writer made some inquiry respecting the general means by which this latter quality was most easily to be attained. The reply was as concise as it was comprehensive--"Know what you have to do, and do it"--comprehensive, not only as regarded the branch of art to which it temporarily applied, but as expressing the great principle of success in every direction of human effort; for I believe that failure is less frequently attributable to either…

   gutenberg/PG-35898-the-seven-lamps-of-architecture/PG-35898.txt

7. 07 · blog0.743

   A poem, for instance, is not just a representational symbol; typically, what a poetic work exemplifies is as important to its meaning and artistic value as what the work represents. Accordingly, the goal of the translator must be “maximal preservation of what the original exemplifies as well as of what it says” (1976, 60). As for expression, expanding the scope of the properties that can be metaphorically exemplified, beyond the strictly emotional ones, adds explanatory power to the theory, making it possible to say, e.g., that a sculpture expresses fluidity (cf. Robinson 2000, 216). As is the…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/goodman-s-aesthetics.md

8. 08 · blog0.743

   The existentialist philosophers did not refrain from formulating internal (aesthetic) and external (ethical and political) constraints to artistic practice, but their aesthetics fundamentally proclaims the radical freedom of the artist, also seeing in it the privileged exemplar of human freedom in general. Camus, for example, makes artistic activity, the choice of becoming an artist, one of the privileged modes for humans to deal with the absurd (Camus 1942b, 86–88). Many existentialist texts dedicated to aesthetic matters emphasise the “mystery” of creativity, the amazing “solution” that an a…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/existentialist-aesthetics.md

9. 09 · blog0.743

   Byrne does hew to the representationalist’s line of supervenience (no qualitative difference without an intentional difference), but if his argument does not rule out mental paint, an anti-representationalist may construct inversion cases such as that of Block’s (1990) “Inverted Earth” (see Section 4.4 below), and argue that the paint is a nonfunctional intrinsic mental feature of the experience given in introspection, which is close enough to a “quale” in Block’s special sense, even if the feature does happen to be reflexively represented by the experience itself. An anti-representationalist …

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/representational-theories-of-consciousness.md

10. 10 · blog0.743

    There is no definitive upper limit to the sophistication of the deceiving speaker’s calculations. In addition, the speaker may simply be stonewalling, reiterating an assertion without any hope of convincing the addressee of anything. A more neutral way of trying to capture the relation between assertion and believing was suggested both by Max Black (1952) and by Davidson (1984: 268): in asserting that p the speaker represents herself as believing that p . This suggestion appears to avoid the difficulties with the appeal to hearer-directed intentions. A somewhat related approach is taken by Mit…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/assertion.md