Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

1. 01 · gutenberg0.783

   On the subject of Induction, the task to be performed was that of generalizing the modes of investigating truth and estimating evidence, by which so many important and recondite laws of nature have, in the various sciences, been aggregated to the stock of human knowledge. That this is not a task free from difficulty may be presumed from the fact that even at a very recent period, eminent writers (among whom it is sufficient to name Archbishop Whately, and the author of a celebrated article on Bacon in the _Edinburgh Review_) have not scrupled to pronounce it impossible.(1) The author has endea…

   gutenberg/PG-27942-a-system-of-logic-ratiocinative-and-inductive/PG-27942.txt

2. 02 · yt0.781

   And when we say sublating, I mean that's one of Hegel's favorite terms. This is a translation from Offheeong, which is not a very it's not a very direct translation. We don't really have a word for it in English, but sublating means cancelelling the previous concept. In fact, cancelelling the whole dialectic while at the same time preserving that dialectic by lifting it to a higher level of analysis. So intellect's true concern is the negation of reification. To reify is to make real. Reification in this context refers to the rigidification of conceptual frameworks. Right? So the the power of …

   yt/jAAA11vEwiI-what-they-didn-t-tell-you-about-critical-theory-horkheimer-a/transcript.txt

3. 03 · blog0.778

   In drawing them out, he remains detached, uncovering difficulties internal to his interlocutor’s position without committing himself to a position of his own. The side usually taken by the Academics in epistemological debates was that of the skeptic, in the sense of one who challenges the possibility of knowledge. There are numerous testimonies to the effect that the Academics regarded argument on both sides of the question as a method of inquiry, and argued as they did the better to discover the truth, i.e., to further skeptical ends in the original acceptance of the term (cf. Cicero, Acad. 2…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/carneades.md

4. 04 · blog0.777

   And since it then follows, on Stoic assumptions, that nothing can be known, this was often taken to be equivalent to the claim that nothing can be known. The second skeptical proposition, that one ought to suspend judgment, the Academics deduced from the first together with the Stoic doctrine that the wise do not hold (mere) opinions (S.E. M 7.155–7 = L&S 41C). On Stoic assumptions, assent to an impression that is not cognitive (either in the strict sense or in a broader sense which covers impressions that, though not perceptual, nonetheless afford an equally secure grasp of their contents), i…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/carneades.md

5. 05 · gutenberg0.777

   The above remarks relate to the _matter_ of our critical inquiry. As regards the _form_, there are two indispensable conditions, which any one who undertakes so difficult a task as that of a critique of pure reason, is bound to fulfil. These conditions are _certitude_ and _clearness_.

   gutenberg/PG-4280-the-critique-of-pure-reason/PG-4280.txt

6. 06 · blog0.777

   The first is that it does not look to be supported by the evidence to which it appeals. Sextus, the source for the notion of ‘the reasonable’ as the criterion, says that Arcesilaus and his followers did not define a criterion and that, when they seemed to, they did so “a counterblast to that of the Stoics” ([ M ], 7.150, Bury trans.). (Sextus’ later account of Arcesilaus in another work is also incompatible with his hypothesizing such a theory; see Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.232–3.) And Cicero and Numenius, our other sources for the view that Arcesilas was committed to inapprehensibility and uni…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/arcesilaus.md

7. 07 · blog0.777

   According to Sundholm, Bolzano takes “A exists” to express the propositions that the idea [A] has an object; “A does not exist” expresses the negation of this property. The appearance that Brentano recycles this view is dispelled when we notice that “+” does not express a presentation, but only determines in which mode a content is to be thought. Let us now turn to Kant. Brentano disagrees with Kant’s epistemology on almost every single point. With respect to the nature of judgement, Brentano points out that Kant overlooks their essential character by putting them together with presentations i…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/brentano-s-theory-of-judgement.md

8. 08 · blog0.776

   The first difficulty may not be as serious as it seems, given that the Buddha’s discourses were probably rehearsed shortly after his death and preserved through oral transmission until the time they were committed to writing. And the second need not be insuperable either. (See, e.g., Cousins 2022.) But the third is troubling, in that it suggests textual transmission involved processes of insertion and deletion in aid of one side or another in sectarian disputes. Our ancient sources attest to this: one will encounter a dispute among Buddhist thinkers where one side cites some utterance of the B…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/buddha.md

9. 09 · blog0.776

   Much of the resulting work aims to clarify and defend Anscombe’s view (Moran 2004; Thompson 2008, 2011; Haddock 2011; Rödl 2011; Small 2012; Wolfson 2012; Marcus 2012; Stathopoulos 2016; Campbell 2018; Marcus 2018; Frey 2019; Valaris 2021); but several critics question her arguments, as well as application of the notion to the definition of intentional action (e.g., Houlgate 1966; Grice 1971; Paul 2009b; 2011b). In response, a number of scholars who still find inspiration in Anscombe have sought to accommodate the criticisms by giving up on some of her most ambitious claims. This section conce…

   blog/plato-stanford-edu/action.md

10. 10 · blog0.775

    In the Phenomenology of Spirit , which presents Hegel’s epistemology or philosophy of knowledge, the “opposing sides” are different definitions of consciousness and of the object that consciousness is aware of or claims to know. As in Plato’s dialogues, a contradictory process between “opposing sides” in Hegel’s dialectics leads to a linear evolution or development from less sophisticated definitions or views to more sophisticated ones later. The dialectical process thus constitutes Hegel’s method for arguing against the earlier, less sophisticated definitions or views and for the more sophist…

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/hegel-s-dialectics.md