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anthropic

particular values of the constants that we observe? Because this is the only kind of universe in which we could exist. This is known as the anthropic principle, and some people
Concept
anthropic
Score
6 · because · only
Status
candidate — not yet promoted to canon

Corpus evidence — top 10 passages

Most-relevant passages from the entire indexed corpus (67,286 paragraph chunks across YouTube transcripts, PubMed, arXiv, archive.org, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, OpenAlex, and more) ranked by semantic similarity (bge-small-en-v1.5).

  1. 01 · yt0.800

    And so, yes, people have wondered about the possibility that maybe, just maybe, what happens is the following. In most of these other universes, the fundamental constants of nature in those realms are such that the kinds of structures necessary for living systems, uh stable planet, stable stars, certain biomolecules, at least life as we know it. They give rise to amino acids that give rise to the nucleotides of DNA and so forth. Maybe in the vast majority of those other universes, those structures can't form because the constants of nature are different, and with those particular values, you d

    yt/nH8c60ZbSgw-live-q-a-with-brian-greene-world-science-festival/transcript.txt

  2. 02 · yt0.769

    The All that there is outside in space and time is a mechanism. It's a terribly tragic way of looking at life. And of course, I fully believe that it is false. But I'm The point that I'm that I'm making is that the world of science has been duped by this bifurcationist Cartesian philosophy. So, they think of the world as greatly reduced. And uh what I marveled when I began thinking about the so-called measurement problem is this, that as soon as you step out of this Cartesian way of looking at the world, the solution of the measuring problem is very, very simple, childishly simple, because the

    yt/8NWHGX53agc-dr-wolfgang-smith-renowned-physicist-on-vertical-causation-i/transcript.txt

  3. 03 · blog0.769

    Certainly, if there is such a thing as the particular humanity of Socrates, he cannot lose it without ceasing to exist. Perhaps we can deny that Socrates’s particular humanity is anything distinct from Socrates himself : after all, its existence necessarily coincides with his. Properties are commonly said to depend for their existence upon the entities that possess them. One might propose to state this in the form of a principle, with the help of (EDR) , as follows: (PROP-DEP) If x is a property and y is an entity possessing x , then x depends R for its existence upon y . Now, substituting the

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/ontological-dependence.md

  4. 04 · archive0.760

    give rise to space-time, then different mathematical structures could correspond to different universes with different properties and laws. The ontological nature of this level lies in the assertion that these structures exist as a fundamental reality, regardless of whether we can derive or fully understand them through our epistemological frameworks.

    archive/ThesisTOEdll/00- Quantum Cosmology : An Epistemological and Ontological Perspective on Quantum Cosmology and Levels of the Multiverse (rev0)_djvu.txt

  5. 05 · blog0.759

    We can thus press the point even more by noting that we make claims and construct arguments that appear to involve quantification over properties, with quantifiers reaching (i) over predicate positions, or even (ii) over both subject and predicate positions (Castañeda 1976). [ 2 ] As regards (i) consider: this apple is red; this tomato is red; hence, there is something that this apples is and this tomato also is. As for (ii), consider: wisdom is more important than beauty; Mary is wise and Elisabeth is beautiful; hence, there is something that Mary is which is more important than Mary is. Espe

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/properties.md

  6. 06 · blog0.759

    I am necessarily human, in the sense that it is impossible that I am a nonhuman. (It may be possible that it is not the case that I am human, insofar as it is possible that I never existed at all, in which case I would not have been, in that possibility, among the class of humans. But that is a different matter.) All contingent properties are accidents and all essences are necessary but, according to the Aristotelian, some necessary properties are accidents. A thing’s essential properties are inseparable from the bearer, not only in the sense that the property is necessarily had by that object

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/existence.md

  7. 07 · yt0.755

    So, the first thing that the ontologist must teach the scientist is the distinction between, if you will, the really real world, which consists of irreducible wholes, and organisms are part of that, and then the empirical world, for lack of a better name, which is the world which is how the scientist the physicist the physical scientist conceives of things. And that's something entirely different. You cannot confuse these two. But the beauty is that in a certain sense that only the metaphysician can understand, you can really say that the difference between the world of the metaphysician, whic

    yt/V_ZWBkSNMFg-platonic-physics-in-dialogue-with-wolfgang-smith/transcript.txt

  8. 08 · blog0.753

    If an epidemiologist, for example, found that certain factors had been constant for quite some time before the outbreak of an infectious disease and remained unchanged at the time of the outbreak, he would tend to discount them as being responsible for the epidemic. And if he found that some new powerful factors immediately preceded the outbreak, he most likely would pin the causality on them rather than on what had remained constant all along. The logic in these arguments against permanence can be generalized to various would-be entities, including notably the non-Buddhist idea of the permane

    blog/plato-stanford-edu/dharmak-rti.md

  9. 09 · yt0.752

    But what we're now talking about is what does it mean to say that the universe was alive and conscious from its outset? Because this is something that you talk about that consciousness is a quantum property of a field and not the property of the states of the field. Can you explain kind of how this works into our understanding of the difference between meaning and sort of a larger oneness of meaning? >> First of all, there is one, right? One is the totality of what exists and one uh described by quantum physics as two fundamental properties is dynamic meaning is never the same, keeps on

    yt/h8K3Ib1Nznw-science-spirituality-finally-merge-to-explain-a-new-theory-o/transcript.txt

  10. 10 · yt0.752

    I'm not denying what appears to perception and measurement as matter as atoms. These things are empirically verified. We can measure this stuff. There is something out there that goes by the name of atom and metal and aluminium and so forth. None of that is denied. I'm not denying that there is an external world beyond my mind. What I'm saying is that these external world beyond my mind just like my mind is also made of mental states. And just as my mental states appear to you as matter, my brain, the atoms of my body, you know, the very measurable, very physical stuff. So the mental states th

    yt/DrMEL20o5KE-why-materialism-is-complete-nonsense-bernardo-kastrup/transcript.txt

Curation checklist

  • ☐ Verify excerpt against source recording
  • ☐ Tag tier (axiom · law · principle · primary derivation · observation)
  • ☐ Cross-cite to ≥1 primary source (PubMed / arXiv / archive.org)
  • ☐ Promote to bucket-canon/06-cosmology/